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Abstract 
Theoretical work on civil military relations has traditionally emphasised the 
separation of the military from the civilian spheres as the best means of insulating 
against military intervention. Rebecca Schiff's concordance model challenges this 
basic assumption by arguing that intervention can be prevented by the presence of 
agreement amongst the military, the political leadership and the citizenry, on four 
specific indicators; the social composition of the officer corps, the political 
decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. Schiff's theory 
has been used to explore the post 1945 relationship that has existed between 
Indonesian army, citizenry and political leadership. The thesis argues, in line with 
Schiff's theory that the Indonesian army's participation in society and politics has 
been determined by its unique history and culture. Schiff's theory has been further 
applied to Indonesia to trace the gradual development of a concordance. The 
evidence from the Indonesian case indicates that Schiff's argument is undermined 
by its static nature due to the inability of her model to account for change within 
each of the partners. Schiff's theory overlooks the need for the partners to be 
coherent in order for agreement to form. In the case of this study Schiff's theory 
has been adapted to take into account change within the actors, introducing a 
dynamic element to the model. It is contended that the concordance which did 
eventually emerge was significantly different in nature to that defined by Schiff, 
namely and enforced concordance. This enforced concord endured until 1998, 
when a fundamental change within the nature of the partners led to Suharto's 
downfall. It is argued further that the case of Indonesia demonstrates the need for 
her "concordant relationship" to be considered along a continuum, one stretching 
from agreement to enforced concordance backed by coercive means. 
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Introduction 
The study of civil military relations is of fundamental importance to the field of 
political science. It focuses on the role of the armed forces in society and the 
relationship between the military and political system. The military holds a unique 
place within society as the institution that is charged with the defence of the state; it is 
highly trained in the management of violence. The exclusivity of this role, gives the 
military a privileged status, one that can however be used to intervene against a 
government. In the case of new democracies, the position of the military in society is 
of the utmost importance. The army has the ability to generate powerful forces of 
instability inside new democracies, particularly when institutions and methods of 
control are in their infancy. It has been a common theme in the literature on civil 
military relations, that the best form of military control has been the subjugation of 
the military to civilian control. However, in the context of many developing nations 
there may be no history of this, the military may have played a significant role in the 
establishment of the state, as well as in its social and political life. Thus, it can prove 
difficult to bring once influential militaries under the control of civilians. This 
particular area of focus is relevant to many new democracies, developing nations and 
those countries with a colonial history, with a history of influential armed forces. 
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Literature Review 
The literature that is widely considered to be the backbone of the field of civil military 
relations grew from the writings of men such as Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz in the late 1950’s and 1960’s. The writings of these two men have largely 
directed and guided scholars and students since this time and remain extremely 
important. An outline of Huntington’s seminal work, The Soldier and The State, 
serves as a useful milestone in this discussion. However, it is important first to briefly 
discuss the environment from which this debate grew and evolved. 
The history of civil military relations dates back at least as far as Sun Tzu (544 BC-
496 BC) however, much of the debate and scholarly work was undertaken in the pre 
World War Two era on anti-militarism.
1
 In the wake of World War One when there 
was particular concern amongst the allies regarding what was perceived to be a 
militaristic Germany. Indeed, there were many writers and academics in Germany, 
who at the time of World War One, and immediately afterward, supported militarism. 
It is noteworthy that wider German society was seen as reflecting this militaristic 
viewpoint.
2
 The reasons for these militaristic tendencies were due in large measure to 
what the population regarded as Prussian military virtues.
3
 These militaristic 
tendencies carried on from World War One and extended on through the period of 
Nazi rule. 
In 1937, a book published by Alfred Vagts contributed significantly to what became 
the field of civil military relations. In his book Vagts argues that militarism is best 
                                                 
1
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2
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described as a “...‘tendency to extend dominion’...”4 Vagts goes on to argue that 
modern militarism is fundamentally different from militarism of the past. He argues 
that the modern army is different to its predecessors, because he claims the modern 
military has become “...narcissistic...” Vagts also claims that the modern military exist 
for themselves.
5
 Most importantly and most relevant to the theme of this chapter is the 
discrimination Vagts makes between an army that is maintained in a military way, and 
one which is maintained in a militaristic way. The military way could in some way be 
seen as a similar, far less refined notion of Samuel Huntington’s professionalism 
thesis. Vagts states that an army which is maintained in the ‘military way’, is one that 
is most concerned with securing objectives with the minimum of cost and with the 
highest level of efficiency. It is an army which “...is limited in scope and confined to 
one function and scientific in its essential qualities.”6 By contrast, an army which 
operates in a militaristic manner may behave, and exhibit “...customs, interests, 
prestige and actions...” which could be associated with an army. Much of this 
behaviour however transcends “...true military purposes.”7 Vagts states that a 
militarist army can have an influence which he describes as being “...unlimited...”, 
and one which can this come to “...permeate all society and become dominant over all 
industry and arts.”8 
Vagts concern with the ability of the military to dominate society was followed by 
Harold Laswell’s contribution, in a similarly anti-militaristic vain. Laswell, like 
Vagts, notes the possibility that there may be a new type of military organisation 
emerging. Laswell argues that there was nothing fundamentally new about the idea of 
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a military state; however, there was something unique about the way in which he 
viewed it.
9
 Laswell claimed that military men who specialised in the application of 
violence would have a high degree of understanding of many skills that have been 
included as aspects of modern civilian management.
10
 This would occur he argued 
due to the more technically demanding environment that these individuals now 
operate within. He points to these individuals having knowledge in the areas of 
"...administrative organization, in personal management, in public relations."
11
 
The crucial point of understanding to be taken from Vagts and Laswell are their 
arguments about the potential for soldiers to enter into politics, and in fact become 
specialised not only in what had been their traditional domain of warfare, but in a new 
skill set. Such a skill set, in their eyes, could lead to the establishment of these 
individuals in positions of authority. Thus arrives one of the fundamental discourses 
in civil military relations, namely how does one understand and explain the behaviour 
of those soldiers who involve themselves in coups and, likewise, how does a state 
ensure its own security territorially while also ensuring that it does not become the 
victim of military intervention. 
Military Professionalism- Samuel Huntington 
Despite the relevance of contributions such as Vagts and Laswell, Samuel 
Huntington’s work the Soldier and the State is one of the most important 
contributions to the field in explaining military intervention in politics. Peter Feaver 
states it became the “...capstone...” to the work before it, and has since remained 
hugely significant, because he argues that much of what has been written since The 
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Soldier and The State has been an “...implicit or explicit response to his argument."12 
It is for this reason that so much of the literature in the discipline has focused on the 
institutional separation of the military from government, as being the best way to 
inhibit military intervention. Key to the point about the separation of institutions is 
Huntington’s notion of the Professional Soldier. Without the Professional Soldier it is 
unlikely, according to Huntington that an army would remain politically neutral and it 
should be expected that it would, at some point, engage in a coup or some other act to 
undermine the government’s authority. What was it according to Huntington that 
made a soldier professional? According to Huntingdon there were three criteria that 
distinguished the soldier professional from other vocations: expertise, responsibility 
and corporateness. 
Expertise 
Huntington asserts that the professional soldier is an individual who has 
“...specialized knowledge and skill...”, and that this knowledge and skill can only be 
acquired through “...prolonged education and experience.”13 Professional knowledge 
is also seen by Huntington as being intellectual in nature. This, according to 
Huntington, makes professional knowledge subject to preservation in writing. The 
preservation of this knowledge in writing ensures that the profession has a history; 
Huntington states that knowledge of the profession’s history is important for the 
competence of the professional.
14
 Professional education, argues Huntington, consists 
of two distinct aspects: the first is a “...broad, liberal, cultural background...” this is 
usually handled by "...general educational institutions."
15
 The second form of 
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education comes in the form of a technical phase, which is undertaken in institutions 
run by or affiliated with the profession itself.
16
 
                                                 
16
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Responsibility 
The professional, attests Huntington, is an expert whose work is essential to the 
ongoing functioning of society: “The client of every profession is society, individually 
or collectively.”17 Flowing from this is the “...responsibility to perform the service 
when required by society.” Huntington argues that this responsibility to society 
separates the professional, “...from other experts with only intellectual skills.”18 
Huntington is also keen to point out that the professional is not only partly motivated 
by financial gain, but is also motivated by the “...responsibility to serve and devotion 
to his skill...”19 Finally Huntington acknowledges that a profession is regulated by a 
set of values and ideals “...which guide its members in their dealings with laymen.”20 
Corporateness 
Those who belong to a profession, argues Huntington, “...share a sense of organic 
unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.”21 The sense of 
union amongst those whom comprise a profession stems from discipline and training, 
as well as the sense of responsibility.
22
 This sense of cohesion results in the creation 
of a professional organisation “...which formalizes and applies the standards of 
professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional 
responsibility.” It is this membership to the professional body, the retention of expert 
knowledge and acceptance of special social responsibility that defines that individual 
as a professional and distinguishes him from the layman.
23
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The military officer, asserts Huntington, meets the criteria of a professional 
vocation.
24
 He argues, however, that there is an aspect of their vocation that separates 
them from the civilian world. The skill that Huntington claims separates these 
individuals from the civilian professional is what Laswell termed “the management of 
violence.”25 The task of the military professional is to undertake successful combat 
operations. In order to be capable of undertaking these operations successfully, the 
officer must be capable of executing certain duties, for example the training and 
equipping of a military force.
26
 Within the military there exist other specialty roles. 
These other experts may have the rank of officers, however they are seen as 
fundamentally different by Huntington because their area of expertise exists in some 
area other than in the immediate application of violence. These individuals are 
necessary to the success of combat operations, however Huntington makes the key 
point that such individuals do not have a sufficiently wide scope of expertise to 
successfully prosecute combat operations. Huntington considers that for the officer to 
have the ability to be capable of managing violence requires the individual to devote a 
significant portion of their life to academic education.
27
 
The military officer, Huntington argues, is not primarily motivated by financial gain. 
He points out that in western countries it is a vocation which does not receive 
significant monetary reward. The motivation of the officer to engage in their chosen 
vocation is brought about by “...a technical love for his craft and the sense of social 
obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.”28 This mix, which 
Huntington speaks of, informs what he terms as the officer’s professional motivation. 
This is perhaps where the professional soldier differs from other vocations which are 
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considered professional. The military officer is not motivated only by economic 
incentives or an increase in personal prestige. They are instead motivated by a 
complex mix of factors which contribute to ensuring that they remain apolitical. The 
professional military officer has a series of “...regulations, customs, and traditions.” 
which tightly prescribe “...an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes 
approved by society through its political agent, the state.”29 This statement 
encapsulates much of what Huntington believes about civil-military relations, namely 
that the military and the officers as the leadership of that institution should remain 
apolitical if they are professional. The military officer is responsible to the state, and 
responsible for ensuring the security of the state. Huntington however states very 
clearly that this is, in many ways, like other professional-client relationships, where 
the professional holds the position as expert advisor. The officer is able to advise on 
the action that should be taken, and become involved in the action taken as a result of 
his advice. 
Huntington’s definition of military professionalism also includes what he defines as 
its “...corporate character...”30 He points out that membership to a profession is 
limited, and that this is no different in the case of the military officer. Within a 
professional body the numbers admitted are controlled, and in the case of the officer, 
he is admitted through his commission. Once admitted to the corps, the officer joins a 
world which is largely removed from the rest of society; it maintains its own system 
of hierarchy which is based upon rank. Rank within the organisation is dependent 
upon the competency of the individual and is decided by the corps itself, based upon 
guidelines established by the state.
31
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At this point in his argument, Huntington also makes a distinction between the 
reservist officer and the full time officer, as well as between the officer and the 
enlisted soldier. The reservist officer does not have the level of skill that the full-time 
professional officer has, and therefore is more likely to inhibit lower ranks within the 
organisation.
32
 
The individuals who comprise the enlisted ranks are viewed as not being as fully 
professional as the officer in relation to their level of skill and responsibility. 
Huntington states that the enlisted soldier is an expert in the “...application of violence 
not the management of violence.” He also points out that the enlisted soldier can 
progress and in fact does in some cases. However, this is not common because the 
level of skill and education required by officership is generally above that of the 
enlisted soldier. 
The Military Mind and the Professional Military Ethic 
Huntington asserts that as a professional, the military officer develops a particular and 
specific manner of thinking; this specific mode of thinking develops as a result of his 
performance of military functions. This way of thinking is what Huntington refers to 
as the military mind. It comprises the “...values, attitudes, and perspectives which 
inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are 
deducible from the nature of that function.”33  The “...professional military 
function...” that Huntington refers to is the performance of the functional imperative; 
this can be best described as the ongoing maintenance of state security by the armed 
forces.
34
 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. p.17 
33
 Ibid. p. 61 
34
 Ibid. p.61 
11 
 
The values and attitudes that make up the military mind are part of what Huntington 
has termed the military ethic. The military ethic in this context is different to that of a 
professional ethical code, (i.e. the rules which govern the behaviour of the 
professional individual in their dealings with the nonprofessional or client.)
35
 
Huntington’s military ethic is comprised of “...A value or attitude...” which has been 
“...implied by or derived from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and organization 
of the military profession.” Furthermore it can “...include any preferences and 
expectations which may be inferred from the continuing performance of the military 
occupational role.”36 The military ethic is based on the assumptions which the officer 
has about the world around him, and furthermore in the nature of warfare itself. 
Huntington claims that the officer will adhere to the ethic so far as they are 
professional, and also that the professional officer will only adhere to this ethic so far 
as it is shaped by functional and not other societal imperatives.
37
 The professional 
military ethic is furthermore non-dated and non-localized, Huntington states, “So long 
as there is no basic alteration in the inherent nature of the military function there will 
be no change in the content of the professional military ethic.”38 Thus, Huntington 
further argues that it is this ethic that becomes the standard by which to judge the 
professionalism of any officer corps at any particular time.
39
 
Having explained the significance of the Military Mind and the Military Ethic to 
Huntington’s theory of professionalism, it is pertinent to discuss what Huntington 
considered comprised this Military Ethic. He begins by making an assertion that the 
ethic itself is grounded in the underlying assumption that “...conflict is the universal 
pattern throughout nature...”, and that violence itself is rooted in mans “...biological 
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and physical nature...”40 Huntington, concludes that the military holds a negative view 
of human nature, and describes the man who adheres to the military ethic as being 
Hobbesian in his outlook.
41
 He states that the military ethic emphasises the weakness 
of man and that any individual who follows it has a decidedly pessimistic view of 
man.
42
 Huntington at this point further links his ideas about the military ethic and 
mind to his notion of professionalism by stating that 
“Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the 
participation of military officers in politics undermines their 
professionalism, curtailing their professionalism competence, 
dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous 
values for professional values. The military officer must remain 
neutral politically.”43 
Huntington’s Model for Civilian Control 
Huntington claims that the notion of civilian control of the armed forces had been 
discussed but it was his contention that the term had never been defined. He contends 
“Presumably, civilian control has something to do with the relative power of civilian 
and military groups.”44 Beyond the issue of relative power he suggests that civilian 
control will “...presumably...” exist to the extent that military influence is 
counteracted by civilians.
45
 It would thus seem that in order to minimise the power of 
the military the power of civilian groups should be maximised. However there are as 
Huntington points out, a number of different methods by which this can be achieved. 
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Subjective Civilian Control 
Subjective Civilian Control is a form of control which emphasises the maximising of 
civilian power at the expense of the military. It is the “...civilianizing...” of the 
military.
46
 The problem with this form of control, as Huntington points out, is 
knowing who within the ‘civilian group’ is doing the controlling, as he states that the 
disparate nature of civilian groups would make it difficult for conflicting interests to 
be settled.
47
 This competition that exists between civilian groups results in a situation 
where it is difficult for the civilian groups to maximise their control “...as a whole...” 
over the military.
48
 For Huntington, Subjective Civilian Control “...involves the power 
relations among civilian groups”, and the situation that results from this is the 
enhancing of a particular civilian group’s power over others.49 Subjective Civilian 
Control has historically manifested itself in the maximisation of power in “...particular 
governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional 
forms.”50 
Objective Civilian Control 
Objective Civilian Control, in contrast to Subjective Civilian Control, is the 
“...distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most 
conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behaviour among the 
members of the officer corps.”51 Where Subjective Control emphasises the control of 
the military by “...civilianizing...” the military, Objective Civilian Control seeks to 
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maximise professionalism within the military.
52
 Huntington outlined at an earlier 
point in his theory that it is the professionalization of the officer corps that results in 
the rendering of the military as a politically neutral entity. The professional military 
under Objective Civilian Control stands ready to serve the civilian group which 
possess the “...legitimate authority within the state”, and this according to Huntington 
ensures that no civilian group is able to gain leverage over the military for their own 
purposes.
53
 
Huntington argues that the degree to which a group is “...structurally unified...” will 
directly impact upon their effectiveness in dealing with other groups or 
organisations.
54
 He claims that a group with unity possesses a distinct advantage over 
a group which lacks it. In the case of the military, he claims that if the various military 
branches (land, sea and air) were to have a united leadership, (for example one overall 
commander); they would possess a significant advantage in dealing with the other 
institutions of government. Furthermore it would make it more difficult for other 
organisations to play the respective officer corps off against one another.
55
 
The scope of authority which Huntington raises “...refers to the variety and type of 
values with respect to which the group is formally authorized to exercise power.” He 
considers that this scope of authority has particular relevance to the military, and as in 
the case of this thesis, also to the Indonesian military.
56
 In many western nations the 
military’s authority would, in fact, be limited to purely military matters. However in 
many cases militaries have a scope of authority which goes beyond that of purely 
military matters. Political influence of the military is difficult to measure and 
evaluate, but is nevertheless significant, especially in the context of Indonesia. 
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Political influence according to Huntington can be broken down according to four 
rough indices which can measure the influence of the officer corps.
57
 
The affiliations held by the officer corps and its leaders, are one important measure. 
Huntington explains that it is the “...extent and nature of its affiliations with other 
powerful groups and individuals” that is significant.58 The affiliations of officers prior 
to enlistment is significant, as Huntington points out that  they may come from a 
particular social or geographical section. He argues that this can enhance the position 
of the corps within a particular class or area.
59
 In Indonesia, for example, the military 
is predominantly Javanese. This has been an enduring pattern in the Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI).
60
 The officers may also develop affiliations with those with whom 
they interact in the course of their service. Huntington cites government committees 
or private companies as an example of this.
61
 
The access that the military have to economic and human resources can also present 
the military with another form of influence. Huntington argues that the larger the 
military is, and the larger its funding is as a proportion of national product, the greater 
their influence may be.
62
 Hierarchical interpenetration is the term Huntington uses to 
describe a situation in which the officer corps or elements of the military are able to 
gain positions of authority within “...non-military power structures.”63 Just as the 
military’s authority maybe increased by the degree to which it is able to penetrate non-
military power structures, the military’s position may be weakened if non-military 
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individuals are able to penetrate positions within the officer corps.
64
 The “Prestige and 
popularity of the officer corps and its leaders.” are a further key determinant of 
influence according to Huntington.
65
 
The concept of military professionalism is central to understanding Huntington's 
model of civil military relations. The officer is the professional within the military 
organisation; they are separated as professionals from other skilled individuals by 
their criteria which he lists as expertise, responsibility and corporateness. The military 
professional is however crucially separated from civilian professionals by their 
particular area of competence, namely the management of violence. As officers they 
are driven to undertake their functional imperative, which is to ensure the ongoing 
security of the state. Politics, Huntington states is beyond the realm of the military 
professional's competence and that participation in politics undermines their 
profession as a whole. Huntington describes two distinct models for control of the 
armed forces; the first is subjective civilian control, which emphasises civilian power 
at the expense of the military. This form of control, however suffers from competition 
between civilian groups about who will control the military, which ultimately makes 
it difficult for anyone group to exercise control. Ultimately this form of control see's 
one particular group achieve dominance over others civilian groups. Objective control 
emphasises the importance of enforcing military professionalism in the armed forces 
as the method by which to control the military. 
‘The Man on Horseback’- Samuel Finer 
Samuel Finer is another scholar of central importance to the development of civil 
military relations theory; he became one of Huntington's early critic's. Finer’s central 
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point of critique on Huntington’s thesis begins with Huntington’s argument about 
professionalism. Professionalism, as Finer points out, is the “...central concept...” for 
Huntington’s argument, and is the “...decisive factor...” which prevents the military 
from intervening.
66
 Finer suggests that Huntington’s theory argues that in order for 
the military to remain politically neutral they must be encouraged to be fully 
professional. He makes the point however that professional militaries have indeed 
intervened in politics, as in the cases of Germany and Japan.
67
 As Finer points out, 
Huntington has essentially set up a particularly specific and specialised definition of 
professionalism and the military mind, and that  if the soldiers are seen to act in a 
manner which is not consistent with these definitions “...they are not completely 
‘professional’, not purely military.”68 Finer suggests that Huntington’s argument has 
become essentialist.
69
 
Finer claims that instead of the military being “Professional” according to 
Huntington’s definition, it is instead the principle of civilian supremacy which 
prevents the military from intervening in politics.
70
 For Finer, the idea of a ‘politically 
sterile’ professional military is misplaced. He begins by claiming that the 
“...military’s consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see 
themselves as the servants of the state rather than the government in power”, because, 
as he states, they may come to see the government as an entity which exists only 
temporarily, and therefore instead begin to identify with the nation.
71
 This presents the 
danger that the military may become politicised, and begin to resist the authority of 
government. According to Finer, the military will then  begin to “...invent their own 
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private notion of the national interest...”, and it only requires a small jump in thinking 
for the military to then intervene, according to their perceived idea of the national 
interest.
72
 
Military professionalism according to Finer, emphasises the ‘specialist’ nature of the 
officer corps. This he claims can lead the officer corps to view themselves as being 
the expert in the “...size, organization, recruitment and equipment of the forces.”73 
This may bring them into conflict with the civilian government. 
The use of the military against domestic opponents by a government can create 
tension between the military and the government. Finer argues that the military views 
itself as the guardian of the state against foreign enemies, and that it does not view its 
fellow countryman as the enemy.
74
 He also claims that the military would resent 
taking action against its fellow countrymen on the basis that to do so would devalue 
their status as a trained combat force to that of a police force.
75
 As a result of being 
used against domestic opponents the military may come to dislike the politicians, and 
the loyalty of the officer corps may come into question. The result of this may be 
action by the military against the civilian government.
76
 
Professionalism according to Finer cannot be the only force for preventing the 
military from intervening. He suggests that they must also have accepted the principle 
of the supremacy of civil power.
77
 This, for Finer, falls outside the definition of 
professionalism, it is expected that the military remain loyal to the government’s 
authority they must accept “...the major policies and programmes of government...” 
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and these should be decided by “...the nation’s politically responsible civilian 
leaders.”78 
Beyond the scope of professionalism and civilian supremacy, Finer postulates that a 
number of other phenomena “...deter...” the military from intervening.79 He states that 
the possible politicisation of the military resulting in the factionalisation of the 
military instils a fear within the organisation that the capability and “...capacity...” of 
the military may be compromised. Civil war and the possibility of firing on fellow 
soldiers and countrymen is a further reason, according to Finer, which will limit the 
possibility of military involvement. Finer concludes by stating that the military would 
fear that in the wake of a failed coup not only would the lives of soldiers and the 
capacity of the armed forces be eroded, but that the existence of the military as an 
institution may also be threatened.
80
 
The Disposition to Intervene - Motive 
In order for the military to undertake intervention, Finer states that the military must 
possess both the occasion on which to act as well as a disposition to intervene.
81
 This 
disposition, is the "...combination of a conscious motive and of a will or desire to 
act."
82
 Each of these motives is described in the following discussion. 
Manifest Destiny of the Soldier 
Sectional bodies, such as the military argues Finer, may all plead the national interest 
when it suits to advance their own interests.
83
 Finer argues that the military have a 
particularly strong position from which to make this argument.  He also suggests that 
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the army is the very representation of a state’s sovereignty and independence.84 
Furthermore, the military by virtue of its function is instilled with nationalism, and 
Finer emphasises that it is this which makes up the esprit de corps of the army and 
has the result of creating a unique consciousness within the institution.
85
 The military 
thus comes to identify itself closely with the nation, and this combined with the 
military value of self sacrifice results in the belief that the army has the duty to 
intervene to “save the nation.”86 Finer argues that this creates the necessary but not 
sufficient belief amongst soldiers in their ‘Manifest Destiny’. 
‘The National Interest’ as a Motive 
Finer claims that when the army or sections within the military become politicised, 
they begin to view the national interest in a particular manner, namely that they have 
some special relationship with the national interest.
87
 This identification with the 
nation’s interest means different things to military's. It is, as Finer argues, by no 
means a uniform term. The military may come to see themselves as being responsible 
for the nation’s interest and this, as Finer points out, can lead to varying levels of 
intervention on by the military.
88
 The level of intervention could range, for example, 
from “...overt rulership of the nation and the establishment of a more or less complete 
political programme...” through to “... a duty to arbitrate or veto...”89 The term 
‘National Interest’ can however also be used as a pretext for the military to ensure its 
own interests. Finer is acutely aware of this point, and it will be discussed later in the 
course of this work. 
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The Sectional Interest 
Military intervention may be executed against a government because of the particular 
makeup of social classes within the military, and because of those present in positions 
of power within the government. The theory of class interest as a driver of military 
intervention posits that the military will “...support the civil power when this is drawn 
from a similar social class, and overthrow it when it is drawn from a different and 
hostile class.”90 Furthermore the military may become politically active when the 
officer corps are comprised of those of similar social backgrounds. This may bind 
them together in the eventuality that their interests become threatened. In the event 
that their interests do become threatened these soldiers may seek to intervene as a 
means of securing their interests. It could also transpire that the majority or at least a 
significant minority of officers may be drawn from within a particular geographical 
region of a given country. This, as Finer points out, can lead them to develop 
“...special ties with it...”, and this could then lead the officer corps toward 
intervention.
91
 
The Corporate Self Interest of the Armed Forces 
Finer states that the military have a particular anxiety about ensuring their autonomy 
and privileges, and when threatened, this can become a powerful catalyst for 
intervention.
92
 Finer also suggests that intervention by the military can emanate from 
two paths of ‘perceived’ intrusion by the government. The military have certain areas 
of interest which they may view as being their own to administer. Areas of interest are 
defined as things such as recruitment, level and scope of training as well as 
equipment. The military may argue that they alone should be left to preside over such 
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matters. Beyond simply demanding the right to autonomy over these areas, the 
military may well view these, and other areas that relate to the military such as foreign 
and economic policy, as being their responsibility. The clash over such interests may 
well lead the military to overthrow a civilian government if it comes to view the 
government as impinging in its area of interest. The most significant and crucial point 
that Finer makes in this discussion however is in relation to the idea of 
professionalism.
93
 He states that claims to the control of areas such as arms 
acquisition or control of military training is bound up in the idea of military 
professionalism and is therefore a natural consequence of a military professionalism.
94
 
For Finer, the need to control aspects relating to their operational function stems from 
the fact that the professional military are functionally specialised. The function that 
they undertake separates them from the rest of society. It is the anxiety to 
“...safeguard and guarantee their success” that may cause the military to intervene if 
they perceive that their interests or their ability to carry out their function is impaired 
by a civilian government.
95
 
The Motive of Individual self Interest 
Self interest amongst soldiers or officers can provide a motive for intervention, and 
some will choose to intervene when the opportunity for personal gain presents itself. 
If, for example, there is the opportunity for further career advancement or for material 
gain this may provide another justification for intervention by the military.
96
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The Mood 
The previous section describes Finer’s ideas about which ‘motives’ may lead the 
military to intervention. His model also, however, points to the existence of a unique 
‘mood’ within the military which permeates the institution. The military view 
themselves, according to Finer, as having an identity which is distinct to the civilian 
world around them.
97
 Finer claims that this sense of “...self-awareness...” only needs 
to be combined with two further elements, to produce possible military intervention.
98
 
The first of these elements is that which Finer refers to as a sense of “...overwhelming 
power...” He further suggests  that  the military needs only to believe that at any given 
time it has the ability to enforce its will, and that there is nothing which would be able 
to prevent them from executing their desired action. The second element required is a 
grudge. Examples of this were covered in the section on motive, and may include 
such things as civilians impinging upon areas the military regard as being under their 
control and autonomous to the civilian government.
99
 Humiliation and a sense of 
injury to the military’s self-esteem present reasons for the execution of coups. The 
level of injury to both elements vary from  case to case but Finer emphasises that in 
such cases the military will share “… a morbidly acute feeling of injured self-
respect.”100 
Military's which can be seen as self important or those that possess what Finer terms a 
“morbidly high self esteem” can also present threats to a civilian administration. Finer 
claims that a self important military is one which has “…a good but not excessive 
opinion of themselves relative to the government or to civilians in general.” This type 
of military may view themselves as being the equal of civilians unlike a military 
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which has morbidly high self-esteem. This second group of militaries holds the view 
of themselves as being superior to civilians and civilian administrations.  As Finer 
points out “Affronts or imagined affronts to their pride tend to spark such armies into 
intervention more quickly…” than those previously mentioned.101 
The military, according to Finer’s model, must be afflicted with a particular mood and 
motivated to carry out an intervention. Finally, however, the military requires the 
opportunity to intervene. In a time of war, the civilian administration may come to 
depend more upon the military; this may be manifested by the civilian administration 
giving power to the military and may, for instance, take the shape of the military 
being involved in the economy. 
Political crisis within a state may also present the military with circumstances which 
would enable them to carry out some form of intervention against the government and 
civilian institutions.
102
 Finer points to a situation in which rival political forces have 
taken arms against one another. The state and its institutions then find themselves in 
the position where they are unable “…to rely on the support from any single one 
without drawing on itself the full violence of the rest.”103 The armed forces may at 
this stage be relied upon by the government as the only means by which they are able 
to enforce their control. Similarly in a situation of latent crisis, a government or ruling 
elite may be widely disliked and unpopular, thereby creating political tension and 
demonstrations, and as such those in power come to rely upon the military to keep 
them in power.
104
 The military may however choose to withdraw support for such a 
regime, and by doing this leave  themselves with the option to step in to replace the 
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civilian administration.
105
 Flowing from this previous example, Finer raises the 
potential for the military to intervene in a situation that he terms the power vacuum. 
This is a situation in which there is “…no organized political movement of any 
strength, and singularly little if any political opinion at all.”106 In a situation such as 
this, the military has the distinct advantage of possessing a monopoly on force, and as 
Finer argues, the lack of any form of government or organized political movement 
presents the armed forces with the opportunity to act as they wish.
107
 
The popularity of the armed forces within a particular state may present the military 
with further opportunities for intervention. Finer states that is difficult to generalize 
about the reasons for civilian support for the military, but points to examples such as 
corrupt and inefficient civilian regimes juxtaposed with the organised and austere 
appearance of the military, which  may prove popular to the people.
108
  
All of Finer’s arguments outlined so far culminate in four potential outcomes.109 
1. Neither disposition nor opportunity to intervene: No intervention will occur. 
2. Both disposition and opportunity to intervene: Intervention will occur. 
3. No disposition to intervene but the possibility of doing so: Finer points to four 
possible outcomes. Firstly that the armed forces do not take action because 
after all they lack the disposition to intervene. Secondly, that after much 
cajoling and pressure from others they intervene. Thirdly, that there is some 
form of invitation to intervene. Finally, that there may be the installation of a 
‘legal’ but temporary military regime.110 
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4. Disposition but no opportunity: Under such circumstances military 
intervention will likely fail. 
Samuel Finer's argument challenged Huntington's key assumption that military 
professionalism could restrict military intervention. For Finer, it is the acceptance 
amongst the military of the principle of civilian supremacy that restricts their 
intervention in politics. The acknowledgement of civilian supremacy ensures that the 
military maintain loyalty to governmental authority and that they accept the policies 
of the government. There are for Finer several reasons that military professionalism 
may not restrict military intervention. Military professionalism may lend itself to the 
development of an attitude amongst soldiers, which sees them identify their own view 
of the national interest; this according to finer can lend itself to intervention. The 
specialist nature of the professional officer corps can result in the claim amongst 
officers that they are the experts in the equipping the army, in its organisation, its 
recruitment. This has the potential to draw them into conflict with the government. 
The use of the military against domestic opponents can also generate interventionist 
tendencies. Alongside a critique of professionalism, Finer states the military requires 
both a motive and a mood in order to execute intervention. The motive according to 
Finer can stem from the manifest destiny of the soldier, the national interest, sectional 
interest and the corporate self interest of the armed forces. Alongside mood and 
motive the military must be presented with an opportunity for intervention, this may 
stem from a crisis facing the ruling government or a power vacuum. 
Nordlinger and the Praetorian Soldier 
Eric Nordlinger’s study of Civil Military describes praetorian soldiers as those who 
engage in military intervention. The term ‘Praetorian’, to which Nordlinger refers, 
stems from the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Army. Formed as a special unit of the 
27 
 
military they were tasked with the protection of the emperor.  However, they would 
later intervene against the emperor whom they were tasked with protecting.
111
 
Praetorianism can be defined according to Nordlinger as: 
1. The threat (overtly or otherwise) of a coup by officers against the 
government if a set of demands are not met. 
2. The staging of an unsuccessful coup. 
3. The staging of a coup which brings power to another civilian 
government. 
4. The staging of a coup by military officers to replace the civilian 
government with a military one. 
Crucially relevant to the case of Indonesia is Nordlinger’s assertion regarding the 
civilianisation of coups. This, he argues, is the case when the military leaders of the 
coup no longer don military uniform but take the offices of government.
112
 This 
civilianisation of the coup depends on whether those who comprise the new 
government have served or continue to serve in the military. Nordlinger also states 
that civilianisation of the coup depends upon whether the new regime still relies 
heavily upon the support of the officer corps.
113
 
Civilian control of the military stands in the way of praetorian urges. According to 
Nordlinger three distinct models of civilian military control exist, with one relevant 
only to one party states, and thus not pertinent to this discussion. The first of these is 
what he refers to as the traditional model. This model was largely present in the 
monarchies of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. It was a system of civilian military control 
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in which there was an “…absence of civilian-military differences.”114 This was due, 
Nordlinger claims, to the fact that the elites of these nations were the same elites 
which made up the civilian and military positions in these various states. Those who 
belonged to these elites shared similar values as well as family blood ties and often 
shared links between the civilian and military realms.
115
 Nordlinger notes that on 
those occasions when tensions did appear between those comprising the elites, namely 
the aristocracy, they would view themselves as civilians first and soldiers second. 
These elites were more interested in preserving their positions and ensuring their own 
wealth.
116
 This model is largely irrelevant today, due to the fact that in many states 
there is no common linkage between the civilian and military elites.
117
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The Liberal Model- Eric Nordlinger 
The liberal model of civilian control according to Nordlinger “…entails the maximum 
possible depoliticization of the military.”118 The civilian elite (those holding positions 
within government) have a particular realm of expertise. Nordlinger states that this 
expertise relates to “…determining domestic and foreign goals, overseeing the 
administration of the laws, and resolving conflicts among social, economic, and 
political groups.”119 The military’s area of expertise is in the application of violence, 
and their responsibility is the security of the state both internally and externally. The 
military must accept their subordinate position. Their role is within the area of 
national security only and is limited to providing advice to the civilians in charge. In 
the case of disagreement, the military must accept the views of its civilian masters. 
It is one thing to assert that the military be subservient, and quite another to ensure 
that civilian supremacy will be adhered to. Nordlinger argues that a series of beliefs 
and values around civilian authority that he terms the civilian ethic prevents the 
military from threatening a civilian regime, “Soldiers who are imbued with these 
beliefs and values-what might be referred to as the civilian ethic-are attitudinally 
disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticized stance even 
when in sharp disagreement with the government.”120 Nordlinger states that it is the 
civilian ethic that will steer the military clear from engaging in interventionist 
activities.
121
 
Civilians within this model must also respect the military, if it does so the military 
have less motivation for intervention. Civilians he believes must respect  
                                                 
118
 Ibid. p.12 
119
 Ibid. p.12 
120
 Ibid. p. 13 
121
 Ibid. p.13 
30 
 
"...the military's honour, expertise, autonomy, and political neutrality. It 
does not slur the officer corps, interfere in professional military affairs, 
interject political considerations into the armed forces (e.g., by promoting 
officers because of their political loyalties), or use the army for domestic 
political advantage."
122
 
 
If civilian governments do not respect the military the result can be the generation of 
praetorian urges. The military may undertake a coup in order to protect its 
"...autonomy, professionalism, cohesiveness, and pride in the face of civilian 
transgressions."
123
 
Nordlinger presents the concept of praetorianism, which encapsulates the threat of a 
coup, the successful execution of a coup or the staging of an unsuccessful coup. 
Civilian control of the military according to Nordlinger restricts praetorian urges and 
the ability of praetorian soldiers to execute coups. His liberal model results in the 
maximum depoliticization of the military. According to the model the civilian elite, 
those in government hold particular expertise, for example in"... determining domestic 
and foreign goals..."
124
 The military also holds particular expert knowledge in the area 
of the application of violence. The military according to this model must always 
accept its subordinate position to the civilians in government. In order for the military 
to accept civilian supremacy the military must also recognize the concept of the 
civilian ethic. Both the military and the civilian government must exhibit respect for 
their respective spheres of influence. If they do not do so civilian control will be 
undermined and a coup may take place. 
Concordance Theory - Rebecca Schiff 
 In a more recent contribution, Rebecca Schiff has questioned much of the prevailing 
theoretical work in the area of Civil-Military relations. She begins by arguing that one 
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school of thought within the field has achieved pre-eminence, namely that 
emphasising separation or what Huntington termed objective civilian control.
125
 This 
theory she argues does not take into account "...a nation's unique and indigenous 
culture, or any culture at all, since it is a theory that focuses on replicating US civil 
and military institutions."
126
 She claims that a nation's unique cultural and historical 
experience are both important to this study of civil and military institutions, and 
moreover that her theory incorporates this important background information as part 
of its analysis. As already noted, Schiff states that the existing body of work 
emphasises separation of the civil and military spheres as a means of preventing 
military intervention, and moreover that this be translated into policy.
127
 In contrast to 
this, concordance she claims, can involve separation but does not require it. 
Schiff's theory "...argues that three partners - the military, the political elites, and the 
citizenry - should aim for a cooperative relationship. For Schiff, Concordance may 
mean a high level integration between the military and the rest of society, although 
this is just one type of relationship she believes that no single type of relationship  
"...is seen as necessarily leading to domestic military intervention. In 
essence civil and military institutions need not be separate (like the US 
model) to prevent domestic military intervention."
128
 
 
The type of civil-military relationship, Schiff asserts, is far less important than the 
ability of her three partners to agree upon four key indicators.
129
 Before continuing the 
discussion of her theory it is first necessary to define her actors and her indicators, as 
these are of central importance to her work. 
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The Partners 
The military, asserts Schiff, 
"...encompasses the armed forces and the personnel who represent 
the military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those 
most dedicated to the armed forces."
130
 
 
The military is the institution, she states, which is recognized by the political elites 
and society in general as being responsible for the defence of the nation's borders.
131
 
The political leadership is best defined by its function. Schiff believes that the 
particular "...nature of governmental institutions and the methods of their selection are 
less important when determining concordance."
132
 Instead, Schiff states, it is the 
identification of elites who represent the government and have "...direct influence 
over the composition and support of the armed forces" which is critical.
133
 Examples 
of these elites include cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments 
and monarchs. 
The citizenry, Schiff asserts is also best defined by its function, "How do the citizens 
interact with the military? Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the 
role of the military in society?"
134
 The citizenry is broadly defined, "....it is comprised 
of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and 
entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other 
groups who may be disenfranchised."
135
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Indicators of Concordance 
Alongside these three distinct actors are four indicators which "...will determine 
whether relations among the military, the government, and the society take the form 
of separation, integration, or some other alternative."
136
 Schiff emphasises that the 
nation's particular historical and cultural context shapes the relationship among the 
partners and the indicators.
137
 The social composition of the officer corps, we are told 
by Schiff, represents her primary indicator of concordance, as it is responsible for the 
"...broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces."
138
 The officers  
"...are the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to 
the development of the military and who help to define the 
relationship of the military to the rest of society. The officer is 
distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier; and, as leaders of the 
armed forces, the officer corps provides not only critical links 
between the citizenry and the military but also between the military 
and the government."
139
 
 
Schiff states that within the officer corps of all modern militaries there are differing 
degrees of representation of various groups within society. Democratic nations, she 
argues, the officers will generally represent the various groups within society; these 
groups may be based on class, religious or ethnic background. However, 
representation of the various groups in society within the officer corps is less 
important than agreement on it particular composition amongst the three partners.
140
 
Thus concordance can prevail even if the representation of the various social groups 
within the officer corps of a given state is limited. It is the agreement amongst the 
partners which is of utmost importance. 
Schiff's second indicator is the political decision-making process, which focuses upon 
the "...institutional organs of society..." that determine various factors such as its 
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budget, material, size and structure.
141
 The process by which this occurs is not 
dependent upon a particular type of government, for example democratic or 
authoritarian, it is rather, "... the specific channels that determine the needs and 
allocations of the military."
142
 The needs of the military may be determined by 
"...parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees and political elites that may or 
may not involve the participation of military officers."
143
 The specifics of the system 
that determine the military's needs are less important than the requirement of the 
partners agreeing to it. 
The military's recruitment method is Schiff's third indicator of concordance. This 
covers the system by which citizens are enlisted in the military. Schiff refers to two 
different recruitment types, coercive and persuasive recruitment. Coercive recruitment 
"...refers to the forcible conscription or extraction of people and supplies for military 
purposes."
144
 This form of recruitment makes harsh demands upon the population and 
as such it is unlikely that concordance between the military and the citizenry will 
exist. Persuasive recruitment, may according to Schiff, be either voluntary or 
involuntary, and based upon beliefs, namely that military service is a necessary 
sacrifice for patriotism and to ensure the state's security. Coercion is not a 
requirement of this form of recruitment because these individuals have made 
themselves available to serve. Persuasive recruitment implies agreement amongst the 
partners on the military's requirements. 
Military style comprises Schiff's final indicator of concordance. This refers to the 
"...external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: 
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what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it."
145
 Style, 
Schiff asserts is about social boundaries and the ability to establish them or remove 
them. Style allows members of groups to differentiate themselves from one another. 
Style is also about the way a military looks, the signals that it conveys and its rituals; 
these things are all part of the relationship between soldiers, citizens and the body 
politic.
146
 Military style Schiff believes is manifested within the military's traditions 
and symbol. Important examples of this are things such as uniforms, parades, marches 
and other ceremonies.
147
 
Concordance, Schiff argues, will result if agreement is reached amongst the partners 
on the four indicators. Concordance, asserts Schiff acts as a deterrent to domestic 
military intervention, which can apply within a variety of different cultural contexts 
and may prove more appropriate to the particulars of a nation's cultural and historical 
experience. For Schiff, the scholarship which has focused upon the developing world 
has largely forgotten this, as well as the fact that much of the writing on the topic was 
derived from modern example of U.S military separation. 
Schiff's framework will be used extensively throughout this work, in order to test the 
validity of her concept of concordance in the Indonesian context. An intrinsic part of 
this model is the examination and assessment of the role that Indonesia's unique 
culture and historic experience have had in determining the nation's civil military 
relationship. Schiff's framework will feature as the core analytical lens, it will 
however be complimented with the work of the other scholars highlighted in this 
chapter. Huntington's concept of professionalism and corporateness will be discussed. 
Samuel Finer's notion of precursive motivations for military intervention will be 
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explored. Nordlinger's theory of liberal control of the armed forces will be discussed. 
In particular, emphasis will be placed upon Nordlinger's argument relating to the need 
for civilian respect of the military's sphere of autonomy and influence. 
37 
 
Chapter Two 
Schiff's work breathes new life into the field of civil military relations theory, an area 
which requires new work and reinterpretation. Schiff has introduced a number of new 
and contested ideas into the academic debate. Despite the injection of this new theory 
into the discourse, there are several structural issues that require re-examination and 
critique. Significantly this is centred on the issue of agreement, leading on from this it 
will be shown that her notion of concordance is static, and in order to resolve some of 
the issues with her theory, her ideas will be reinterpreted so they are able to take 
account of change over time and thus introduce some notion of dynamism or 
evolution. 
Concordance we are told describes a cooperative relationship amongst its 
stakeholders. For Schiff, when there is agreement among the partners on a number of 
different indicators there is a state of concordance. When the civil military 
relationship is concordant argues Schiff the likelihood of military intervention is 
reduced. It should be clarified also at this point that when the relationship is 
concordant, that it is the likelihood of a coup d’état taking place that is reduced. It is 
somewhat unclear whether her idea of concordance can prevent other forms of 
intervention, or whether simply by definition these other degrees of involvement are 
removed. When the aforementioned partners disagree on the indicators of 
concordance, this is when a coup may occur. It is at this point that the theory appears 
to some to become tautological that is true by definition. When there is agreement 
amongst the partners there is no disagreement, and in turn there is no intervention. If 
however there is no agreement, the result we are told may be military intervention. A 
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second issue is that the model at this point becomes static. That is to say that 
concordance evolves, either stays in place, or collapses. 
The model as it is currently structured cannot really account for or understand change, 
except in the case where events lead to a collapse in concordance. The model is 
incapable of explaining more subtle change and more importantly for the purposes of 
the current case study, of explaining and taking account of change in Indonesia's civil-
military relations. By altering the model slightly, it will allow greater understanding 
of cases where the military has long had political influence and power, even though 
they may have officially relinquished political power or have failed to execute a coup. 
Change in the existence, or lack thereof, in concordance may be precipitated by a 
change in the nature of the actors themselves. We are told by Schiff that what is truly 
significant about her model and what makes it so different is the fact that it is the 
existence of agreement amongst three actors on her set of indicators that determines 
the nature of a state's civil military relationship. Just as a change in the nature of any 
agreement amongst the actors, can affect the concordance, so can a change in the 
nature of the actors themselves. 
Change within the military can have a significant impact upon the existence of any 
concordance. The issue of cohesion within the military itself is of primary concern. 
Military factionalism, particularly at the level of the officer corps can have all manner 
of affects. It undermines the officer's professionalism, by undermining his 
responsibility and corporateness. This lack of cohesion may be driven by any number 
of factors, for example religion, ethnicity, recruitment and education amongst others. 
The destabilising force that factionalism generates can have significant effects within 
regimes relying on the support of the military. In the context of regimes experiencing 
pressure for political change the military may shift its support from backing the sitting 
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regime, to removing support and its control of the state's coercive instruments. 
Factionalism may produce pressures on any existing concordance for a change in the 
nature of the relationship. 
Hostility and division can be generated within the military due to structural factors 
present within the officer corps itself, particularly issues around age, the promotion 
system and the career paths open to officers. Newly created militaries such as those in 
newly independent states may often contain a large number of officers and soldiers 
from a similar age group. This can prove a major source of discontent and tension for 
junior officers who may be in the same age group as those of much higher rank. This 
can have the affect of undermining the system of discipline by "...reinforcing 
discrepancies in the perception of authority and competence within the military 
hierarchy."
148
 Grievances can also come about due to the possible restriction in 
promotions. If the officer corps is made up of officers of a similar age it can restrict 
promotion.
149
 Promotions may also be restricted by the sheer numbers of officers 
graduating from military academies. This is not a problem in itself, but it can become 
one if there are not adequate positions of command for the graduates to fill. A 
situation may be created in which there are too many officers and too few positions of 
command. This has the potential to undermine the career progression and prospects of 
officers, and can become a source of discontent.
150
 Resentment and pressure for 
change within the military may be generated from the interference of political leaders 
in the promotion of officers.
151
 Political leaders may seek to intervene in the process 
of promotion in order to ensure the loyalty of the military to themselves or their 
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regime. The creation of a functional rival can lead to a powerful disposition toward 
intervention within the military; once again this may motivate the military as an actor 
to challenge the government.
152
 
In order to alter Schiff's model to allow for dynamic change, it has become necessary 
to include additional factors that may precipitate this change. It has long been argued 
within the literature that economics has played a role either in causing the military 
coup itself or explaining the life of a military regime. It is within this tradition that the 
role of economics is to be further explored. Of particular focus is the role that 
economic change can have in affecting the nature of the citizenry, thereby affecting 
the overall existence of a concord. It is particularly important to examine the role of 
economic growth in developing nations as this can have an overall impact upon the 
civil-military relationship of those nations. 
The nature of these countries often means that the populations may be young, rurally 
based, poorly educated, with limited access to government services and with poor 
wealth distribution. The reality of this situation for the population of such a country is 
that politics may in fact take a back seat to immediate economic concerns. For those 
segments of the population that live on or close to the poverty line concerns of a 
political nature may well take a backseat to those which directly relate to immediate 
issues of food security, housing and employment. 
Alternatively, if a country does experience economic growth it is possible for the 
middle class to swell in size, and crucially they may begin to "...make new political 
demands; and they spawn new political debates and tactics."
153
 It is a plausible to 
suggest that as the wealth and access to crucial resources increases, a growth in 
                                                 
152
 Ibid. p.75 
153
 Hagen Koo, "Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea," 
Theory and Society 20, no. 4 (1991). p.485 
41 
 
political participation may increase as those who previously were engaged in simply 
acquiring resources to survive, are now able to divert time into concerns over the 
political system. They may begin to make demands of political decision makers and 
of the political system as a whole. These demands may lead to instability within the 
political system, possibly culminating in political change.
154
 Similarly Lipset argues 
for a link between average wealth, degree of industrialization, urbanization, and level 
of education with the degree of democratisation within a nation.
155
 The development 
of the middle class changes the nature of the citizenry as an actor within Schiff's 
model. The middle class, now better off can expand their attention beyond 
subsistence. 
The role of the middle class, as a component of the citizenry, cannot be 
underestimated, indeed much has been made of the role that the middle class can play 
in political change, Samuel Huntington in his book The Third Wave, attests to the 
significance of the middle class in explaining political change in developing nations 
during the 1970's and 1980's.
156
 Huntington noted that the "...unprecedented economic 
growth of the 1960's..."contributed to the rise and growth of an urban middle class in 
a number of nations.
157
 Just as the growth of the middle class is an important point to 
consider, it is also relevant to think about the impact that any contraction in the 
economy may have upon the middle class. As mentioned above the middle class is 
significant because it is this group within society that  seeks "....consistently to 
promote change.", Lev also believes that historically it has been the middle class 
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which has been a major driver of social, economic, cultural and political change.
158
 
The middle class thus become very important when they are viewed in the context of 
the concordance relationship. They may come to play an important role in either 
establishing a military regime, prolonging the rule or become an organiser in the 
collapse of a military regime. It is for the impact that the middle class can have upon 
the political decision makers and upon the political process that they should be closely 
considered as a potential driver of  change, and as a key element in creating dynamic 
change within this modified theory of concordance. 
The structure of society is also a further factor to take into account and is one which 
can be considered as part of the group of factors that is driven by socio-economic 
change and can have profound impact upon the political system. This point is 
particularly relevant within those states that can be classified as developing nations. 
For such nations rapid economic growth, while being hugely beneficial to the nation's 
economy may cause cleavages to emerge between social classes. This conflict could 
manifest itself in a variety of ways. Some examples of this particularly in South East 
Asia have evolved from rapid economic growth which has resulted in income 
inequality. The demand for improved pay and conditions of workers has led to clashes 
with authorities. Land and access to land has become a key issue around economic 
development. People particularly those in the rural areas who depend upon access to 
land for their livelihoods have been displaced by the requirements of economic 
development, leading to demonstrations and confrontation with governments. 
Urbanisation is an important aspect of economic development, indeed the two often 
operate in an interdependent manner.
159
 Those nations that have the most urbanised 
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populations also tend to have higher levels of economic development. Urbanisation, 
an increase in the proportion of the population living in urban areas, is often 
motivated by the possibility of better economic opportunities or access to service.
160
 
Urbanisation can, however, like those factors already mentioned, have a destabilising 
affect within society and upon the political system. Large numbers of those who move 
to urban centres may find that those opportunities they sought are actually not that 
accessible and become vulnerable to crime, exploitation and poverty. These can 
become powerful motivators for those who feel downtrodden to demand a change in 
their circumstances and to confront those in political power. Within cities these 
migrants may also engage in new forms of political participation, which was 
unavailable to them when they lived in rural areas. The greater population in urban 
centres allows people to take part in large strike and protest action, which may not 
have been possible within their smaller rural hometowns. 
A sudden economic crisis may also create the ideal conditions to precipitate a shift in 
the civil-military relationship. Massive economic change, particularly in developing 
economies where a large percentage of the population may be living close to the 
poverty line, can have profound social and political consequences. In such cases, this 
particular segment of the population is likely to be particularly sensitive to 
fluctuations in the performance of the economy, for example through rapid rises in the 
cost of living, drop in incomes and increases in unemployment. These affects combine 
to impact upon society as a whole, of particular concern to this case is the influence 
that such a crises can have upon the political system and specifically upon the existing 
civil-military relationship. In cases where such a crises occurs in a country with some 
                                                                                                                                            
for Asia and the Pacific (Un Escap)," in 5th Asia-Pacific Urban Forum (Bangkok: 2011). p.3 
160
 OECD, "Oecd: Glossary for Statistical Terms" http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2819 
(accessed 13/9/2012 2012). 
44 
 
form of military government or military backed regime, the military may become the 
target for the large numbers of the population who have been adversely affected by 
the change in the nation’s economy. In such an instance those disenfranchised 
sections of the population may mobilise in frustration against the nation's political 
leaders and make demands upon the system and those individuals responsible for 
decision making. 
Just as economic change can effect a concordance so too can change in the security 
environment, such as the shift from peace to war or vice versa. In the context of this 
study, the cold war was of major importance. South East Asia had been on the 
frontline in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
President Eisenhower introduced the concept of the Domino theory in Southeast Asia, 
which asserted the vulnerability of countries to communist expansion should one 
country fall to communism.
161
 U.S military and political action in a raft of countries 
during the Cold War was driven out of the perceived threat of the spread of 
communism to American interests throughout the world.
162
 During this time the 
conduct of regimes against their own populations was tolerated in the name of 
securing anti-communist allies. This situation did begin to change in the 1990's, as 
Western governments grew more critical of human rights abuses.
163
 The conduct of 
the regimes who restricted political participation and perpetrated abuses against their 
population were no longer automatically tolerated within the context of the cold war. 
Military's involved in such activities could expect their conduct to be more closely 
scrutinised. 
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Alongside economic drivers of change there are also a number of changes that may 
take place within the military itself, in its structure or in the military's behaviour that 
can affect the relationship between the military the political system and the civilian 
populations. As is the case with a change in the economic situation of a given country, 
a change in the military can affect the nature of the civil-military relationship, and 
may alter the nature of the concord amongst the partners. 
In the 21st century militaries have found themselves having to operate in a variety of 
different roles. They must be trained as war fighters and for the purpose of national 
defence, however they are expected and trained to operate in a variety of different 
roles and to fulfil a number of different missions. This has seen the training, doctrine 
and expertise of the soldiers and officers change from being purely devoted to 
fighting a war to being involved in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief and 
increasingly counter-insurgency and other low-intensity conflicts. Alfred Stepan in his 
study of military regimes in Latin America has discussed this point. For Stepan, the 
notion of the Huntingtonian politically sterile soldier is misplaced, "...the 
professionalization thesis was rooted in the assumption that armies develop their 
professional skills for conventional warfare against foreign armies."
164
 Stepan 
believes that in order to deal with domestic threats, or operations such as COIN, the 
officers and soldiers involved require a distinct set of skills which transcend 
Huntington’s idea of professional knowledge. These may for example include 
knowledge and understanding of political matters. For those military commanders 
who find themselves engaged in operations other than war (OOTW), for example 
peacekeeping, will need to be engaged in setting the scope and objectives of the 
operation, this leads to a blurring of the lines between the military and political 
                                                 
164
 Alfred C. Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil : Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1973). p.49 
46 
 
spheres.
165
 Linked to the notion of Stepan's new professionalism and the blurring of 
civil-military boundaries as a result of OOTW, in Scobell's analysis of the 1987 Fijian 
coup, he discusses the importance of the Fijian military's participation in foreign 
peacekeeping operations in shaping their 'New Professionalism'.
166
 Martial law 
operations may also affect the military, it presents it with considerable authority and 
power. The missions that the military must be trained for are increasingly broad, it is 
due to the variety of missions and the training required that a military may become 
politicised. The result of this politicisation may lead to a change in the civil-military 
relationship, a re-balancing or it may lead to an extreme situation in which the 
military take a politically active role or indeed overthrow a government. 
Political Leadership 
Change within the political leadership is also a crucial addition to Schiff's original 
concept. This gives it the same characteristics of dynamism that has been noted 
missing from her original concept of concordance. Max Weber's forms of legitimate 
domination offer a manner of interpreting the change of leadership. Weber offers 
three types of legitimate domination to explain different forms of rule. He argues that 
there are three different types of rule, Legal, Charismatic and Traditional. If a power 
structure were to stand upon any of these systems alone it would be relatively 
unstable, thus argues Weber, "...both rulers and ruled uphold the internalized power 
structure as legitimate by right, and usually the shattering of this belief in legitimacy 
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has far reaching ramifications."
167
 As will be shown the collapse in legitimacy that 
Weber refers to, did have far reaching consequences. 
It should be noted that Traditional domination will be excluded upon the basis that it 
is not relevant to the current study. This type of domination did not exist within 
timeline of this study. Weber argues that "Traditional domination rests on the belief 
that the sacredness of the social order and its prerogatives as existing of yore."
168
 
Legal Domination 
Legal domination is represented, claims Weber, by the bureaucracy.
169
 Under such a 
system laws are implemented or changed according to a formal procedure, and there 
is a governing body which can be either elected or appointed.
170
 There is an 
administrative staff appointed by the ruler, and the law abiding masses constitute the 
body politic.
171
 Obedience under such a system is not granted to anyone personally, 
but instead to a series of rules and regulations which denote what the ruled owe 
obedience to.
172
 The ruler is also obliged to act according to "the law" when giving a 
command, namely the law or laws "...which represent abstract norms."
173
 The 
individual "...in command typically is the "superior" within a functionally defined 
"competency" or "jurisdiction", and his right to govern is legitimized by 
enactment."
174
 On top of this bureaucratic system, sits the "....top positions of the 
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body politic..." which may come in the form of monarchs, presidents or rulers elected 
by parliaments.
175
 
Charismatic Domination 
Bureaucracy, Weber agues can meet the quantifiable and repeating demands of  
'normal' routine, however "...The provisioning of all demands that go beyond those of 
everyday routine has had, in principle, an entirely heterogeneous, namely, a 
charismatic, foundation..."
176
 The leaders that possess this charismatic quality are 
distinct from those who serve in an occupational capacity. They are, by contrast, 
individuals who Weber claims hold particular gifts of the body and spirit.
177
 Weber 
also states that those around the leader, the administrative staff, are chosen according 
to their own levels of charisma and devotion to the leader, not because of any 
particular qualification.
178
 The charismatic leader is followed because of their "...non-
routine qualities..." they are only followed to the extent that people ascribe these 
qualities to them.
179
 The rule of the charismatic leader ends when the masses lose 
faith in their leadership potential. Charismatic leadership is according to Weber 
inherently unstable.
180
 
Having made adjustments to Schiff's original model, we provide the model with the 
ability to explain change in concordance. The role that external events such as 
military conflict or economic crises can have upon the concord are examined, and it is 
suggested that the role of external crises can be significant to the continued existence 
of the concord. The model has been adjusted to take account of factionalism within 
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the military, which can break the cohesion of the military as an institution, change it 
as a partner, and result in some possible form or intervention, whether coup d'état or 
some lower level intrusion. Changes to the citizenry has also been proposed as a 
further affecting the concordance, in particular, the effect of economic growth and 
urbanisation upon the masses. Schiff's definition of political leadership has been re-
examined using Webers lens of Charismatic and Legal leadership. Change to the 
army's mission has also been explored as explaining potential intervention and thus 
affecting any existing concordance. 
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Chapter Three 
In order to understand the nature of the relationship which exists between the 
Indonesian military, government and wider society, it is necessary to discuss the 
history of Indonesia itself. This knowledge of the history is also needed to understand 
the Indonesian military and for the purposes of this study which focuses on the 
development of a concordance between the nation’s citizens, political leadership and 
military. 
Colonial History 
The Indonesian Archipelago lies between South East Asia and Australia and is 
comprised of around 17,508 islands sprawling some 5000km. Of these 17,000 islands 
approximately 6000 are inhabited.
181
 The state is also very ethnically diverse. It is a 
country which has considerable natural resource wealth. It was the strategic and 
natural resource value which drew the Dutch and the Portuguese to the Archipelago in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
182
 The Dutch, founded the East Indies 
Company which was used to utilise the commercial opportunities available from the 
natural resource wealth in the Archipelago. The Dutch East Indies Company collapsed 
in 1798, which resulted in the Netherlands government stepping in to take control of 
the area. The Dutch, by the 20
th
 century, had control over a large number of islands 
which stretched from Sumatra to New Guinea.
183
 Like many colonial possessions, the 
borders of the Dutch East Indies were created in a largely arbitrary manner, stemming 
mainly from colonial negotiations. The result of this was the creation of a colony 
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which largely ignored the ethnic and social differences present amongst its 
inhabitants.
184
 It could be argued that the ramifications of this policy are still being 
felt today, with the ongoing ethnic tension and violence that has plagued areas of the 
country. 
The Nationalist Movement 
Dutch colonial rule over the East Indies during the nineteenth century could be best 
described as a mix of exploitation and repression. There are a number of instances 
which can be used as proof of this, for example the nearly 200,000 Javanese believed 
to have been killed by the Dutch in an effort to retake Java in 1825.
185
 There were a 
number of such incidents, not only in Java, but also elsewhere in the Archipelago 
which resulted in high numbers of casualties. This had two effects; firstly it built up 
resentment amongst the population, and secondly, it required the Dutch to extract 
increasing amounts of money out of the colony as a means to pay the increasing costs 
of administering the colony. It was at this point that the Dutch introduced their system 
of cultivation agriculture. This system was particularly harsh and exploitative on those 
whom were subjected to it and it was this system of production that was credited with 
the causing of several famines.
186
 This system proved an enormously successful 
means of generating income for the colony’s rulers, so successful in fact that it paid 
off all of the East India Company’s debts by 1877. It was in the 1860’s and 1870’s 
that liberal entities in Dutch politics began to suggest that the colony should not be 
exploited economically to the benefit of Holland, and to the detriment of the local 
population. The system of cultivation was slowly dismantled as a result of the 
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increasing criticism that the policy was being subjected to in Holland.
187
 Despite the 
disassembly of the cultivation system, the peasants also found it difficult to profit 
under a system that was structured under liberal economic principles.
188
 This was one 
of the grievances which Kahin described as leading to the formation of “...articulate 
nationalism...”189 
The system of administration which the Dutch employed in the East Indies also 
initially served to limit the growth of Indonesian nationalism.
190
 The Dutch installed a 
system of indirect rule. This system relied upon the local indigenous aristocratic rulers 
and provided what Kahin has described as a useful “...buffer...”191 The merit of this 
system for the Dutch, was that it allowed the Indonesian masses to vent dissatisfaction 
at their Indonesian rulers. Kahin credits this system for allowing the Dutch to exploit 
the colony economically and politically for three centuries without incurring 
widespread opposition from the general population.
192
 
The system of administration that was used by the Dutch created widespread 
resentment. It was seen as a system which had institutionalised racial 
discrimination.
193
 The system of administration discriminated against the Indonesian 
masses in a number of different areas, namely, career and economic opportunities 
available to the Indonesians, access to the education system and protection afforded to 
them by the law. 
The career opportunities that were available to the colonial subjects were also limited. 
This was of course linked to the discrimination and inequality present within the 
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education system. This had the combined effect of reinforcing the sense of 
discrimination that they suffered at the hands of the Dutch, as well as limiting their 
economic potential and career options. A very small Indonesian middle class existed, 
and those who could be classed as middle class were largely employed as members of 
the civil service or some other salaried position.
194
 There was an entrepreneurial class 
that was virtually non-existent in Indonesian society. In the cases where Indonesians 
were employed within the colonial service, they were subject to salaries which paid 
less than their European counterparts. Economic exploitation and discrimination 
would become a key factor in fuelling support for the nationalist cause.
195
 
Access to education for Indonesians also became a significant source of grievance. It 
was generally observed that the facilities available to Indonesian students were far 
fewer than those available to Dutch students. Moreover the fees that were charged for 
the tutoring of Indonesian students also proved an area of contention. Dutch students 
were not charged fees. There were specialty technical, law and medical colleges being 
opened to Indonesian students, however these only allowed for small numbers of 
students. It is likely that his reinforced the sense of discrimination, and contempt for 
the Dutch government.
196
 Kahin argues that for some nationalists these policies were 
part of a deliberate Dutch attempt to limit the educational opportunities available to 
the colonial subject. This policy was said to have developed in the 1930’s from 
concern expressed by the Dutch authorities that too much education would be 
“...politically dangerous...”197 Nevertheless education became one of the major 
aspects of Dutch policy which led ultimately to its own undoing. The unequal access 
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to the education system would create resentment and further strengthen the nationalist 
movement. 
Discrimination against the Indonesian people within the Judicial system and the penal 
legislation was a continued source of grievance. The courts that the Indonesians had 
access to were of a lower standard than those accessible to the Dutch. The court 
system also offered less legal protection to Indonesians. Indonesians were able to be 
held in jail under preventative detention, despite the fact that no Judicial authorization 
had been given; this provision, however, did not apply to the Dutch citizens in 
Indonesia. 
Within the Dutch East Indies there was also an all pervading sense of social 
discrimination and superiority practised by the Dutch and Eurasian members of the 
colony toward the Indonesians, despite the fact that in many cases the abilities and 
educational backgrounds of the Indonesians were superior.
198
 This, Kahin notes, 
would continue to fuel nationalistic sentiment until 1949.
199
 All of these factors 
combined to motivate the Indonesians to become determined to achieve independence 
by whatever means possible. 
There were clearly a large number of grievances that drove Nationalist aspirations in 
Indonesia, and it is clear from the history that organised and aggressive nationalism 
was checked at various stages by the police and intelligence apparatus of the Dutch 
authorities. There were, alleges Kahin, a number of unique factors which both 
empowered and weakened the nationalist cause. Religion and language were both 
seen as powerful uniting influences within the Archipelago.
200
 The People’s Council 
or Volksraad was established in 1917, and partially comprised of Indonesians. It was 
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set up with advisory powers to the Dutch authorities. This avenue allowed for sitting 
nationalist members to express mild nationalistic aspirations to the public, as well as 
keeping nationalist grievances in view of this body.
201
 The Volksraad was by no 
means an accurate expression of the entire nationalist movement. Any of the more 
radical nationalists refused to have anything to do with it. It was also set up in such a 
way that contact between those Indonesian members on the council and the wider 
public would be limited.
202
 It should also be noted however that the Volksraad, was 
far from a venue that allowed for free expression. It was merely advisory, and its 
overall role in Indonesian independence should be viewed within such circumstances. 
The evolution of technology in the form of radio, and the increasing dissemination of 
both radio and press, also provided for a flow of ideas. When combined with the 
movement of people throughout Indonesia, the phenomenon of migration as well as 
media and press serve the Nationalists by further propagating their ideas and 
causes.
203
 
Any discussion of Indonesian history and in particular the struggle for Independence 
and the nationalist movement cannot be complete without a discussion of Sukarno. He 
would become the leader of the nationalist movement and later, Indonesia's first 
president. Sukarno unlike many of his countrymen had the opportunity to attend 
school. His father was a teacher, and luckily for Sukarno this resulted his education at 
his father's school, and later finishing with further education at European schools. It 
was during this time that he was confronted with the discrimination that was inherent 
within the European education system. Combined with his own education and 
exposure to political ideas, this pushed a young Sukarno toward his anti-colonial 
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viewpoint.
204
 He completed a degree in engineering in 1925. Along with his Western 
education, Sukarno also had a considerable Muslim education. This together with his 
knowledge of Javanese mysticism would enable him to translate "...this synthesis in 
terms which the peasant could understand."
205
 
In 1927 Sukarno would become the head of the PNI or Indonesian Nationalist Party. 
The aim of this organisation was the gaining of independence from Holland (both 
political and economic), with an elected government by and for the Indonesian 
people. The PNI was anti-capitalist although not communist. As the head of the PNI, 
Sukarno would emphasise the importance of unity amongst the population in the drive 
to independence. Sukarno was acutely aware of the issue of Islam in the nationalist 
struggle. Kahin argues that he "...stressed that the party could not have an Islamic 
basis." This point is corroborated by Ricklefs, who describes the party as being 
secularly nationalist.
206
 The PNI was combined with a number of student groups and 
religious parties and organisations to create an umbrella organisation known as the 
Agreement of Indonesian Peoples Political Associations (PPPKI).
207
 
The PPPKI was significant because it was an attempt to amalgamate a number of 
disparate groups that comprised the factionalised Independence groups. However, 
Ricklefs argues that the unity the PPPKI created was largely inconsequential. There 
was a division which remained between those Muslim organisations which expressed 
secular opinions and those which did not.
208
 Islamic groups were largely opposed to 
secular nationalism because it was a creation of man, while Muslims believed only the 
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word of God. As Ricklefs notes they were unable to accept that within a Muslim 
society, unity of the country could occur though an absence of Islam.
209
 
The growing strength of the PNI was noticed by the Dutch authorities. They became 
increasingly concerned about individuals such as Sukarno who were able to draw 
large crowds and who openly insulted the colonial authorities. Governor Andiers C.D. 
de Graeff having already dealt with the Indonesian Workers Union, moved against the 
PNI and arrested Sukarno in 1929. He was tried in 1930, and found guilty.
210
 Sukarno 
was sentenced to four years, but was released early at the end of 1931. In the wake of 
the dissolution of the PNI there would be other organisations established. However a 
split would emerge between those who espoused some cooperation with the Dutch 
and those who held more radical nationalist views.
211
 Sukarno continued to present a 
challenge to Dutch rule. He commanded "...the respect and loyalty of many 
intellectuals while establishing wide rapport with the masses..." To counter this he 
was exiled to the island of Flores by the Dutch until 1942 when he was released by 
Japanese forces.
212
 
The PKI or Indonesian communist party established in 1920, was involved heavily in 
nationalist activity as well as in trade unions. The Dutch were quick to realise the 
danger that this organisation represented to their authority and exiled the party's 
leaders.
213
 The result of this was the emergence of a more radical group in the party 
who attempted a number of revolts in 1926 and 1927. At this time the party 
membership numbered around 3000. The Dutch crushed the revolts, imprisoning and 
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interning those caught.
214
 The party was declared illegal in 1927 and would "...put an 
effective end to Communist activity in the Indies for the remaining period of Dutch 
rule."
215
 
The Dutch Colonial Army 
The KNIL or Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger was one of the coercive 
instruments used by the Dutch to control the East Indies. Concordance theory 
introduces Indonesia's own historical and cultural experience into the discussion of 
the nation's civil military relations. By doing this, it allows conclusions to be drawn 
about the particular patterns of civil military relations in Indonesia and to better 
understand the attitudes of the soldiers toward the politicians. 
The colonial military period is significant because it directly affects the way in which 
the military in the post-colonial period behaved. Many KNIL officers would come to 
hold powerful positions in Indonesia's military. The types of appointments taken by 
these men would have profound impacts not only on the structure of the military and 
its doctrine, but also and most significantly for this study, on the way in which the 
military would view politicians and civilian government, and act toward civilian 
institutions, which are all important elements within a concordance. 
The KNIL was primarily trained for internal operations, however this was to all 
change with the rapid Japanese headway made through the Pacific.
216
 It quickly 
became obvious that the KNIL was going to be needed to defend the Indies. The 
defence of the colony had been predicated on the idea that the allied powers would 
help the Dutch defend the East Indies in the case of a military threat to the 
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Archipelago. The Dutch knew that their forces alone would prove incapable of 
defending the colony.
217
 
The KNIL by 1940 had a professional Officer Corps numbering around 1300 and an 
enlisted force numbering around 37,000.
218
 Complementing the Colonial Army was 
also a small Naval force and an Air force which had around 275 aircraft.
219
 When the 
Japanese invasion did reach the East Indies, the Dutch did not contemplate a general 
mobilisation, nor did they employ asymmetric tactics. The KNIL was overrun and 
defeated relatively quickly by the Japanese forces, with around 65,000 members of 
the Dutch armed forces interned.
220
 
The structure of the KNIL also reflected the Dutch policy of excluding Indonesians 
from positions of Authority. The KNIL Officer Corps was primarily filled with those 
of European or Eurasian extraction. There were however some important exceptions 
to this. One such exception was Lt. Gen. A.H Nasution, who attended the Royal 
Dutch Military Training academy. Nasution was one of a small minority of officers 
who attained senior ranks in the KNIL. His experience within the KNIL would come 
to have a significant impact on the development of the Indonesian military. 
Like Nasution, Suharto would begin his career in the KNIL. Born to a poor family 
from Yogyakarta, after working a variety of jobs, Suharto joined the KNIL in 1940. In 
June he joined the KNIL aged 19. Following the completion of his military training in 
which he supposedly finished top of his class, he was posted to a battalion near 
Malang.
221
  He was promoted to the rank of sergeant before the invasion of Indonesia 
by the Japanese. With the collapse of the Dutch forces, Suharto took off his KNIL 
uniform and returned to his village to avoid possible persecution by the Japanese 
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occupiers. During the occupation of Indonesia Suharto served initially as a policeman 
and was later recruited into PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, Protectors of the Fatherland). 
PETA was a volunteer army made up of local recruits for the defence of Indonesia 
against and Allied invasion. 
The Japanese Occupation 
The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies began on the 10
th
 of January 1942. By 
the end of January the Japanese had destroyed the combined naval power of the 
Dutch, American, British and Australian navies in the Battle of the Java Sea. The 
Dutch Forces stationed in Indonesia were quickly defeated by the Japanese forces. On 
the 8
th
 March 1942, the Dutch Forces surrendered to the Japanese. The Dutch 
surrender amounted to a collapse of Dutch Authority. There was little sympathy 
amongst the local population for the plight of the Dutch. In some parts of Indonesia 
the local population attacked the Dutch military and Dutch civilians. The Europeans 
who remained (other than those who were allies of Imperial Japan) were interned in 
camps. As the Dutch forces were quickly defeated by the Japanese, the Indonesians 
witnessed the rapid collapse of their former colonial masters. The defeat of the Dutch 
by the Japanese discredited the former colonial masters in the eyes of those whom 
they had ruled.
222
 The Japanese justified their invasion as liberation of the Indonesian 
people from their former white colonial masters.
223
 Initially the Japanese were greeted 
with enthusiasm, however, this was quickly replaced with contempt, as everyday life 
in the Indies became increasingly miserable.
224
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The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies was to have a decisive impact upon 
the political development of Indonesia.  The Japanese encouraged and developed 
political movements amongst the local population which would eventually lead 
Indonesia to independence, “By the time the Japanese surrendered, there had been so 
many extraordinary changes that the Indonesian Revolution was possible. The 
Japanese contributed directly to these developments.”225 
Indonesia was divided into three separate regions by the Japanese; Sumatra under the 
25th Army, Java and Madura under the 7th Army, and Kalimantan and East Indonesia 
under the control of the Japanese Navy. Each region yet was run differently. Java was 
seen as the least important in terms of resources. Despite this, Ricklefs notes that the 
administrative policies in the region had the effect of stimulating nationalism to a 
higher degree than that of the other two regions.
226
 The area under control of the 
Japanese navy was ruled far more harshly due to its importance as a source of raw 
materials for the Japanese war effort.
227
 The Japanese also militarised a significant 
number of young Indonesians, many of whom would later form the backbone of the 
guerrilla resistance to the Dutch. This would have profound consequences over time. 
Schiff's model allows us to take account of this history and demonstrates how the 
legacy of the Japanese trained military organisations would later impact upon the 
shape of Indonesia's future civil military relations. 
The Japanese occupation forces encouraged the aspirations of those in the nationalist 
movement. This may seem surprising given the grand design that the fascist Japanese 
government held for their ever growing Asia-Pacific empire, nevertheless the decision 
to accommodate the Nationalist movement was driven more out of necessity and 
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pragmatism than any wish to see the Indonesian people move toward self-
determination.
228
 By 1944 the Japanese were being confronted with an increasingly 
unfavourable strategic position, and as such the support of those leaders who were 
identified as having nationalist aspirations, became increasingly important. The 
Japanese required the support of the Indonesians to stave off the advance of allied 
forces. By supporting these leaders the Japanese hoped that they would be able to use 
the support of the indigenous population in their confrontation with the allies’ forces. 
From the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese endeavoured to do away with all 
signs of European influence. A propaganda exercise was undertaken which sought to 
convince the Indonesian population of their status as members of a wider ‘Asian 
Brotherhood’, and that they too were part of the new order in Asia.229  The occupiers 
tried to bury all trace of the Europeans. The use of the English and Dutch languages 
was banned, while encouraging the use of Indonesian.  The Indonesian flag and 
national anthem were displayed publicly. As Ricklefs has noted, this propaganda 
campaign emphasised goodwill and a shared destiny but this was ultimately frustrated 
by the realities of occupation.
230
 In the end it “...became clear that the Japanese were 
only another conqueror of Indonesia.”231 It has also been argued that the Japanese 
administration utilised policies which were by and large similar in nature to those 
utilised by the Dutch and that they were as equally despised by the Indonesians. An 
example of these policies was the fostering of racial superiority.
232
 
The Japanese occupation authorities also worked closely with individuals such as 
Mohammed Hatta and Sukarno, men who became central to Indonesia’s 
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independence struggle. These relationships were utilised especially as the tide of war 
was increasingly turned against the Japanese. During 1943 and 1944 Indonesian 
involvement in the Japanese administration was increased through the inclusion of 
Indonesian advisers as well as an advisory board which was headed by Sukarno. 
There was division amongst the occupying administration, with the Army command 
in Java pushing for greater Indonesian participation. This was countered by the other 
military commands in other parts of the Archipelago, as well as the high command in 
Tokyo. 
Japanese support for the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesian people cannot be 
viewed in any way as altruistic. Throughout 1943 and 1944, it was a calculation 
increasingly tempered by the requirements of the war effort. The Japanese were in an 
increasingly dire strategic position, and as such they needed the resources in 
Indonesia more than ever. The support for the nationalists was a careful calculation, 
one which was ultimately decided by the requirements of the war effort. As such, the 
increased support of the nationalist aspirations could be seen as means to an end; 
namely ensuring the support of the populace while at the same time ensuring their 
ongoing access to resources and support from the population.
233
 It must be noted 
however that the Japanese were aware that they would eventually be unable to control 
Indonesian nationalism and would also be unable to keep the populations aspirations 
confined by the limits they placed upon the people.
234
 
The Japanese, as well as encouraging nationalist aspirations, implemented policies 
which would see the formation of organisations in order to fill the ranks of the 
Indonesia Army. Although the Army was not directly formed by either of Indonesia’s 
colonial masters, the para-military and military organisations founded by the Japanese 
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and the Dutch would have a profound impact upon those who served in ranks of the 
Army as well as on the culture and conduct of the organisation in the post-
independence period. In 1943, as the position of Japan's military was becoming 
increasingly precarious. It was confronted with a situation in which it was attempting 
to occupy a large number of different countries separated by the vastness of the 
Pacific Ocean.  Japanese commanders in Indonesia were aware of their increasingly 
tenuous position. The forces which the Japanese had at their disposal in Indonesia 
were numerically insufficient, as well as in some cases, inadequately equipped. As 
such the overall defensive capability of the Japanese forces was severely 
compromised.
235
 
The solution to this position of weakness that the Japanese found themselves in, 
would now be found in the Mobilisation policy. The Japanese had, from the beginning 
of their occupation of Indonesia, mobilised the local population in an effort to further 
enhance their war fighting capability. 
236
 1943 saw the creation of an organisation 
which would aid the Japanese forces in their defence of Indonesia, and perhaps more 
significantly would become the “...nucleus of the future Indonesian republican 
army.”237 
In December of 1943, the first battalions of the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air - The 
Defender of the Fatherland) were formed.  While the Japanese created a number of 
youth organisations PETA was one of the largest and most significant. Estimates of 
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the organisation’s size, vary from 40,000 to 120,000.238 It should be noted that PETA 
was not the only organisation to receive training. As Salim points out, basic military 
training had become common in many of the other Japanese sponsored 
organisations.
239
 Heiho was a similar initiative to PETA. It was set up to provide 
Indonesian assistance to regular Japanese forces. Unlike PETA, Heiho soldiers would 
assist Japanese forces directly, often by providing supplementary tasks to specific 
units.
240
 
The typical PETA recruit was aged in their teens or early twenties.
241
The period and 
content of the training varied depending upon the trainee's rank in PETA.
242
 Noted by 
those who took part in these programs was the intense discipline, emphasis upon self-
reliance and the propensity to endure hardship.
243
 PETA recruits were also heavily 
indoctrinated with ideas of Indonesian nationalism.
244
 This indoctrination also 
consisted of what Sundhaussen has termed “...samurai...” type indoctrination.245 This 
samurai type indoctrination concentrated upon the individual's fighting spirit. The 
Japanese believed very strongly that if they could instil these values in their 
Indonesian recruits they would fight for the Japanese in their coming confrontation 
with the allied forces.
246
 The Japanese hoped that this type of indoctrination would 
create a force which would tenaciously oppose the inevitable allied invasion. The 
impact of the PETA experience upon those who served was considerable. It impacted 
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greatly on these men’s view of the military’s place in society. Those who served in 
PETA were indoctrinated with a number of beliefs and perceptions which would later 
affect their perceptions of civilian leadership, as well as the other soldiers with whom 
they served. 
The values and ideas that these men were indoctrinated with are an essential part of 
one of Schiff's indicators that of Military Style. Schiff refers to Military style as: 
"...the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated 
with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people 
think about it. Why is style so important? Style is about the drawing of 
social boundaries or their elimination."
247
 
 
Military style particularly that of the PETA soldiers, is a very important element in 
explaining the behaviour and nature of these soldiers in the wake of the Japanese 
surrender and the struggle for independence. Kingsbury notes a number of the aspects 
of PETA and of the Japanese experience which would later inform the Post-
Revolutionary Indonesian military mind.
248
 Kingsbury claims that the system of Dwi 
Fungsi (Dual Function), which was the guiding principle prescribing Indonesia’s civil 
military relations for many years, was inherited from the theoretical underpinnings 
prominent in Japanese Fascist ideology. The civilian leadership was unable to exercise 
any authority in the military arena. Increasingly however the military came to involve 
itself in the civil arena. This pattern somewhat mirrored the evolution of civil-military 
relations in Indonesia. This sentiment is similarly offered by McVey, who argues that 
“...in the PETA, future army leaders had been persuaded by their Japanese mentors of 
the need for military independence from civilian control.”249 
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Pauker goes further to argue that the PETA soldiers were the “...intellectual 
captives...” of the training they had received from the Japanese, and as such they held 
a particularly entrenched unfavourable view of their civilian masters.
250
 It has also 
been argued that the way in which the Indonesian military came to involve itself both 
in the domestic and foreign affairs of the nation was inherited from the example of the 
Japanese occupation forces.
251
 Kingsbury argues that the Japanese forces had other 
impacts upon the fledgling Indonesian military. He suggests that the Japanese 
military's utilisation of mass organisations would also have a profound impact upon 
the Indonesian military.
252
 A further significant argument from Kingsbury relates to 
the use of violence by the Japanese fascist government. According to Huntington this 
amounted to the "....superimposing of an extralegal system of violence upon the 
formal system of constitutional government.”253 Kingsbury suggests examples of this 
can be seen in the history of the TNI. He specifically mentions for example the use of 
the TNI to suppress the communists in the mid 1960's and later the use of Kopassus 
(Indonesian Army Special Forces) to target and eliminate sources of domestic 
political dissent.
254
 
The Japanese occupation forces and system of government administration may have 
also impacted upon the development if the TNI's Dwi Fungsi. It has been argued that 
during World War Two the Japanese had a civil-military relationship that was 
characterised by a high degree of military independence.
255
 It is also claimed that the 
Japanese system of government during this time allowed for a level of separation 
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between the military and the civil, according to their principle of niju seif (Dual 
Government). Kingsbury claims this idea was reflected in the TNI's doctrine of Dwi 
Fungsi.
256
 
The KNIL, like the Japanese armed groups, also had an important legacy upon the 
development of the Indonesian armed forces. It was historically used by the Dutch in 
an internal security role, putting down uprisings and quelling resistance to their 
rule.
257
 The importance of conducting internal operations has certainly been an 
important ongoing mission of the Indonesian army and the wider security forces. This 
mission to ensure the ongoing integrity of the country has often been perused with 
ruthless efficiency as can be seen in operations undertaken in Aceh and Papua. As 
noted, the KNIL leadership was mainly comprised of European officers. These 
individuals had been educated according to western military standards at Dutch 
military academies and brought with them notions of military professionalism 
different to those understood by members of Japanese founded organisations. The 
KNIL group of officers, though small in number, would become a powerful group in 
the new army and because of their educational background they were able to 
undertake staff duties.
258
 This educational background was to be one of the major 
points of difference in the future between the KNIL soldiers and those from PETA 
and other mass organisations. 
There were a number of individuals who served in the ranks of PETA who would 
come to have a significant impact upon the course of Indonesian history and hold 
significant roles in Indonesian politics and the military. Suharto is one such individual 
and possibly the most significant to this discussion. His intense patriotism was 
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fostered as part of the PETA indoctrination.
259
 The PETA experience crucially would 
come to inform the opinions of those who had served in its ranks about the role of the 
military, the nature of the military, and the relationship between the military and 
civilians. Kingsbury, Elson and Pauker all suggest that the experience that PETA 
soldiers had during their time in the organisation pushed them to view civilians with a 
certain degree of suspicion and mistrust. Kingsbury argues that the PETA soldiers 
came to believe that there should be a relationship between the military and 
government, and that the military had a role in directing and controlling society.
260
 
Elson suggests that it was PETA's freedom from civilian control or authority that 
would come to have a major impact upon the post-independence Armed Forces.
261
 
Pauker, considered that it was the values that the Japanese instilled within the PETA 
soldiers which would lead to them holding contempt for "...scheming politicians..."
262
 
Revolution 
The existence of PETA and other para-military groups gave the Indonesian 
Nationalists the means to resist the Dutch in the wake of Japan's defeat in Indonesia. 
Many of those whom had served in the Japanese Para-Military organisations would 
become fighters in the war against the Dutch, and this then led to the end of Dutch 
control over Indonesia. This episode in Indonesia's history became known as the 
revolutionary period. This period brought the further development of the Indonesian 
armed forces, as well as the further evolution of the philosophical and theoretical 
underpinnings that would later inform the behaviour of the TNI, and its relationship 
with the civilian government within the fledgling state. 
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When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on the 15
th
 August 1945, pressure began 
to mount upon the young nationalist leadership to declare independence. Sukarno and 
Hatta were however conscious of avoiding armed conflict with the Japanese forces 
remaining.
263
 There were other individuals who were more determined to have 
independence declared immediately. One group in particular took matters into their 
own hands. Menteng 31 Group abducted Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to 
declare independence. 
The pronouncement of Indonesian independence took place on the 17
th
 August 1945. 
Despite proclaiming independence, Sukarno and Hatta knew that they would still have 
to be careful. Some armed Japanese troops remained in the country and, as the allies 
were about to land in Indonesia, they were keen to avoid a confrontation or an act 
which would in any way compromise their proclamation of independence. It is 
interesting to note that at this point, there were no plans for the creation of an Army. It 
has been pointed out that this may have been due to the divergent views held by the 
nationalist leadership, relating to the methods and strategy which were to be used in 
the independence struggle. It has been argued that those such as Hatta and Sukarno 
were keen to avoid direct conflict and therefore favoured a policy which would 
emphasise diplomatic negotiation. Those men, who had belonged to organisations 
such as PETA and the other youth para-military groups, believed that it was more 
likely that independence would be achieved as a result of armed struggle.
264
 It was 
due to this cleavage that the new government had to be careful in the strategy it 
employed to gain self-determination. They were faced with a situation in which 
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increasingly large numbers of men were determined to pursue an aggressive strategy 
toward the Dutch. 
The new republic’s leaders found themselves in a situation that was further 
complicated by the disarray which now confronted leaders in the wake of the 
Japanese military defeat. Despite the departure of many of the Japanese, armed 
Japanese soldiers remained and the para-military organisations which had been 
formed by the Japanese had been demobilised. This resulted in large numbers of 
young men with access to weapons. The Indonesians were also aware of the 
approaching landing of allied troops and the republics leaders were keen to avoid a 
confrontation. As previously mentioned, the republic’s leaders were grappling with 
the question of founding a military force. Simultaneously, many of the men who had 
been members of PETA and the other similar Japanese Para-military organisations 
were beginning to organise their own ad-hoc organisations. As Ricklefs notes, these 
organisations were often formed spontaneously by young charismatic leaders, who 
more often than not had access to arms.
265
 Therefore one could argue, that it was at 
this time, that a proto and unofficial Indonesian army began to evolve, without 
submitting to the nascent republic's civilian leadership. 
It was during the revolutionary period, and in its immediate aftermath, that the 
government struggled to bring the para-military forces to heel.
266
 Jenkins stated that it 
was at this point in time which contained many of the origins of future conflicts that 
would break out between the civilian government and the military.
267
 Salim Said, who 
has written on the Indonesian military and the leaders of the military, supports 
Jenkin’s position by stating that it was the weakness of Indonesian governments to 
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establish effective civilian institutions as well as the military’s involvement in politics 
from its birth that would result in a source for future conflicts between the military 
and the civilian government.
268
 As previously noted the civilian leaders were taking a 
different path to those former PETA fighters and the Pemuda.
269
 
The Revolution and the Creation of an Army 
With the proclamation of Independence, pressure was brought to bear upon Sukarno 
over the issue of raising a military force. This pressure was applied by the numerous 
Pemuda groups, who had been radicalised by the suffering and oppression of the 
Japanese occupation.
270
 Representatives of the Pemuda and other groups met with 
Sukarno over the action that should be done about the PETA.
271
 Pemuda were pushing 
to have a national army created. Sukarno and the government leaders were 
circumspect. As mentioned, they were concerned with the possible reaction of the 
Allies and the Japanese.
272
 Despite this, on the 22nd of August 1945, the People’s 
Security Agency, BKR, was created. 
On the 4th of September 1945 Sukarno began naming ministers who would form his 
cabinet. One post was curiously absent that of the Defence minister. It was not until 
the 6th of October that a name was actually put forward. This is a further example of 
the government’s concern about Allied reaction to the formation of the security 
services.
273
 It is important to note that as the BKR came into existence, there were 
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already armed groups forming spontaneously outside of Jakarta. It has been noted that 
there was a lack of control over those outside of Jakarta at this time, and as such these 
groups were created autonomously of any central direction.
274
 It is also important to 
note that many of these armed groups began to align themselves to specific political 
parties or causes, and this would lead to conflict among various political interests. 
Those groups who chose to stay outside of the BKR, or later the army were 
encouraged to form partisan groups or Lasykar. 
It became obvious that the BKR was ineffective. Because the BKR had proved 
difficult for the central government to control. Furthermore the number of Pemuda 
who had armed themselves and stayed outside of the BKR resulted in the political 
leadership looking to the creation of a "...hierarchical and purely military organization 
directly under its own control."
275
 Thus the People’s Security Army or TKR came into 
existence. The structure of the new force was improved, according to Sundhaussen by 
the inclusion of the former KNIL officers.
276
 Even at the beginning, tensions were 
present over the leadership of the army. There was tension about the appointment of 
the Chief of the General Headquarters of the new army, because Urip Sumohardjo, 
the man chosen was a former KNIL officer. This action created resentment with those 
whom had served in PETA.
277
 
This would form a flashpoint for tension in the new army as there was an inherent 
friction between those soldiers who had trained in the Dutch forces and those who 
were PETA recruits. In this created major issues at the leadership level, particularly 
because the KNIL officers had the ability to carry out staff duties.
278
 Added to this 
mix were individuals who came from a Lasykar background. These individuals were a 
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disparate group who had a variety of different allegiances and beliefs. They were not 
career military officers like those individuals who had entered from the KNIL, but 
were instead motivated by other ideological causes or aligned with political parties.
279
 
Some of these Lasykar and Pemuda groups operated outside the military, others 
however were incorporated within the new army. 
David Jenkins argues that, following this appointment of Urip Sumohardjo, the 
government virtually left the military alone, as they were unsure what to do next, 
"...there were no policy guidelines and no attempt was made to control the recruitment 
or promotion of officers or to bring the military structure under government 
control."
280
 The TKR was organised on the basis of four Komandemens comprising 
Sumatra, West, Central and East Java. These Komandemens were responsible for both 
the TKR and the partisan or Lasykar groups. However as Sundhaussen observes, 
much of this organisation was superficial. In the case of the Sumatran command, he 
notes that the General in charge was resented by his troops for having no military 
training, and for his ethnic background.
281
 The General was Javanese and had been 
put in charge of a Sumatran command.
282
 Ethnic and religious diversity would also 
become a significant issue within the military. 
Indonesia is a very ethnically diverse nation, and this diversity was not reflected in the 
officer corps during the army's establishment. Within the officer corps there was a 
high percentage of Javanese officers, which totalled approximately 70-80% of the 
total officer corps.
283
 The next most significant group were the Sudanese, and 
alongside the Sudanese were a number of other smaller populations. The ethnic 
division within the military began to create tensions as the Javanese officers, who 
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were over represented, were spread throughout the country in command roles, and 
were increasingly concentrated within the army's headquarters. This situation in the 
military also mirrored what was occurring more widely throughout the government.
284
 
The prominence of Javanese officers within the military's senior positions would 
become a source of grievance for those who came from outside of Java. Sundhaussen 
notes that in the first few years of the army's existence, the ethnic issue was not to 
prove a serious flashpoint, however it became more serious in the 1950's.
285
 
The TKR was divided further along religious lines. Indonesia is comprised of a 
number of different religious faiths, Islam of which is the most widely followed. In 
Indonesia Islam is divided between those who follow a more conservative faith and 
those who have a more secular outlook. This divide was replicated within the new 
army. Those, known as Santri adhere to a strict orthodox interpretation of Islam and 
its laws. This group was often in conflict with those known as Abangan. The Abangan 
belief system is more secular in orientation and comprised of mystic beliefs 
incorporating both Islam and Hinduism. The officers from within Java were shaped 
by this divide; those from central Java held the Abangan beliefs, while those from 
East and West Java along with the outer islands tended to hold Santri beliefs.
286
 
Alongside Islam, Christianity and Hinduism are practised in Indonesia. During the 
early 1950's the most senior military officer, Simatupang, was a Protestant. Some 
officers were also Catholics, although they did not generally attain similar heights to 
those of other religious denomination.
287
 There were very few Hindu officers amongst 
the ranks of the officer corps. 
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The nature of the fighting engaged by the Indonesian nationalists and the army would 
also have a fundamental impact upon the military. The independence struggle 
involved periods of guerrilla warfare involving irregular forces, such as the Laskar, as 
well as regular military units. It was a conflict that required both political action as 
well as military action. The guerrilla war that took place between the Indonesian 
nationalist army and the Dutch would have implications not only on the development 
of Indonesian military doctrine and strategy but also on the relationship between the 
military and the people. The military depended upon winning the hearts of the people 
to defeat the Dutch. General Nasution defined this in August 1948, when he outlined 
his strategy "Executing total people’s resistance". This strategy involved a close 
relationship between the villagers and the soldiers who they depended upon. Nasution 
argued that in order for the strategy to work, a number of different command levels 
were put in place. The base level would require military personnel at village level to 
prevent infiltration or manipulation of the populace by the enemy.
288
 McGregor 
describes this experience as being at the core of the military's claim to direct access to 
the people as well as their political role.
289
 When the civilian leadership of the 
revolution were surrounded and captured on the 20th December 1948, the military 
fought on and viewed themselves as the saviours of the republic.
290
 Jenkins argues 
that the military felt as though it had been betrayed by the actions of the civilian 
leadership; he also claims that civilians who fought with the army against the Dutch 
came to view the military as being the republic.
291
 Sundhaussen goes further, claiming 
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that the military came to see themselves as being responsible for Indonesia's eventual 
independence.
292
  
The guerrilla war and the surrender of the nationalist movement would have important 
consequences for the development of the evolving Indonesian military mind. Firstly, 
the military viewed itself as having had a shared experience with the population in 
winning independence, particularly in the guerrilla phases of the war. This would 
justify their belief that they had a social and political role to play. Secondly, the 
surrender of the independence movement's political leadership nurtured a sense that 
they had been let down by civilian politicians, and perhaps reinforced a sense of 
inherent civilian weakness in the minds of some of the soldiers. Thirdly, it was the 
military that won independence, when at the time the independence movement had 
looked its weakest yet had continued fighting and eventually won. It seems plausible 
to suggest that this engendered a sense of entitlement within them, as well as the view 
of superiority to those civilians who had surrendered. 
The war for independence and the guerrilla struggle would also have an important 
side effect for the chain of command and the military hierarchy. It was a conflict 
which by its very nature was highly decentralised. Military officers in outer islands 
had limited contact with those in Java and vice versa. Nevertheless, the cause of 
independence bound this disparate group together. When the struggle ended, this bond 
no longer existed, and respect for the officer’s rank was by no means guaranteed.293 In 
Java, units operated with little contact between one another when they did operate 
together it was more "...collegial than hierarchical…" This was further strengthened 
by the fact that these units were drawn out of the local population and reflected the 
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local ethnic and cultural intricacies.
294
 The revolutionary experience created an 
intense bond amongst these individuals which, as McVey argues, created alliances 
and relationships that endured after the revolution had ceased.
295
  
The significance of shared experience during the revolution between the young men 
and their seniors cultivated a level of loyalty that was particularly intense. McVey 
suggests that this would create a bond between commanders and men that was more 
"...vivid and enduring..." than any subsequent, and "when torn between revolutionary 
loyalties and the authority of their current commander, soldiers were only too likely to 
choose their revolutionary chief or to avoid action altogether."
296
 
The Indonesian army would also become involved in counter-insurgency operations 
from its foundation. The impact of these military operations would be profound and 
enduring, the significance of which cannot be underestimated. The nature of the 
struggle that took place in the wake of Independence would have a profound impact 
upon the development of the army's ethos and doctrine. The independence struggle 
involved a four year conflict with the Dutch. The Indonesian Army's experience in 
undertaking counter-insurgency operations against the Darul Islam or Negara Islam 
Indonesia. Darul Islam an early example was a parallel state to the republic, 
established in 1948 according to Muslim practice and law. It was located in Western 
Java where more modern interpretations of Islam had been unable to gain a significant 
following.
297
 This state was headed by S.M Kartosuwirjo, who called for the 
Indonesian Republican Government to scrap the Renville agreement with the Dutch. 
If it did not, Kartosuwirjo advocated the removal of the republican government and its 
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replacement by democratic means.
298
 Darul Islam also possessed military capabilities, 
which it would use to continue its fight against the Dutch in West Java. Following the 
proclamation of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950, Kartosuwirjo appealed to 
Sukarno twice through letters calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. These 
letters were never responded to, and Indonesia remained a secular state. Darul Islam 
sought separation from the republic and control of its own territory.
299
 As time passed 
the organisation attracted individuals who were more interested in lining their own 
pockets and who engaged in extortion to secure supplies and perpetrated violence 
against the local population.
300
 Darul Islam would remain a significant challenge for 
the Indonesian security forces until its final collapse in 1962 with the capture of its 
leader. 
Similarly, the Madiun affair of 1948 was a further example of the military engaging in 
an internal security role. Tensions were initially provoked by the proposal of a 
reduction in the size of the army. Nasution wished to reduce the size of the military 
from approximately 350,000 regulars and 470,000 Laskar in Java to a force of 
approximately 160,000. Consequently, there would be those who would suffer under 
the demobilisation plan, namely many of the local Javanese units, and the Laskar.
301
 
This would prove a source of grievance and one which would later be seized upon by 
the PKI in its confrontation with the republican government.
302
 Amid this climate of 
tension and discontent, Musso, a PKI leader of the 1920's arrived in Indonesia from 
the Soviet Union. As the PKI began encouraging demonstrations by workers and 
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peasants in the Surakarta area, Musso began challenging the republic's diplomatic 
strategy of trying to win American support for its independence.
303
 The PKI also 
criticized the plans for the rationalization of the military which it viewed as turning 
the military into a first and second class army.
304
 By the middle of September 1948, 
clashes were taking place between those elements of the armed forces loyal to the 
government and those loyal to the PKI. The government sent in the Siliwangi 
Division, which pushed the PKI forces into Madiun. On the 18 September 1948 the 
PKI won strategic sites in the city of Madiun and announced that a new National 
Front Government had been formed. Despite an offer of compromise made by the 
leaders of the PKI to the republican government, it was decided that the republic 
would not accept the offer.
305
 Sukarno announced on the 19 September 1948 that the 
PKI's activities amounted to an attempt to topple the national government. The 
Siliwangi division now marched on Madiun. Vicious fighting took place between 
those forces loyal to the PKI and those of the national government. By the 30th of 
September, however, the uprising was over and the city had been recaptured.
306
 The 
events in Madiun would have far reaching consequences for the military. The project 
of rationalising and reorganising the military would continue. The main proponent of 
this plan, General Nasution, whose Siliwangi division had been bought to fight the 
PKI, found his position was enhanced.
307
 Following Madiun, the military was purged 
of the officers and soldiers who had taken sides with the PKI. This, argues 
Sundhaussen, was an attempt to remove a variety of extremists from the army.
308
 The 
soldiers who remained loyal to the republic, the Madiun affair a treasonous and an 
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extremely violent act, and one which resulted in soldiers regarding the political left 
and communism in particular, with a lasting sense of enmity.
309
 
The examples of Darul Islam and the Madiun Affair both illustrate that from a very 
early stage the Army had a significant role to play as an agent for maintaining internal 
security. In the wake of the Madiun affair, Sukarno spoke about the danger of having 
sectional interests adopted above those of the people, and stated that there was only 
one ideology that the military should accept, that of Pancasila.
310
 Both the handling of 
Madiun and the initial experience with Darul Islam would also lead to the military 
rejecting both militant Islam and communism.
311
 For the Indonesian army the early 
experience of counter-insurgency and conducting of guerrilla style operations would 
come to permeate Indonesian strategic thinking and shape the relationship that the 
military would come to hold within the state as well as its relationship with the 
people. In November 1948, General Nasution issued operational order Number 1, 
which would come to be known as the territorial concept. Inherent within this, was the 
notion that there should be a territorial control network that exists from the village 
up.
312
 Nasution also emphasised heavily the importance of the relationship between 
the people and the guerrilla. This, claims Cribb, was not only significant for the 
development of guerrilla strategies but also for the army to claim a "...direct 
relationship with the people, independent of the republican state, and so to establish a 
platform and justification for army involvement in politics."
313
 The combined effect 
of this was to create a military which from its inception, would take a major role in 
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maintaining internal security. This was developed from the early experience that it 
had in COIN operations. As Fairburn argues, this orientated the "...Indonesian army 
organisation and activities along police-action-cum-civic-action lines."
314
 The 
experience of having prosecuted a guerrilla war and then having been engaged in 
COIN operations led the military to realise the significance of politics and 
maintaining a connection to society in order to execute its role in internal security, 
Jenkins considered that this was the formative period for its later doctrine of Dwi 
Fungsi, which would shape Indonesian civil military relationship under Suharto. 
Structurally the age distribution within the new army would have affected the stability 
of the new organisation in years to come. As Sundhaussen notes this is a problem 
typical of armies in new states.
315
 In the case of the Indonesian army, the senior 
officers, were all very young. Sudirman, who was promoted to head the army in 1945, 
was 33 years old at the time of his appointment, and his divisional commanders were 
aged in their 20's.
316
 The young age of those serving in the officer corps can have a 
number of negative impacts for the cohesion and discipline of the army. To begin 
with, it created tension and rivalries amongst the individuals serving. It was plausible 
to have two soldiers of a similar age and experience, but one receiving a more senior 
rank. This would create a situation in which the soldier of lower rank was likely to 
question his senior officer's appointment, and could as Luckham suggests "...weaken 
established patterns of discipline..."
317
 The similar ages of officers in Indonesia 
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created an environment of "...envy and resentment..." between those in less senior 
positions.
318
 
The military hierarchy and system of discipline was further undermined by individual 
officers who promoted themselves to higher ranks, or created their own regiments that 
were comprised of their friends and acquaintances.
319
 The army tried to put an end to 
this practice in 1946 when, during a conference, it was agreed that senior ranks would 
only be given to a certain number of officers holding specific commands.
320
 This 
breakdown in the system of military hierarchy and discipline also manifested itself in 
the election of acceptable commanders to leadership positions by their 
subordinates.
321
 Soldiers were electing their commanding officers. This practice was 
completely undermining the system of military promotion which is based upon merit, 
experience and knowledge. It was being replaced by practice which was undermining 
military discipline and western concepts of military professionalism, with a chain of 
command that included those who had not earned their positions through merit. In the 
wake of independence, those officers who held command positions were uninterested 
in resigning their command; this created a situation in which the channels for 
promotion became jammed.
322
 This not only had a negative impact upon the military's 
chain of command and the military's discipline, but it would also prove a source of 
future conflict. 
The Indonesian Army from its very inception was beset by division. The importance 
of the backgrounds of officers and soldiers who would come to fill the rank and file of 
the TKR cannot be underestimated. This division manifested itself in the level of 
training of the soldiers and officers, their views on civilian leadership, tactics and 
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strategy and their levels of education. There was hostility between the two groups as 
they struggled for control of the new organisation. Ethnic rivalry between the various 
groups recruited into the new army would also prove a source of tension, both at the 
time of its creation and at points in the future. The level of tension between these 
various factions was compounded by the overall lack of civilian control of the 
military in its early stages of existence. The military during the revolution often 
operated quite independently of those political leaders in charge of the new republican 
government. There were, for example, revolutionaries outside of Java who had very 
little contact with the politicians and leaders of the revolution. 
Analysis 
The Military 
The military was far from evolving into a coherent actor, it slowly evolved from the 
remnants of the KNIL and the Japanese trained Indonesian auxiliary forces. These 
disparate coercive elements then combined together in the struggle for independence. 
The backgrounds of the individuals from these two organisations created significant 
division within this new army. Command was problematic, commanders acted outside 
of a unified chain of command. There was deep disagreement and resentment within 
the new organisation about the appointment of officers to positions of command. The 
KNIL officers took positions of command within the new army, including the position 
of the Chief of General Headquarters. Such appointments highlighted the division 
between those from the western 'professional' KNIL background, and those from the 
Japanese and other youth and religious based organisations. Cohesion in the army was 
further undermined in this early period by ethnic and religious diversity present within 
the officer corps as in its lower ranks. Religion also compounded the factionalism 
85 
 
present in the organisation, with a split amongst those officers from the Islamic faith, 
as well as those who held Hindu and Christian beliefs. As a result there was little or 
no cohesion within the army. Thus the military cannot be seen at this time as a 
coherent partner to any concord. 
Political Leadership 
The basis of the political leadership was the Indonesian nationalist movement which 
had been in existence during the Dutch colonial period and later during the Japanese 
occupation. Under Dutch colonial rule, the PNI, headed by Sukarno was one of the 
organisations that comprised the movement. There were also other organisations such 
as labour unions and religious based organisations that were involved in the 
movement. Sukarno however was one of the individuals to emerge from the 
movement, who had a major impact upon politics of the nation in years to come. 
Sukarno's involvement and importance to the nationalist movement was not 
overlooked by the Dutch, as he was imprisoned and exiled. He commanded 
widespread support amongst the wider population as well as amongst a variety of 
elites. His nationalist credentials and charisma, made him influential in the later 
struggle with the Dutch. Despite being an influential leader within the nationalist 
movement, his ability to exert direct influence over the armed forces was limited, 
particularly during the guerrilla war with the Dutch. Independence was proclaimed on 
the 17th of August 1945, yet it took until the 4th of September for Sukarno to begin 
naming his cabinet. There was a high degree of caution exercised by the political 
leadership about creating an army; evidence of this can be seen in the time it took 
after the pronouncement of the BKR on the 22nd of August 1945, to name a defence 
minister, which eventually took place on the 6th of October. This demonstrates that 
the political leadership was largely ineffectual as partner. 
86 
 
As previously noted the army during this time often acted quite independently of its 
command structure. The ability of Sukarno to directly influence these operations was 
limited. The nature of the guerrilla war also meant that the soldiers were often living 
within close proximity of civilians and relying upon them for material support. The 
political leadership according to Schiff has "...direct influence over the composition 
and support of the armed forces", however in the context of the war for independence 
this was limited.
323
 It should also be noted that the fledgling military did not always 
have the highest degree of respect for the civilian leadership. When on the 20th of 
December 1948 the leadership of the revolution surrendered to the Dutch, the army 
continued its fight, this had the affect of deeply undermining the credibility of the 
leadership in the eyes of the army. There was a sense of betrayal and distrust of 
civilians that permeated relations between the army and the political leadership for 
many years to come. Despite Sukarno being appointed as president on 17th August 
1945, the effectiveness of his leadership was undermined by the nature of events 
during the revolution and the pursuit of a guerrilla struggle. Thus, the political 
leadership was not a fully formed partner. 
The Citizenry 
The citizenry under the Dutch generally held widespread resentment for their 
treatment by their colonial masters, with the obvious exception of those individuals 
who benefitted directly from the policies of colonial rule. The nationalist movement 
and the drive to independence drew widespread support from a number of different 
groups within Indonesian society, including unions, religious organisations, youth 
groups, communist and many others. These groups had disparate ideas about the 
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political future of Indonesia; in particular there were divisions amongst secular 
nationalists and those with a religious bent. 
Under Japanese rule, when the Indonesian citizenry were trained in military 
organisations such as PETA, nationalism was encouraged to the extent that it 
supported Japanese objectives, but was restricted from becoming a challenge to their 
authority. By the time the Japanese were defeated in Indonesia, there was a politically 
diverse nationalist movement alongside armed groups made up of Indonesian citizens. 
With the surrender of the Japanese, pressure was put by a variety of civilian groups 
onto the nationalist leadership to declare independence. It was one of these 
organisations, Menteng 31 Group, which abducted Sukarno and Hatta and forced 
them to declare independence. The civilian population had a particularly close 
relationship, during the revolution, as the army and civilian guerrilla groups fought a 
protracted war against the Dutch. 
Evidence of this relationship and interdependence can be seen in the writings and 
strategy of General Nasution, who described the need for a close relationship between 
the army and the people to undertake successful resistance. Despite many instances of 
military and civilian cooperation and interdependence, there were also two glaring 
examples where this was undermined: the PKI uprising in Madiun and the Darul 
Islam insurgency. These episodes offered a foreboding vision of the future 
relationship between the military and the civilian population. In a final analysis of this 
partner, there were major divisions amongst the various groupings that comprised this 
partner. These divisions became only more pronounced in the wake of independence, 
and increased again after the conflict with the Dutch. Thus in similarity with the army, 
it is not possible to conclude that the citizenry where a cohesive group, thus any 
possibility for a concordant relationship emerging was not possible. 
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The Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
Indonesia's diverse ethnic composition was poorly reflected in the officer corps, there 
was an over representation of Javanese officers, this from the creation of the 
institution would have a profound impact upon Indonesia's civil military relations, it 
would also have major repercussions for the development of any concordant 
relationship. Within the army itself, there were ramifications for the chain of 
command, particularly when there were individuals from one particular ethnic group 
put in charge of soldiers from another.
324
 There was also the religious division within 
the army and its officer corps. The domination of the officer corps by the Javanese 
became an issue for members of the citizenry who did not belong to this ethnic group, 
this would in time become a source of injustice for those outside of Java. 
Similar to the issue of ethnicity, there were the religious divides amongst the officer 
corps. Muslim officers within the army made up the majority, with minimal numbers 
of those from other faiths being represented, this proved another source of grievance 
for those who felt disadvantaged by their religious faith. It has been noted earlier in 
this chapter that the composition of the political leadership was also mirroring that of 
the armed forces at this time, thus the predominantly Javanese administration was 
unlikely to disagree with the social composition of the officer corps.
325
 Having 
examined the positions of the partners it is not possible to argue that there was any 
agreement on this indicator. 
The Political Decision Making Process 
During the time period that has been discussed, there was a general lack in what 
Schiff would define as the organs of the political decision making process. There was 
                                                 
324
 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967. p.7 
325
 Ibid. p.15 
89 
 
a cabinet that was named on the 4th of September 1945, with the eventual naming of a 
defence minister on the 6th October. This demonstrates the initial indecision and 
complexity of the situation that confronted Indonesia's early political leadership. On 
the one hand they needed to get control of the highly disparate military force that had 
evolved largely spontaneously by 1945. On the other hand the political leadership, 
were concerned about the potential for a negative reaction from the allies. During the 
war with the Dutch that soon followed the declaration of independence the political 
leadership became estranged from the army. The nature of the guerrilla operations 
meant that units fighting the Dutch often acted in a manner independent of the 
political leaders and the political decision making process. The army for its part often 
operated alongside and amongst the local population which it depended upon. When 
the civilian leaders were captured and surrendered, the military came to view those 
civilians with distrust as well as the institutions that comprised the political decision 
making process. Once again the nature of events during this time stunted the ability of 
any stable political decision making organs to develop and there was a general lack of 
certainty about how such organs should operate. The military in particular became 
prejudiced toward such civilian institutions. Thus any agreement amongst the partners 
on this indicator was not possible and this prevented any concordant relationship. 
Recruitment Method 
The recruitment indicator was not significant. The post-independence army that 
evolved did so out of a number of different armed groups, with those who participated 
doing so on the basis of a commitment to ensuring Indonesia's ongoing independence 
from the Dutch. It certainly could not be argued that coercive recruitment was at work 
so many of those that took part in the fighting were driven to participate out of 
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patriotism. Thus it could be termed persuasive recruitment. The significance of this 
indicator during this time by comparison to the others was negligible. 
Military Style 
This early period of Indonesia's history had a formative impact upon the development 
of the army's military style and on the future of Indonesian civil military relations. As 
has already been discussed the origins of the TNI came from the Dutch colonial 
military, Japanese trained militia groups and lastly the guerrilla groups involved in the 
war against the Dutch. These groups had vastly different levels of professionalism, 
training, education and cohesion, ultimately they were bought together in one army; 
however, the historical legacy of these different groups had a distinct impact upon the 
newly formed Indonesian military. The KNIL officer group became important 
because of its ability to manage the military at the senior leadership level; PETA by 
contrast had a very different educational experience to the KNIL officers. This 
resulted in KNIL men holding higher rank, combined with the fact that most of the 
recruits to the new army were all of a relatively young age, there was a degree of 
resentment that began to build quickly amongst those who believed they had been 
passed over for higher ranks; typically this was those from a PETA background. This 
illustrates a characteristic of the Indonesian military that would become a big part of 
the ethos of the organisation, namely internal division. The participation of the army 
and the eventual victory of the nationalist's over the Dutch was also uniquely 
interpreted by many in the army. Firstly, the army as a result of the military campaign 
and their involvement in it came to view themselves as being the guardians of the new 
state. They had fought, sacrificed and had won independence. Secondly, there was a 
generally negative view held amongst the army regarding civilian leadership. The 
actions of those nationalist leaders who surrendered to the Dutch even as the army 
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continued to fight was resented deeply. The military by the end of the war with the 
Dutch came to view civilian political elites in a negative manner; this view would 
permeate military relations with the political elites for many years to come. The 
army's relationship with the wider population was close because of the nature of the 
guerrilla conflict and because of the view held amongst military men that that the 
army had evolved from the people. Thus, they believed that they had a particularly 
unique and close relationship with the wider population. 
The military's involvement in the defeat of the PKI in Madiun in 1948 would also 
have important consequences for its style. This early example of the army's 
participation in a counter insurgency style operation had a couple of important 
impacts upon the organisation. Firstly, the example of the PKI rebellion demonstrated 
to the army the danger of any uprising that had the potential to threaten the unitary 
nature of the Indonesian state. They had from their inception been exposed to the 
danger of dissent and demands for succession. Secondly, the Indonesian from its early 
days was operating in a counter insurgency type role, on which Alfred Stepan argues 
can create a style of military professionalism different from that of Huntington's 
politically neutral soldier.
326
 Stepan argued that these soldiers in order to be 
successful within a counter insurgency role required political knowledge and skills 
that challenged Huntington's politically neutral argument. 
Agreement amongst all the partners on military style was not possible. The military 
was imbued with an attitude of suspicion toward civilian politicians and the country's 
political leadership. Despite the close involvement between the army and much of the 
population during the war with the Dutch, the events in Madiun and the actions of 
Darul Islam, made the army suspicious of some groups in Indonesian society, namely 
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the political left and radical Islam. This would impact upon the army's relationship 
with the citizenry. The political leadership for its part was cautious of the army which 
had emerged after the revolution as a self-confident entity, with a distrust of the 
nation’s politicians. The civilians for their part had largely participated and operated 
alongside of the army during the revolution, with the exception of those groups who 
had supported the PKI and Darul Islam. Thus with the exception of the two groups 
who had fought against the army, the citizenry was largely accepting of the army's 
military style. 
The period of colonial rule, Japanese occupation and then the revolution that 
culminated with the defeat of the Dutch forces had a profound impact upon the 
evolving civil military relationship. The military was evolving, but was far from 
cohesive, there were as a result of its experience in these events the seeds of conflict 
which led to intense factionalisation within its ranks for years to come. It had 
developed largely autonomously of any political leadership, and was comprised of 
individuals from a wide range of backgrounds, resulting in an army that had a number 
of officers with different levels of technical knowledge, command experience and 
professionalism. The chain of command suffered as a result of a young officer corps; 
there was resentment held by those officers who missed out on command positions 
despite their similar age to those successful candidates. Command and control also 
suffered as a result of those units that operated during the revolution largely 
autonomously of the centre. The commanders of such units had cultivated a close 
bond with their soldiers, one that the central command structure was often unable to 
affect. The conduct of the revolution’s leaders resulted in this fledgling army 
becoming highly suspicious of civilian politicians. The army from its inception had 
operated in a role outside of that of a typical war fighting. This was because of the 
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nature of the conflicts in which it was participating, namely guerrilla operations and 
counter-insurgency operations. This resulted in the army developing a political role 
and expertise for itself from its very beginning. 
Concordance didn't exist during this early period of the army's history. It has been 
demonstrated that the army as a partner was far from coherent, it was beset by 
factionalisation. The political leadership was symbolised by the charismatic Sukarno, 
however this partner was also divided. The citizenry for its part was made up of a 
number conflicting views about what independent Indonesia should like. The 
activities of Darul Islam and the PKI evidenced that there were groups within the 
citizenry willing to undertake violent action to impose their vision of the future. There 
could be no agreement on the indicators of concordance as long as the partners lacked 
cohesion. 
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Chapter Four 
Despite the army's successful contribution to the revolution it would soon find itself 
the victim of political interference, and internal division. Beginning in 1950 this 
chapter traces the development of a particularly dysfunctional time in the history of 
the army, the citizenry and Indonesia's political leadership. This chapter also focuses 
on the attempts made by the military's leadership to implement reform, and how in 
combination with the army's factionalism and political interference these factors 
contributed to a number of incidents involving officers challenging their senior 
commanders. It traces the development of the army's military style, through this 
division and its participation in internal operations, and the expansion of its political 
and social role as a result of martial law. It will demonstrate the lack of cohesion 
amongst the partners and discuss the repercussions that this would have on the 
emergence of any concordance. The chapter ends with the beginnings of Guided 
democracy in 1960. 
The plans for military rationalisation and reorganization implemented by Nasution 
had contributed to the crisis in Madiun in 1948 and would continue to prove a source 
of tension in the 1950's. This tension culminated on the 17th October 1952 with an 
open confrontation between the factionalised post-revolutionary army and the 
political leaders of the newly independent Indonesia. The factors that contributed to 
this new crisis were to be found in the deep factionalisation within the military, 
factors stemming from the revolutionary war and the increasing interaction between 
soldiers and politicians in post-revolutionary Indonesia. 
There were a number of reasons for the motivation of Nasution, the Chief of Army, in 
driving forward his plans for rationalization of the army. By 1948 the size of the army 
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and the aligned militias had grown to approximately 500,000 men. An army of that 
size did not sit within Nasution's vision for a smaller force that would gradually move 
away from its guerrilla roots toward a new smaller more professional force.
327
 By 
1950 the army had been cut down to approximately 200,000 men. Nasution was 
hoping to reduce this number further to around 150,000 over the next few years.
328
 As 
part of this reorientation there would be a new concentration upon training and 
education within the army. This would all form part of Nasution's plan to change the 
nature of Indonesian military strategy and doctrine. Nasution had difficulty with the 
strategy of Guerrilla warfare as it was fundamentally defensive, and that they "...must 
grow in the direction of becoming a regular army so as to be able to carry out an 
offensive in order to defeat the enemy"
329
 By 1951 it was proposed to reshape the 
training and education of the soldiers and officers. As part of this effort 
"...Inspectorates for the Infantry, Calvary, and Artillery were set up at headquarters 
level which established training centres for its particular weapon system."
330
 In their 
efforts to improve the training and education of soldiers and officers the army was 
stymied by a lack of knowledgeable instructors. Consequently the Indonesian Army 
was relying heavily upon the Netherlands Military Mission to assist them in building 
their capacity to train and educate their soldiers.
331
 Nasution warned that the army 
could ill afford to fall behind in its attempts to improve its education and training 
capacity. Furthermore, within this new and better trained Army, there would be little 
quarter given to those who were not prepared to engage in training and improve their 
skill sets. Nasution warned "...those who did not meet the requirements for higher 
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positions must be prepared to fill lower positions."
332
 Within this statement lie the 
seeds for future conflicts within the military: between the factions which pushed for a 
more professional, disciplined and smaller force and those factions which preferred 
the status quo. Those who had the most to lose were the PETA veterans and those of a 
Guerrilla background. 
Before 1952, relations between the Army and Government were characterized by a 
level of mistrust and suspicion; nevertheless the military continued, despite its distrust 
of civilian leaders emanating from the experiences of the revolution, to accept the 
principle of civilian supremacy.
333
 The top echelons of the military were comprised of 
whose who Crouch terms ‘military technocrats’; men who had been educated in the 
Dutch military academies, and who in the wake of the revolution had advanced at the 
expense of those who had inferior levels of training.
334
 Men, such as Nasution, fitted 
the previous category and were more interested in creating a smaller better trained and 
more effective military than involving themselves in the issues of government. 
Despite men within the military's leadership attempting to maintain an apolitical 
stance, there were still those who believed that due to their revolutionary 
contributions they were entitled to engage in politics. As alluded to at the end of 
chapter three, there were factions and elements within the army that chose to align 
themselves with certain political groupings. The difficulty in handling this issue was 
compounded by the problems of asserting control within the disparate regions, as the 
obedience to the headquarters of their own military commanders could not be 
guaranteed. 
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The 17th of October Affair 
It was against this period of relative stability that the events of October 1952 
unfolded. The plans of individuals such as Nasution, those who could be grouped into 
the category of that which Crouch calls the "...technocratic military leadership...” 
foresaw a smaller military with improved education and training.
335
 These plans stood 
as a direct threat to the positions and careers of those officers who had entered the 
military through a Peta or guerrilla background. This group felt that they would be 
marginalised by the plans of Nasution and his allies. The cause of this group was 
taken up by a group of politicians who opposed the government; here lay the seeds for 
the first significant clash between the military and the government. 
The general political environment during this time could be described as chaotic and 
in an embryonic stage of development. Within government itself, individual cabinets 
tended to have a short lifecycle.  There was according to Sundhaussen little time 
"...to develop recognized and widely-accepted political norms and 
procedures. Therefore, there was no understanding of what was, or 
was not proper in politics. Political institutions generally remained 
weak, and cabinets were seen as fair game to be hunted down. 
Parliament consisted of appointed politicians and lacked both 
legitimacy and quality."
336
 
 
Against this backdrop of an evolving political system in 1952, there was still 
continuing dissent in the country. There was ongoing fighting in West Java, South 
Sulawesi and the South Moluccas, by groups who opposed the republic.
337
 Economic 
conditions within Indonesia were also worsening in 1951 and 1952, as the Korean 
War boom was over and the value of Indonesia's main export of rubber had dropped. 
As part of their effort to improve the domestic economy, the government resolved to 
reduce spending. A reduction in the size of the military was seen as one way to 
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improve the government's finances.
338
 This policy of reducing the size of the military 
was driven as much by the designs of Nasution as it was by the increasingly desperate 
economic realities with which Indonesia was now confronted. 
Nasution and the other individuals who supported him had support within government 
for their plan to begin a reduction and restructuring of the military. The plans for 
rationalisation and reorganisation of the military would see the overall size shrink 
from approximately 200,000 to 100,000. This plan was opposed by those army 
leaders and officers within the regions, many of whom stemmed from the PETA 
background discussed earlier. Along with the reduction in size and the resulting focal 
shift from numbers to improved training and education, Nasution also sought to 
minimise the influence of those officers who stood in opposition to his position and 
authority within the military. 
The soldiers and officers who belonged to the PETA group did, however, have 
political allies, including President Sukarno himself. The personnel changes that had 
taken place throughout 1951 and 1952 had diminished his influence within the army. 
In 1952 he had objected to the new policy being pursued by the army leadership by 
refusing to sign a decree.
339
 Of similar concern to Sukarno was the closure of the 
Chandramiuka Military Academy in Bandung, which has been described as a "...sort 
of ideological refresher school for army officers, where a number of his personal 
associates, men of the PETA group, occupied positions of leadership."
340
 
Many Parliamentarians and politicians objected to the rationalization plans for a 
number of reasons. They resented the demands for new recruits to have "...certain 
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scholastic qualifications..."
341
 Plans for changes in the outward appearance of the 
military caused concern, namely in the uniforms and the manner in which they 
marched and saluted. These criticisms fall inside Schiff's category of military style, 
indicating there was little consensus at this time in what the new army’s style would 
be. The 'Rationalizers', such as Nasution, sought to pull the army away from its 
guerrilla and pre-revolutionary roots, and create an army that was similar to its foreign 
counterparts. It would seem that those who were opposed to this change in style 
feared, as a result, a reduction in their influence, a loss in their revolutionary bond that 
they had with their soldiers, and an overall decline of their influence within the army. 
A further reason for the political opposition to the reform plan in the army was due to 
the concern that the Socialist Party (PSI) was supporting the hierarchy and the 
'rationalizer' camp within the military for their own reasons; namely that doing so 
would increase their influence within the army. The military's view of politicians was 
also at a low. They viewed the politicians and parliaments as being largely ineffective. 
In the seven years following Indonesia's independence there had been a total of twelve 
cabinets, a large number of which, argues Sundhaussen, had been bought down by 
Parliament.
342
 The military viewed the politicians as weak and ineffective. They 
questioned the legitimacy of the parliament many of whom had attained their 
positions through the creation of the Dutch-created federal states, and a president 
who, at the height of the guerrilla struggle with the Dutch, had surrendered. 
All of these tensions came to a head in October when Parliament demanded that the 
Army's leadership be reshaped and, most significantly, that Nasution and others 
within the military hierarchy who were pushing for reform be dismissed. This demand 
was interpreted by Nasution and the military command as an unacceptable attempt at 
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interference in the military's affairs. Personnel appointments are, after all, one of the 
areas that Finer would include within the military's corporate self-interest.  This 
would have offended their sense of military professionalism of the professional 
officers such as Nasution. This final insult to Nasution and his professional reformist 
minded colleagues was too much and they took action. On the morning of  17th 
October, 30,000 people stood in front of the Parliament and then demonstrated in 
front of the presidential palace demanding "...the dissolution of the sitting parliament 
and the holding of elections."
343
 The protestors had been brought in with the 
assistance of army transportation.
344
 The military also made their presence felt with 
the arrival of tanks, some of which trained their guns on the Presidential palace.
345
 
The military officers involved now made their demands known to the 
President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; namely that parliament be 
dissolved and new elections be held. The Army officers who were present at this 
meeting made their belief known that Parliament was at fault for the ongoing 
instability in the country. They stated this was due to the frequent dissolution of 
cabinets by parliament.
346
 Furthermore, these officers argued many of these so called 
parliamentarians had cooperated with the Dutch while the army was fighting for 
national independence. These politicians argued that the officers, did not have the 
"...moral right..." to criticise the army.
347
 The meeting was described as tense.  
Officers stressed to Sukarno the resentment that had built within the high command 
for what they considered to be political interference with matters which they regarded 
as purely military. An example of this was the placement and deployment of troops.
348
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Those officers who had confronted Sukarno where clearly unhappy with what Schiff 
would call the political-decision making process. Such was the level of hostility 
between the military, Sukarno and the politicians, that any agreement would be 
extremely difficult to achieve. This indicates the degree to which the civil military 
relationship was disconcordant. 
Sukarno managed to defuse the demands of the protestors by agreeing to fresh 
elections and claiming that if the parliament was dissolved it would amount to too 
much power being placed in the executive and himself being put in the position of a 
dictator.
349
 He was able to disperse the crowd, and similarly in his dealings with the 
army "...promised them vaguely that their interests would be satisfied."
350
 
It is quite clear also that each partner was highly factionalised, there was little 
agreement amongst the three partners on any of the indicators, particularly in the 
wake of independence. This is a serious issue which becomes apparent when applying 
this theory to the case of Indonesia because in the wake of independence the partners, 
who Schiff mentions, are far from united. They are fractious by nature and each of 
these factions often has its own independent goals. As has been shown in the time 
leading up to the 17th October affair, the military was beset by factionalism. 
Politicians aligned their interests with some of those factions within the Army. Each 
of these various groups were able to mobilise the support of the masses, and 
manipulate them. There was next to no agreement on the political decision making 
process that would satisfy the military's needs. Indeed some of the politicians 
continued to push the boundaries, and began pushing into areas that the military 
viewed as being their prerogatives. Similarly, there was little agreement over the 
social composition of the officer corps. There were officers who had guerrilla and 
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PETA background, and others, such as Nasution, who came from the KNIL pushed 
for reform. Both these groups had distinctly different experiences within the military 
and were pushing for the military to go in different directions. 
There was no concordant civil military relationship that had yet emerged. Within days 
of the demands being made by the Army's leadership, Nasution and his colleagues 
had lost the momentum. The government and Sukarno moved to deal with the 
opposition from within the army by challenging the legitimacy of those Army officers 
who stood against them, claiming that because they had failed in their duty to 
Sukarno, they should be removed, even by their "...patriotic subordinates..."
351
 This 
was devastating for the Army's chain of command which was now being subjected to 
further factionalisation and infighting as the leadership was removed and other 
officers were forced to gain the support of their subordinates to remain in 
command.
352
 The power of those officers in regional commands was further enhanced 
by the weakening of the High Command and the side-lining of the group of reformist 
officers. By December of 1952 Nasution had been suspended and put on the inactive 
list, where he remained for three years. Along with Nasution, other individuals from 
the Army's High Command were removed from their positions. The newly weakened 
position of the Army's leadership also extended to the military's ability to provide for 
itself. Its budget was cut significantly in the wake of 1952, resulting in regional 
commanders fostering their own private business interests, thus enabling them to 
support their troops as well as guarantee the loyalty of those beneath them.
353
 
Nordlinger's liberal model of military control warns of the potential for military 
intervention if civilians do not exhibit due regard for the military, he notes in 
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particular the danger of civilian leaders interfering in the appointment of staff and 
system of promotions as well as in areas relating to its own expertise.
354
 In the events 
of 17th October 1952 and June 1955 the military did assert itself, firstly 1952 by 
making direct demands of Sukarno and in 1955 by ignoring the appointment of a new 
senior officer. Despite these actions not constituting a military coup they do show that 
there were consequences for the Indonesian political leaders lack of respect for the 
military's domain and interests. 
The army over the next few years was beset by factionalism. There was also a 
growing sense of dissatisfaction relating to the performance of successive 
governments both within and outside the army.
355
 Crouch also states that there was a 
fundamental change in the military, from an "...apolitical tool of the state...to the older 
idea that the army was a guardian of the national interest with the responsibility to 
intervene in political affairs whenever the weaknesses of civilian government made it 
necessary.”356 This is an important point to recognise, because, as Finer argues, this 
can become a motive for intervention. It seems that at this time the army's style was 
changing. Schiff refers to this as the "...inner mental constructions associated with the 
military...what ethos drives it..." This view of itself as a Guardian to the state was 
being reinforced by the political instability at the time, as well its participation in 
ongoing regional instability. Ultimately it was the perception that successive 
governments had performed so inadequately that led the officer’s corps, who had been 
divided in the wake of the 17th of October 1952, to begin reconciliation.
357
 
Sundhaussen describes that in the years following the 17th of October 1952; those 
soldiers who had taken action against their superiors concluded that they had been 
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used by the politicians to remove the army's leadership which had "...refused to be 
pushed around by quickly changing alliances in parliament."
358
 
A meeting took place in 1955 which would begin the slow process of reconciliation 
amongst the Indonesian high command. The meeting was convened in Jogjakarta with 
the intention of dealing with some of the "...controversial issues involving military 
personnel..."
359
 A charter was drawn up calling for an end to the factional infighting 
that had weakened the military in the past. It also called for military leaders to 
"...press basic army demands on the government."
360
 Most significantly however was 
the meeting that occurred at the gravesite of the revered commander General 
Sudirman. Officers met at the gravesite and pledged to uphold the unity of the 
military. The outcome of this meeting was very significant because, as Sundhaussen 
suggests, the military was agreeing amongst itself to resist political interference in 
military affairs, and secondly, they were calling for a distinction to be "...drawn 
between the functions of the army headquarters and those of the government."
361
 In 
June 1955, the government attempted to appoint a relatively junior ranking officer to 
the position of Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Bambang Utojo. His political sympathies 
lay with the ruling political party.
362
 The military refused to accept this new 
appointment. Unlike previous times when unity within the military had undermined 
their position, this time their refusal was complete, to the extent that the official 
ceremony celebrating Utojo’s appointment was only attended by five or six army 
officers and there was no army band in attendance to play the national anthem.
363
 
These defiant actions by the Army resulted in the collapse of the Ali government, and 
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a new "...self-confidence..." that in the future they could have a larger influence on 
politics.
364
 
Feith makes some interesting observations, which are very significant when viewed in 
the context of later developments. He focuses on the reasons for the new found sense 
of unity within the army. Firstly, he points to conditions within the army itself, 
namely the issue of military budgets, access to equipment, welfare for the soldiers and 
the declining prestige of the military officers.
365
 This point is significant because 
according to Samuel Finer, the corporate interests as well as the motive of individual 
self interest in the armed forces can be drivers of intervention. Furthermore, Finer's 
motives of Self Interest and Corporate Interest link into one of Schiff's indicators of 
concordance. This relevant indicator is the political-decision making process, which 
determines "...the needs and allocations of the military."
366
 According to Feith this 
had the effect of unifying the military. After all, its corporate interests were being 
threatened; this however resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the 
government and the army. This relationship would make concordance, at this time, 
impossible to achieve. 
Secondly, Feith affirms that it was the shared "...image of the army as the founder of 
the nation...", that the officers viewed themselves as holding a guardian role that was 
particularly significant. The military considered its role to be the protection of 
Indonesia, particularly if the country was undermined by political crisis or there was a 
challenge to the state’s independence. Finer discusses  the motive of the 'National 
Interest' as being a driver of intervention, which is what Feith refers to as the 
Guardian role, namely that the army could intervene if it perceived the nation was 
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being threatened by the political elites that were running the country.
367
 The 
significance of the term, which Feith refers to as the guardian role, is twofold. In the 
context of Schiff's theory, it has reference to both the indicators of concordance as 
well as the importance of history and culture. The military coming to view themselves 
as guardians of the nation informs the way the military think of themselves. It affects 
the military's style. Schiff also recites the importance of history and culture on the 
development of the civil military relationship. In Indonesia, the military began to see 
an exclusive and privileged role for itself. This consciousness developed early and 
would permeate the army's style for some time. 
The military also witnessed the growth of corruption within the civil service and 
amongst the politicians. Feith affirms that by this time the military had come to hold 
an extremely dim view of the ability of the government to function and the interplay 
between the politicians and the institutions within the country.
368
 There was also the 
increase in power of the communist party, which had grown considerably in numbers, 
something an officer corps described as "...decidedly anti-communist in orientation..." 
was an alarming development.
369
 
In the wake of the affair involving the appointment of Utojo and the Army's defiant 
stand against the government, Colonel Nasution was reappointed to the position of 
Chief of Staff and was promoted to the position of Major General. On his resumption 
of command, Nasution implemented a new policy to tackle the problems within the 
military's hierarchy and the problems it had with maintaining military discipline. 
Nasution's answer to this was the creation of a 'Tour of Duty' system, which allowed 
him to rotate and replace regional commanders when it was considered necessary.
370
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Many of the regional commanders had groomed positions for themselves that were 
increasing their power and independence from the army's central hierarchy. They 
were doing this through alliances with local political parties or other groups.
371
 These 
regional commanders had grown so much in standing that they were, according to 
Sundhaussen, able to "...obstruct almost any policy of the headquarters or the 
government if they so choose."
372
 This Tour of Duty policy was once again creating 
tensions within the Army, as those officers who had the most to lose began to turn 
against Nasution and the military's command. 
The Lubis Coup Attempt 
Nasution’s appointment as the Chief of Staff would once again create problems within 
the army. His "Tour of Duty' policy already had its opponents when Nasution came to 
be challenged directly by one of his fellow officers. The man who came to oppose 
Nasution was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis. His dislike of Nasution stemmed from 
Nasution's recent appointment to the position of Chief of Staff.
373
 Lubis lost his 
position in Jakarta and was ordered to take over a position in Northern Sumatra.
374
 
Lubis and other officers now began planning a coup and the installation of a military 
junta. It was also decided that Nasution's 'Tour of Duty' policy had to be stopped.
375
 
Initially a group around Lubis attempted to arrest the Foreign Minister on charges of 
corruption. Lubis and his fellow conspirators along with sideling Nasution were 
interested in overthrowing a democratic government which they believed was 
ineffective and corrupt. Furthermore, some Sudanese officers resented the Javanese 
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domination of government.
376
 Lubis's next move took place on October 11th 1956 
when army units loyal to him tried to enter Jakarta; they were stopped and the action 
resulted in several officers loyal to him being arrested.
377
 On November 7th Nasution 
called Lubis to account for his activities by issuing a summons for him and two other 
officers suspected of involvement in his plans. The other officers appeared but Lubis 
did not. On November 16th another military unit attempted to enter Jakarta, and along 
with units based in the city they intended to arrest the Chief of Staff and take control 
of the capital. This plan also failed.
378
 Following the failure of the actions on the 16th, 
Nasution’s position was strengthened, and by the end of the month Cabinet had issued 
a statement condemning him for engaging in an attempted coup. He was suspended 
from his position and a warrant was issued for his arrest. However he was able to 
evade capture.
379
 
Regional Turmoil- PERMESTA and the PRRI 
The island of Java and its inhabitants is often identified as the centre of Indonesia. 
Along with a demographic advantage, it had also been influenced by Javanese 
tradition and history. Javanese political thought emphasises the notion of the centre, 
"The state was seen as a series of concentric circles, defined by the 
diminishing power of the ruler from its highest concentration in his court 
and capital, through outlying districts and allied kingdoms to the world 
beyond his reach.”380 
Java's central position was only reinforced by its colonial history and then 
subsequently occupation by the occupation of Japanese forces in World War Two. 
Throughout this time Java remained politically powerful but economically weaker 
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than the outer lying Islands. In the outer Islands there were a number of grievances 
that had developed against the central government in Jakarta. There was 
dissatisfaction with Jakarta over the level of funding that had been provided for much 
needed development in the regions. Furthermore, for those in the regions the 
performance of successive governments in Jakarta had become a source of tension, 
particularly in the area of economic management.
381
 Linked into the issue of 
economic mismanagement was anger at the government's policy toward regional 
exports, particularly copra. Regional farmers often found themselves suffering due to 
unequal terms of trade and this created deeper resentment toward the central 
government. Many of these farmers began smuggling products out of the regions. 
Army officers often participated in these activities for their own operational and 
material reasons.
382
 As noted previously, ethnic tension also became a significant 
issue. There was in Indonesia a legacy of tension between the predominantly Javanese 
centre and the ethnically and religiously diverse outer regions, Feith notes that 
throughout 1956 these tensions continued to rise.
383
 There were also calls for 
increased local autonomy for the outer islands in the handling of their affairs from 
Jakarta. Despite many of these underlying tensions in the regions it was the internal 
problems within the army that had a major impact on the course of the regional 
problems. In the case of Sulawesi, Harvey argues "...it was rivalries within the 
military which sparked off the challenge to central authority."
384
 
In order to better understand the course of events during the regional rebellion it is 
necessary to explain the system that serves as the over-arching system for 
organisation of the military. This system evolved from experiences during the war for 
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independence, Indonesia's geographic particularities and the requirements of overall 
defensive strategy.
385
 Between 1950 and 1957, seven military territories (Tentara dan 
Territorium or T & T) were established, comprising the following commands: 
 T&T I- North Sumatra 
 T&T II-South Sumatra 
 T&T III-West Java, including Jakarta 
 T&T IV-Central Java 
 T&T V-East Java 
 T&T VI-Kalimantan 
 T&T VII-East Indonesia 
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Figure 1 - The Army's Military Territories (Tentera Dan Territorium, T & T), 1950 -
1957
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Commanders in the outer regions of Indonesia at this time were in a distinctly 
different position to their fellow officers in Java. Tensions prevailed between the 
regional commands and the central military command. There were a number of 
reasons for this. The territorial command structure and the way in which it was 
organised was partially responsible. The territorial commands themselves were 
designed to be able to carry out Guerrilla operations largely independent of central 
control in the event of conflict.
387
 This is significant because of the Army's 
revolutionary experience, namely because as a Guerrilla force encouraged self- 
reliance and a symbiotic relationship with the people. The nature of this territorial 
structure and overall army strategy encouraged independence. As McVey notes these 
regional commanders came to hold a great deal of independence from the Army's 
leadership. McVey argues that the relationship between these individual commanders 
and headquarters could be characterised as "...one of negotiation" rather "...than 
command."
388
 Furthermore, these officers came to see themselves as the "...equals of 
the officers on the general staff..." and that decisions of "...basic policy should be 
taken collegially, with them, rather than by the central authorities alone."
389
 
Consultation and consensus were clearly important, if the high command hoped to 
carry out a particular course of action.
390
 These powerful commanders had already 
faced down Nasution in 1952 when he attempted to restructure the army. Lubis and 
others had taken the same action in 1956, when Nasution had introduced the Tour of 
Duty system as a means to curb their power.  During the years of regional crisis these 
same individuals were again bucking against their senior officers. The power of these 
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officers also clearly demonstrates the importance of the revolutionary history in 
shaping Indonesian military professionalism and the Indonesian military's style. 
The relationship between the officers and the enlisted men in the regional commands 
was fundamentally different.   In many cases it was closer than Officer-Soldier and 
was referred to as a bapak-anak buah relationship.
391
 This made these regional 
commands and commanders harder for the central hierarchy to control because the 
Officers and enlisted men had a much closer relationship, one that transcended the 
bounds of the regular command structure. Recruitment within these commands was 
also drawn from the local area. This, along with a "...sensitivity to the desire to have a 
"native son" (anak daerah) in command of local troops..." compounded to further 
complicate efforts by high command in implementing any particular national 
personnel policy.
392
 Some of the commanders in these regional areas were also 
engaged in smuggling operations, a prime example of which was Maludin Simblon. 
Not only was this a sense of irritation for the High Command, particularly as they 
attempted to deal with corruption amongst the nations politicians, but it also provided 
these officers and units under their command with a certain degree of autonomy from 
the Army's central command in Jakarta.
393
 
Complementing the issues around the powerful independence of the territorial 
commanders, were the intense personal rivalries that developed within the Army 
during the 1950's. Harvey believes that the strength of these rivalries within the army 
during the 1950's were a key factor that led to the turmoil that erupted in regional 
Indonesia in the later part of the 1950's. These rivalries existed historically between 
the PETA officers and those from the KNIL. They were further entrenched by the 
                                                 
391
 Bapak meaning Father, but also according to Harvey. p.8, has the connotation of referring to a 
respected leader or patron. The term anak buah refers to follower.  Harvey cites Anderson, Java in a 
Time of Revolution Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946. p.43 
392
Harvey. p.9 
393
 Ibid. p.11 
114 
 
creation of the territorial system and Nasution's plans for the restructuring of the army 
and led to the fear among many PETA officers that they would be side-lined at the 
expense of their KNIL colleagues. Harvey also states that the military in the early 
1950's was comprised of young men of a similar age who all held similar claims to 
leadership positions.
394
 Luckham argues that this flat age structure can weaken 
"...established patterns of discipline...", and this seems to hold true in the case of the 
Indonesian Army's officer corps in the 1950's.
395
 In 1952, Nasution was faced with 
political pressure as well as defiance from the military itself which would generate 
animosity toward him personally as well as the high command in Jakarta. This led to a 
situation in regional areas where commanders loyal to Nasution where ousted by 
those who supported Sukarno and his stance against Nasution's program for military 
reform. Nasution lost his position as Army Chief. When he regained the position in 
1955 he attempted to reduce the power of these regional officers through the 
introduction of the 'Tour of Duty System', and this, particularly in the case of 
powerful regional commanders, became an  "...explosive issue...", that generated 
considerable opposition and rivalry.
396
 This led to a situation in which a number of 
senior officers threatened by Nasution's personnel policies, took direct action against 
him in the form of a coup. When this coup failed these men, such as Lubis and 
Simblon, fled to the regions, and allied themselves to regional commanders in 
Sulawesi in Sumatra who had taken control of local governments. These regional 
commanders garnered considerable support from the local population for their 
defiance towards the central authorities. The result was a political crisis, during 1956-
1958, culminating in1958 with the declaration of the Revolutionary Government of 
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the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), based in western Sumatra.
397
 This led to open 
conflict and resulted in Central Government occupying areas controlled by PRRI 
forces. Despite the relative speed with which these forces dealt with the PRRI, 
guerrilla operations continued until 1961. 
Corporateness 
The period during the rebellion clearly demonstrated the lack of any cohesion within 
the military and would prevent the development of a concordant civil-military 
relationship. At the centre of this problem is Schiff's indicator that surveys the social 
composition of the officer corps. When the actions of the rebellious army leaders, 
such as Lubis and Simbolon, are considered in relation to Schiff’s indicator, it is 
apparent that there could be no concordance. There were a number of issues relating 
to ethnicity, namely the relationship between officers who came from the regional 
ethnic minorities and the Javanese officers.
398
 The animosity held by these regional 
officers toward the central command would undermine any sense of unity within the 
officer corps and would certainly prevent Schiff's partners from agreeing about the 
military's role. 
Along with the rebellion undermining the military's unity and the social composition 
of the officer corps, the corporateness of the Army was compromised. Huntington 
argued that corporateness was a defining characteristic of a profession and thus, 
according to his argument, was a defining aspect of officership. According to 
Huntington "....members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and 
consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen."
399
 On this point the 
Officer Corps of the Indonesian army had evolved in a manner that challenges any 
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notion of corporateness. During the war for independence it had evolved within a 
popular guerrilla struggle where the boundaries between officer and layman were 
blurred. In relation to the actions of military officers during the regional rebellion, any 
notion of corporateness would also be challenged by the actions of those rogue 
officers who challenged their commanding officers by aligning themselves with 
civilian interests. There is Huntington also argues there is "The sense of unity 
manifests itself in a professional organization which formalizes and applies the 
standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of 
professional responsibility."
400
 Any notion of unity in the Indonesian Army was 
extremely tenuous. It was undermined by rivalries, alliances, political interference as 
well as by a difficult and often troublesome revolutionary history. There were many 
examples of this disunity throughout the 1950s culminating perhaps in the complete 
breakdown of military unity during the regional crises, where rogue military 
commanders faced off against their officers in central command. In reference to 
Huntington's statement, standards of professional competence could, in the 1950's, be 
regarded as relatively low. In the early 1950's Nasution had tried to introduce policies 
which were aimed at improving the professionalism of the military by concentrating 
on the education and training of the soldiers. He also sought to reduce the influence of 
the PETA and guerrilla officers who, unlike the KNIL officers, had received training 
which had focused more on indoctrination and self-reliance than technical ability. 
Along with the significant issues present within the military at this time, there were 
also a number of issues relating to Indonesia's political system. As has already been 
described there were issues over the consistent performance of elected cabinets, with 
many of them collapsing. Harvey argues that the nation's leaders were also 
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dissatisfied with the political system, pointing to their concern over the proliferation 
of political parties, who they largely viewed as self-serving. For Sukarno, Indonesian 
unity was being undermined. Harvey argues one of Sukarno’s foremost concerns 
throughout his life was the maintenance of Indonesian national unity. Thus, it is easy 
to understand the concern that Sukarno must have felt at the ongoing political 
instability present in post-revolutionary Indonesia.
401
 Throughout 1955 and 1956, 
Sukarno had spoken about the need for the inclusion of traditional values in 
Indonesia's system of democracy as well as the need for leadership and guidance in 
Indonesian democracy.
402
 By 1956, Sukarno was talking of the need to "...end 
Western, liberal democracy in which '50 per cent plus one are always right', instead 
Indonesia should practise 'real Indonesian democracy', democracy with 
leadership..."
403
 It was a mix of these political issues, as well as the problems within 
the military and the problems in the outer islands, that resulted in the regional 
rebellion. 
The course of the regional rebellion highlighted the fact that there were serious 
internal issues within the military in terms of factionalism. Personal rivalries had 
developed as well as regional commanders who had entrenched power and could act 
independently from High command in Jakarta. This intersected with the grievances 
that were present in the regions, longstanding issues, development issues, ethnic 
issues. Politically, Indonesia throughout the 1950's was experiencing ongoing turmoil. 
They had suffered from a succession of weak Cabinets. Sukarno had begun to criticise 
the role of Political parties in Indonesia, and was looking for a new political system, 
which would become known as guided democracy. 
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Martial Law 
In response to the increasingly chaotic situation in the regions it was recommended by 
General Nasution that a state of Martial Law be declared. The situation in Indonesia's 
regions was becoming increasingly serious for the central authorities. There had been 
a series of incidents in which dissident army officers had seized control of local 
government infrastructure. In December 1956 events in Sumatra caused these Army 
officers, with the support of local civilians, to take action against the local 
governments. On December 20th, the regimental commander in West Sumatra took 
over the local government, and on December 22
nd
, Simbolon announced his takeover 
in North Sumatra. On December 24
th
, the commander in South Sumatra "...forced the 
civilian governor there to begin introducing autonomy measures."
404
 Throughout 
January 1957, more soldiers’ councils were appearing throughout Kalimantan, North 
and South Sulawesi and Maluku, all of which were pushing "...for greater autonomy 
from Jakarta."
405
 By March 1957 the situation was growing increasingly serious. On 
the 2nd of March the commander of Eastern Indonesia had declared martial law over 
his whole command. With the situation in the regions becoming increasingly serious, 
"...Nasution seized the initiative to end parliamentary democracy."
406
 On the 14th 
March the Ali cabinet resigned and Martial law was proclaimed. This along with 
subsequent events now gave the military the opportunity for an expansion of its role 
in society, politics and the economy. It would affect the military corporateness and 
above all would lead to the development of a concordant relationship. 
Martial law now gave the military the means to deal with the unrest in the regions, as 
well as giving it the legal backing for a role expansion in Indonesia. As a consequence 
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"Nearly every civil office was subject to military control or the possibility of it."
407
 
Furthermore, argues Lev, these new military authorities were now able create new 
regulations themselves. Civil Liberties and Human rights suffered as a result. The 
military had the ability to arrest and detain on the basis of a threat to security, and any 
protest to this in parliament was limited out of fear for engaging in political 
activity.
408
 The military also restricted labour unions, particularly in the regional 
areas. Any planned union activity had to be sanctioned by the military authorities. 
Industries, which the military classed as being of vital significance, were also 
prevented from striking. Martial law also gave the army the opportunity to crack 
down upon the press. The military viewed the press as "...provocative, divisive, 
sensationalist and politically motivated…" the banning of newspapers and the arrest 
of journalists and editors was common, and the once "...lively and vital..." press was 
reduced to a state of self-censorship in which editors became increasingly cautious 
about the material which they were publishing.
409
 
The period of martial law also provided the army with the unique opportunity to take 
forceful steps into the political system. The military came with certain perceptions 
about Indonesia's political system and its politicians. These had been shaped by its 
experiences during the war for independence and subsequent events in the 1950's. Lev 
argues the army held a political outlook that was based on "....national consensus, 
unity, obedience and discipline.”410 As time passed under martial law and the regional 
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rebellions had been successfully crushed, the army came to view itself as having a 
"...inalienable right to participate in the management of the nation."
411
 
Political parties also had their activities restricted. Demonstrations and meetings were 
now blocked by the military. Political activity was not only restricted within the 
regions but also in Jakarta. Members of Parliament and regional legislative bodies 
were arrested. In regional areas legislative assemblies were ordered to "...refrain from 
discussing "political" topics."
412
 The army, under Nasution’s leadership, also took 
advantage of the opportunity that martial law presented to create civil-military 
cooperation bodies. These bodies were comprised of labour groups and peasant 
organisations amongst others. The purpose, according to Lev, for the military 
engaging in this was to "...loosen the parties grip on these "functional groupings", and 
to bring such organisations in-line with the army.
413
 The army had mixed levels of 
success with these groups, however it was considerably more successful with the 
army veterans groups. These veteran groups "...had been organized under the political 
parties for several years.", however during 1957 and 1958 this group was bought 
under the control of the army.
414
 Anderson argues that the reason for the takeover of 
the veterans organisations was the military attempting to protect itself from any 
"...linkages..." to political parties.
415
 Nasution and the army also set up the National 
Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB) in 1958. This amounted to another 
attempt by the military to create a large national organisation of which it could take 
charge. It was also part of the vision the army shared with Sukarno for the 
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replacement of the political parties. Having established this organisation Nasution 
then sought to expand it "...into a multi-branched national structure...” with the 
intention of competing with political party's for popular support.
416
 This was however 
opposed by other political parties and Lev argues that despite lasting until 1960, the 
FNPIB never became an "...effective political organization..."
417
 Through these 
actions the military were attempting to curb the power of political parties and to build 
themselves their own bodies that would offer them support that would rival the 
political organisations. Political parties, such as the PKI, were keenly aware of the 
army’s intentions to expand its role. It worked with other political parties during the 
period of martial law to curb the powers of the army. The role expansion into the 
political realm that the army undertook under martial law was a product of the 
organisation’s historical experience. Schiff argues that the historical and cultural 
experiences of a particular nation are important in determining their civil military 
relations. The army had participated in a political and Guerrilla struggle against the 
Dutch as well as counter-insurgency operations. This had affected their views of 
politicians and politics. Indeed it also required the army to engage with people as well 
as to have an understanding of political issues in its effort to conduct successful 
counter-insurgency operations. Many in the army believed that it was their efforts that 
won them independence. The military during the 1950's witnessed the weakness and 
turmoil in the political system while also being the victim of political interference. 
This, along with a growing sense of entitlement emanating from the military's victory 
over regional separatists and its politically conservative outlook, led it to become 
engaged in a political role. The development of the army's political role represented a 
change in the military's style, and a realignment in military professionalism. Those 
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KNIL educated officers, such as Nasution, who had been educated according to 
Western standards of officership, were developing a new indigenous professionalism 
under which a role in the nation’s political life was permissible. During this time, 
Nasution and Army leaders were also engaged in efforts to improve the education of 
the officer corps. Not only was this education aimed at improving the officers’ 
technical war fighting skills but also, McVey argues, at a broader attempt to develop 
"...a broader ideology."
418
 Following exposure to American military training and 
education facilities, Indonesian Army commanders became aware of the importance 
of education in creating "...effective and ideologically compatible officers...", and 
McVey argues that they believed in instilling their soldiers with a revolutionary 
heritage as well as a western notion of military professionalism.
419
 Despite the fact 
that the General staff were interested in improving the professionalism of the officer 
corps, this was tempered with the revolutionary experience and meant that there 
would be aspects which would challenge the notion of the apolitical 'professional' 
soldier. 
Martial law also provided the military with the opportunity to intervene and to gain a 
place in the economic life of the nation. On the 13th December, following the seizure 
of Dutch owned businesses by demonstrators, Nasution placed Dutch enterprises 
under the control of the Army. The military then placed officers, many of whom Lev 
argues were far from the best in the military, in charge of the companies.
420
 Crouch 
also makes the point that the army used its expansion into the economic sector as a 
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means by which to side-line personnel whom it viewed as being ineffective.
421
 Along 
with the side-lining of inefficient members of its own organisation the army's new 
role expansion gave it the means to generate funding streams outside of official 
government channels. Many of these former Dutch businesses were extremely 
profitable, however also many began to be mismanaged by soldiers who simply did 
not possess the required skill set for the management of businesses. Corruption also 
found its way into the army's new business dealings. It gave many the opportunity to 
take their own cut and it also provided those of lower rank with "...a stake in the status 
quo and helped to ensure their loyalty to the army leadership."
422
 
The army's expansion of its traditional roles under martial law amounted to a 
milestone in the history and the development of the institution, as well as the 
establishment of a concordant civil-military relationship. The role that the military 
played in conducting internal security operations against the regionalist challenge 
strengthened their self-image as the guardians and protectors of the nation. The 
army’s participation in the events of the regional crisis was used by the military as 
backing to their claim for "...a more permanent role in the government.”423 The army 
had once again confronted a challenge that also had important political implications 
with its role as internal protector being further emphasised. The army and its 
commanders participated in the administration of military law and used it increasingly 
to move against the political elements that it viewed as divisive. Its functional 
imperative was changing. The function that the military increasingly considered to be 
theirs was one that maintained the security of the nation as well as participating in the 
economic and political life of the nation. As Crouch suggests, officers were now also 
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viewing themselves as managers and bureaucrats.
424
 As a result of this expansion into 
the political and economic sectors the military and the officers, who were directly 
involved in these activities, now had interests to defend and they now sought to 
protect and maintain them.
425
 Because the military had benefited under martial law, 
and army officers were now members of the social elite, their interests were served by 
the maintenance of the status quo.
426
 
On the 12th of November 1958, recognition of this expansion in the army's role and 
status was made by the Army's Chief of Staff General Nasution. He termed this the 
'middle way', arguing that the army was, "...not just the "civilian tool" as in Western 
countries, nor a "military regime" which dominates the state power, but as one of 
many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people [kekuatan 
perjuangan rakyat] which works together with other people's forces [kekuatan rakyat 
lainnya]."
427
 Military officers, it was argued, should be able to participate in the 
government and to use their "...non-military skills in helping to develop the nation."
428
 
Nasution argued that officers should be permitted to "....participate in determining 
economic, financial, international and other policies.", and he also argued that they 
should be permitted positions within the state’s institutions.429 Nasution also hinted at 
the possibility of a violent reaction from the army if its officers were discriminated 
against.
430
 Nasution was redefining Indonesia's civil-military relationship. Lev 
suggests that the response to the middle way was mostly favourable, even if this was 
largely due to the fact that it reassured people that there was unlikely to be a coup. 
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As a result of the events of martial law, there was a new civil-military relationship 
developing.  It brought an expansion of army roles in the political and economic 
sector and a change in the political-decision making process. The nature of this 
developing relationship was evolving in such a way that to call it concordant in 
Schiff's terms is unsuitable. The military was becoming increasingly influential 
through its role in fighting insurgent groups during the regional crisis. It was 
becoming an increasingly powerful political actor as a result of martial law. It was 
able to deal with a parliamentary system which it perceived to be unstable and flawed. 
The political decision making process was also changing with the implementation of 
Sukarno's guided democracy. This period ushered in a far more authoritarian type of 
government. 
Konsepi and Guided Democracy 
During the late 1950's there would be a number of changes which would reshape the 
political decision making process, and have a profound impact upon the nature of the 
civil-military relationship in Indonesia. As has already been described, the military 
was becoming a more influential actor within the political and social life of the 
country. Simultaneously Sukarno began reshaping the state's political institutions as 
well as the overall system of Government. Sukarno, like many of the military's 
leaders, had witnessed the weakness and successive failures of many Indonesian 
cabinets and this emphasised to him the need for a change in the political system. 
Sukarno, amidst an increasingly tumultuous political and social climate, gave a 
speech on the 28th October 1956 which would spell out his personal feelings about 
the state of the Indonesian political system. The speech which became known as the 
'bury the parties' speech, attested to the view that parliamentary democracy was 
failing in Indonesia. In this speech he enunciated the idea that the fractious and flawed 
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system of multi-party participation in government should be suppressed. He argued 
that it should be buried. This was an indication of his belief in the need for change. 
Later he spoke of his Konsepi (idea), of how he believed politics could be changed for 
the better. This called for a political system which did not "...imitate..." western 
political systems and was based instead on an Indonesian model of decision 
making.
431
 According to Lev, hen his ideas were finally made public, they contained 
two basic proposals.  Firstly, that a cabinet should be formed comprising the four 
major political parties, crucially ending the ostracizing of the PKI.
432
 This new cabinet 
would operate according to the principle of gotong-rojong (mutual help), where these 
parties worked together for the benefit of the nation.
433
 The second part of this vision 
called for the setting up of a national council which would contain functional groups 
from within society, one of these eventually being the Army.
434
 Whether requested or 
not, this council would advise the Cabinet, and would, argues Lev, act "...to buttress 
the authority of a new government."
435
 The national council was created in May 1957. 
Legge argues that despite Sukarno's pronouncement that the national council would 
act as a rival to Parliament it, in fact, became "...dependent upon it..." and came to act 
as an advisory body.
436
 As Guided Democracy was becoming established so too was 
the rising influence of both the PKI and the army in the political sphere. The military, 
through the regional crisis and the implementation of martial law, played an 
increasingly significant role in the political life of the country, and were, according to 
Lev, the driving force behind guided democracy.
437
 The position of the PKI was also 
                                                 
431
 J.D Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (London: Penguin Press, 1972). p.283 
432
 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959. p.29 
433
 Ibid. p.29 
434
 Legge. p.283-284 also see Sundhaussen, The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-
1967. p. 131, Nasution was included within the council itself. 
435
 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959, p.29-30. 
436
 Legge. p.289 
437
 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959. p.77 
127 
 
strengthened. It had made gains in regional elections, and was using its organisational 
strength to support the implementation of guided democracy.
438
 Both the military and 
the PKI's rise in influence would come to underpin guided democracy, and result in a 
tenuous relationship between the two adverse groups. Stemming from the chaos 
within the regions, Nasution banned a number of political parties which had supported 
the PRRI in the rebel areas. The role of the political parties, with the exception of the 
PKI, was on a downward trajectory.
439
 
Under Guided democracy the aforementioned functional groups drawn from within 
society would come to form a new parliament, as they had in the national council. 
This would minimise the number of political parties and reduce the amount of 
"...ideological deadlock."
440
 Nasution and the army considered the issue of 
constitutional arrangements to also be of concern. He wanted a return to the 1945 
constitution. This would provide a strong executive, and it would also prevent 
Sukarno from avoiding responsibility for governmental failures in either 
administrative or economic areas.
441
 The reintroduction of the 1945 constitution 
would provide for the reduction of political parties and the creation of functional 
groups. Although there were concerns expressed from a number of avenues, the 
constitution was introduced on 5 July 1959. 
Nasution wanted the military to have significant representation in the new 
government. He wanted the army to be represented as a functional group. Lev argues 
that the point of this "....was to give the army a responsible role while eliminating 
politically unstabilizing influences on it."
442
 Sukarno, argues Lev, also believed that 
by including the army it would allow him to better control it and prevent the 
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possibility of any type of violent action which may affect the state.
443
 The military 
was included as one of these functional groups despite the concerns of the PKI. It is 
important to note that all three branches of the military would be included within this 
body. The military would later claim 35 of the total 260 seats in Parliament, with the 
Army as the biggest beneficiary.
444
 Crucially, seats of the military were by 
appointment, and not by election. 
Analysis 
The 1950's were a particularly unstable period in Indonesian history. As has been 
discussed, in the early part of the decade the military was beset by factionalism and 
was subject to considerable political interference. The army responded by attempting 
to assert its authority with Sukarno; this effort ultimately backfired. Attempts were 
made in 1955 to improve the institution’s cohesiveness; yet these efforts were not 
without their opponents and complications. The manner in which events unfolded and 
the way in which these events were handled involved a considerable amount of 
coercion. Martial law permitted the military to handle matters in the pursuit of dealing 
with the regional crises, as it saw fit. As mentioned previously, martial law allowed 
the army and Nasution to control the press and it also enabled the military to detain 
people as it deemed to be necessary. Political activity was also cracked down upon. 
The Military 
The military as a partner in this concordance could not be considered a homogenous 
group. The army suffered throughout the 1950's with problems of disunity. There 
were a number of reasons for this. In the early 1950's, there were calls for the 
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professionalization and reorganisation of the army, which would have impacted on the 
career opportunities of many officers. The pushing of these policies caused division 
between those in command, and those who would have suffered as a result. There 
were vestiges of power outside the military chain of command that preceded the 
regional crisis. This was highly problematic for the army's senior officers. During the 
regional rebellion the military, as an institution, was deeply split. Elements fought 
against the government. Schiff defines the military as "... the institution publicly 
recognized by society and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation’s 
borders", however during the regional crisis elements within the army were no longer 
loyal to the government, and engaged in fighting for reasons other than defending the 
nation's borders.
445
 It was not until the implementation of martial law and the 
suppression of the regional rebellion that the army was able to deal with some of its 
internal problems by purging those elements which had been involved in the 
rebellion, or had undermined the discipline within the army.
446
 
Political Leadership 
Along with defining who the army was as a partner, defining the political leadership 
was also problematic. Throughout the 1950's, Sukarno maintained his position as a 
forceful presence in Indonesian politics. However, there was considerable weakness 
and instability within the various institutions which, alongside Sukarno, comprised the 
political leadership.  Sukarno and these parliamentary cabinets comprised the elites 
that had "...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces."
447
 
However successive cabinets collapsed, and it was thus not always clear who the 
political leadership was, who was exerting authority, or how much authority they 
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were able to bring to bear on the armed forces, and exactly what the nature of the 
relationship was. Therefore throughout the 1950's until the declaration of martial law 
and Sukarno's establishment of guided democracy, the political leadership remained 
fractured, unstable and ineffective. This course of events throughout the 1950's 
challenges Schiff's idea of the existence of a political partner. It illustrates that during 
the 1950's within the Indonesian context, no cohesive partner existed that was capable 
of being termed the political leadership. 
Citizenry 
The chaotic events of the 1950's, culminating with the regional rebellions toward the 
end of the decade, also had repercussions for the third partner in Schiff's concordance 
model. This was the citizenry. Throughout the 1950's the citizenry was mobilised by 
various elements within the Indonesian elite, both civilian and military, to support 
their causes. As was seen in the October 17th affair, both Sukarno and Nasution, 
appealed to the civilians. Nasution actively mobilised civilians to support his position. 
During the regional rebellion there was a cleavage between those civilians who 
supported the PRRI and the central government, and those who supported the rebel 
commanders and the Army. During the time of martial law, the activities of trade 
unions were controlled. The activities of the press were suppressed. There were also 
elements of the civilian population who supported Sukarno and his efforts to establish 
guided democracy. As with the other two partners, the civilian population’s views 
were divided on a number of political issues, including their views on the role of the 
military. They were not a coherent partner. 
Schiff makes the argument in her theory that concordance will be reached if the three 
partners agree on four indicators of concordance. In the 1950's Indonesia differed. 
Agreement on issues related to the military was not possible. Because of the way in 
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which events transpired in the latter part of the decade, any agreement became very 
difficult. The implementation of martial law ruled out the possibility for agreement. It 
allowed the government and the army to exercise an almost total control over the 
press, political parties and wider society. In this context, the notion of agreement is 
misplaced because the army and the political leadership implemented martial law. A 
civil military relationship emerged, but it was far from concordant. It was a 
relationship where the military, and in particular the army, was able to gain a bigger 
role in the nation’s political realm. 
Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
During the 1950's, agreement amongst the partners as to the social composition of the 
officer corps proved difficult. Factionalism in the army had loomed as a spectre in the 
background since Independence. On successive occasions during the 1950's it came to 
the fore by creating instability within the military, wider society and the political 
system. This factionalism was used by a variety of actors in pursuit of their own 
goals. It was to the detriment of the military as a professional organisation as well as 
undermining any opportunity for an agreement on the social composition of the 
officer corps. There were a number of different cleavages that combined to undermine 
a stable social composition within the officer corps. Ethnic and religious divisions 
soon emerged within the officer corps. This would become one of the primary 
contributing factors to the highly factionalised military during the 1950's. Linked to 
the issue of ethnic and religious difference were hostilities that emanated from 
underlying regional tensions. This manifested itself in a divide between Java and the 
rest of the Indonesian islands. A divide which crossed both the military and the 
civilian political world and ultimately culminated with the regional crisis and a split 
between some regional based officers and those who occupied command positions in 
132 
 
Headquarters in Jakarta. A final division that had emanated from the pre-
independence history of the army was now present. This would create a division that 
would last throughout the 1950's. This division stemmed from those officers drawn 
from the KNIL and those from PETA. Their backgrounds also affected their levels of 
training and education. All of these factors combined to create a highly divided officer 
corps. It was their own officers who could not agree on its social composition, nor its 
political leaders or the wider population. This was an indicator upon which the 
partners disagreed and therefore one that prevented concordance. 
Political Decision Making Process 
The political decision making process that existed post-independence and until the 
implementation of the more authoritarian system of guided democracy, was highly 
unstable and contributed to the lack of a concordant civil-military relationship. The 
first thing to note concerning the political decision making process in Indonesian at 
this time was the inherent weakness within the political institutions themselves, as 
Indonesia saw the collapse of many cabinets in the 1950's, due to political infighting. 
The only constant was the figure of Sukarno, who was a highly adept political 
survivor and demonstrated his ability to manipulate numerous factions for his own 
benefit. There were numerous occasions when there was intense disagreement 
between the military and the political decision makers concerning the needs of the 
military. Perhaps the most enduring and problematic of these was the issue of how to 
integrate the PETA and other guerrilla fighters into the army. There was much 
controversy over this issue. Political interference in Army policy eventuated with a 
backlash by the military. An example of this was the tension that erupted and 
culminated with the 17th of October affair. This was a direct showdown between the 
government and elements within the Army's high command. It demonstrated the 
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volatility of the time and the dysfunctional political decision making process that 
precluded concordance. 
Recruitment Method 
The recruitment method of the military during this period of time did not influence the 
establishment of concordance. 
Military Style 
The Indonesian army's military style is a particularly significant indicator of 
concordance. Schiff states that military style refers to "...the external manifestations 
and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what 
ethos drives it, and what people think about it."
448
 The TNI evolved out of a series of 
historical events that drove its development in a particular manner. The importance 
and influence of KNIL military thinking cannot be underestimated. These were 
soldiers who rose to hold positions as officers in the TNI and brought with them a 
'western professional' military experience. By contrast there were those Indonesians 
who had either joined the TNI as former soldiers of the Japanese occupation forces or 
had partaken in the struggle for independence through Guerrilla organisations. The 
effect of this was a one army with a variety of influences and interests that were often 
diametrically opposed. The independence struggle had involved an extensive 
Guerrilla campaign against the Dutch. This struggle had, by its nature, required close 
coordination with civilians and the political leadership. Thus it developed with a 
mind-set for political issues. It also developed an early distrust and disdain for civilian 
politicians, as It had continued to fight for independence despite the revolution’s 
political leadership having surrendered. This also instilled a belief that the military 
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had a superior role in the revolution and in the life of the nation because of its actions 
in winning independence. Political interference in areas which the military believed to 
be its exclusive domain served as a further cause of mistrust and tension. This 
combined to create a military high command that was suspicious of civilian 
politicians and of civilian governments. In the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, 
events transpired that led the TNI to hold an impression of itself as the nation's 
guardian. It had taken roles fighting insurgencies, ultimately culminating with its 
successful campaign in the regional rebellion. Stemming from the Madiun rebellion, 
as well as from the general threat that the army perceived to be coming from the 
communist party and its supporters, the TNI developed an inherently anti-communist 
disposition amongst many in the officer corps.
449
 By the end of the 1950's all these 
factors combined to produce an army with growing political power, but also one 
which had a deep mistrust of politicians as well the PKI and its supporters. The 
civilian population tended to hold a positive view of the army. Despite there being 
times when the army cracked down on various parts of the politically active citizenry, 
it was viewed favourably due to its crushing of the secessionist regional challenges.  It 
was also held in high regard for its role in the nation’s independence struggle. The 
army was gradually developing a secondary function aside from that of national 
security and defence. The military became involved more heavily in the political life 
of the country during the period of martial law.  This was clearly articulated in 
Nasution’s 'middle way' speech. The army also had the opportunity to move into the 
nation's economic affairs with the nationalisation of Dutch assets during the martial 
law period. This suddenly put army officers in charge of large companies. It provided 
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the army with new avenues of revenue as well as the opportunity for personal 
enrichment through corruption. 
The development of the TNI's military style did not automatically preclude a 
concordant relationship, but it did affect the role that the army would accept. The 
military would not accept a subservient role within the nation’s political structure. By 
the end of the 1950's there was an attitude which would preclude civilian control, in 
any Western sense. The army had, in its opinion, shouldered much of the 
responsibility for the victory in the independence struggle despite the surrender of the 
revolution's civilian leaders. This feeling of animosity towards civilian leadership was 
added to because of the political interference in army affairs by civilian politicians. 
The result was that, by the middle of the 1950's, the army had a low opinion of the 
nation’s political leaders. It would become increasingly more politically active whilst 
at the same time developing its secondary function outside that of national defence. 
These factors combined to create a perception amongst those in the military that they 
should have a more significant role in the control of their organisation, one which 
precluded interference from civilian politicians. It cemented a resolve amongst those 
in leadership positions that they would not submit, as they had in the past, to the 
civilian political interference. The development of their secondary function 
demonstrated the benefits of being involved in areas outside those which were 
deemed purely to be military matters. The combination of history and the course of 
events during the 1950's set the army on a course in which it began to seek more 
independence both politically and within society. The army was thus happy to enter 
into the relationship with Sukarno under Guided democracy because it would at least, 
in the short term, provide the military with the power that it desired.  
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The military during the 1950's was subject to intense factionalism within its ranks and 
political interference. It's commanders at the beginning of the decade attempted to 
undertake a reform program that proved unpopular amongst many officers, this led to 
a confrontation between the political leadership and the military. Resulting in the 
replacement of the army's commander Nasution by Sukarno. Following this episode 
Nasution's leadership was challenged by the attempted coup of Colonel Lubis. The 
military then became involved in suppressing regional rebellion's which were 
supported by dissident military officers. As a result of regional turmoil martial law 
was passed in 1957, resulting in an end to Indonesia's period of constitutional 
democracy and an expansion of the military's role into the economic, social and 
political life of the nation. Concordance at this time was not possible due to the 
divisions within the actors. 
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Chapter Five 
Guided Democracy 
In the wake of the collapse of Indonesia's constitutional democracy, Sukarno 
established a new political system, one which he believed was better suited to 
Indonesia. It was a system which comprised three powerful partners. All three of 
these partners had their own interests and reasons for wanting to be part of this 
conflictual and difficult relationship. Sukarno, as leader, required the backing of a 
sizeable and increasingly politically active army to remain in charge. To hold the 
army in check he, however, needed a partner who was capable of counterbalancing 
the strength of the army. This partner was the PKI, which had considerable popularity 
as well as an extensive grassroots organisation. The PKI’s motivation in supporting 
Sukarno was to ensure that it was protected from the army, as the army largely viewed 
them with suspicion and disdain. The whole system of guided democracy was a finely 
balanced arrangement of partners with competing interests. Thus Anderson has 
described the system of guided democracy as "...a coalition of expediency that began 
to breakdown as soon as the immediate interests of the partners no longer 
coincided."
450
 
There were a number of different institutional instruments that comprised Guided 
democracy. Sukarno resided at the top of this system; however there were a number 
of other bodies that he had to work with or around. At the top sat the Work Cabinet. 
This comprised Sukarno and a number of other senior ministers, as well as a number 
of junior minsters. There were also two deliberative bodies, the Peoples Deliberative 
Assembly (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) or MPR and the Supreme Advisory 
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Council (Dewan Permtimbangan Agung) or DPA. The MPR, a large body, was 
intended, "...to be the repository of popular sovereignty...."
451
 The DPA was tasked 
with providing Sukarno with advice outside that of his cabinet. There was also a 
national planning council whose task it was to provide advice on the economic 
development of Indonesia. Legge argues that the "...complex cluster of councils was 
intended to provide an appropriate framework for the deliberation which, under 
Guided Democracy's rationale, was intended to secure a national consensus."
452
 
Sukarno appropriated the term Gotong Royong from traditional Indonesian society; a 
term which would become important within the rhetoric of guided democracy. The 
concept itself refers to "...moral obligation and generalized reciprocity...", however 
for Indonesian political leaders including Sukarno it came to mean more than this.
453
 
In his speech on the 1st of June 1945, Sukarno spoke of bringing people together, 
"Christians and Muslims, rich and poor, and native Indonesians and naturalized 
citizens in a mutually tolerant struggle against the enemy"
454
 Sukarno's use of the 
term, argues Bowen, "...became an emblem of the Indonesian nation as an active 
joining of opposites."
455
 The significance of the Gotong Royong parliament must be 
seen within this context as a vehicle intended to bring a diverse range of views 
together, and an attempt to unite them. Gotong Royong was a concept intended to 
unite the Indonesian masses as well as political groups in a manner which would 
contribute to a more effective system of government for the country. It would also 
contribute to the modernisation of the nation and improving the state's economic 
situation. 
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In 1960 the old parliament was replaced with the Gotong Royong parliament. This 
parliament contained representatives from the legal political parties PNI, PKI and NU 
(Nahdlatul Islam), as well as members from the armed forces, of which the army had 
the most. It also had representatives for "...workers, peasants, Islamic authorities, 
youth, women and the intelligentsia."
456
 Through the establishment of these 
deliberative bodies, Sukarno now had the institutional machinery that would comprise 
guided democracy. Legge argues that as time went by the effectiveness of these 
bodies was gradually eroded to the point where the parliament was no longer a check 
on the president's power, and the other deliberative bodies, the DPA and MPRS, 
became "...submissive."
457
 
Sukarno sought to hold this mix of competing interests by appealing to an overall 
sense of "...national purpose." spelt out in the concept of Pancasila.
458
 
1. Belief in God 
2. Nationalism 
3. Humanitarianism 
4. Democracy 
5. Social Justice459 
In 1959, alongside Pancasila, Sukarno announced what would become the ideology 
behind Guided Democracy, referred to as MANIPOL. This spoke of the "...revival of 
the spirit of the Revolution, for social justice and for 'retooling' of the institutions and 
organisations of the nation in the name of ongoing revolution."
460
 This was combined 
in 1960 with the initials USDEK, which stood for the 1945 constitution, Indonesian 
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Socialism, guided democracy guided economy and Indonesian identity.
461
 
MANIPOL-USDEK now becomes ideological orthodoxy; it was introduced into all 
levels of education and government as well as the press.
462
 Nasakom also emerged as 
a crucial component of Guided Democracy, it argued for Nationalism, Islam and 
Communism to work together within government, represented by the PNI, NU and 
the PKI. 
Guided democracy was characterized by the conflictual relationship that existed 
between President Sukarno, the armed forces and the PKI. The dynamics and balance 
of power between the three entities was subject to turbulent change over the period 
during which guided democracy existed. The army at the inception of Guided 
Democracy held influence due to its administration of martial law. Sukarno needed 
the support of the army to govern the country and to prevent the possibility of any 
threat to his own government. Sukarno's requirement for the support of the military 
was also tempered by the possibility that the military would challenge his leadership 
or his policies. Therefore throughout the five years of guided democracy he sought to 
find additional supporters to ensure that the military did not become too powerful. 
Herbert Feith has described the relationship between Sukarno and the army as being 
one of "...stable conflict...” driven by competition, tempered by common interest.463 
The army for its part was concerned with the maintenance of its political power and 
influence, as well as being interested in maintaining its status as a respected institution 
within society. The relationship that the army had with Sukarno was key to ensuring 
its legitimacy within the nation's social and political life.
464
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Schiff's concordance framework provides for a means of understanding the events of 
the Guided Democracy period. By applying her framework to the case it will be 
demonstrated that the civil-military relationship was inherently unstable. Despite 
having a number of consultative bodies, ministers and others who made up the 
political leadership, it was really Sukarno who embodied the political leadership. His 
shrewd political balancing act between the army and the citizenry was undertaken to 
monopolise his control of the country. Schiff's third partner, the citizenry, is diverse 
and somewhat ill defined. Her definition of the citizenry is broad and non-exact. 
"...it is comprised of individuals who are members of unions or 
associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers...It is 
also best defined by function. How do the citizens interact with the 
military? Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role 
of the military in society?"
465
 
The PKI became totally relevant to any discussion of the citizenry. It was engaged at a 
grass roots level, both in rural and urban areas. It also grew to considerable size and 
had a crucial relationship with the political leadership. The PKI and the army tended to 
have a conflictual relationship, however there were also some groups in society who 
feared the communists and thus supported the Army. Religious organisations, such as 
the NU, were an example of this. 
The armed forces were well represented in senior positions within Sukarno's new 
system of government. Following the restoration of the 1945 constitution almost a 
third of all ministers were drawn from the armed forces. Similarly, a third of all 
ministers within the new parliament were also drawn from the armed forces.
466
 In 
1960 five army officers were appointed as provincial governors.
467
 There was also 
confrontation, the army pushed back against the relationship that Sukarno was 
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developing with the PKI, particularly in the wake of PKI’s criticisms of the army's 
handling of the regional rebellion and the army’s failure to finish it with force.468 In 
1960 the army arrested members of the PKI's politburo. Military commanders in 
South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan banned the PKI and arrested 
communists. Sukarno was eventually able to broker an end to the conflict, and the 
leaders of the PKI were released. From the beginning of the martial law period 
through to its end, the PKI sought to have the powers that the army were prescribed 
lessened.
469
 It should also be noted that Sukarno attempted to use the Air Force 
against the army. The air force had often been jealous of the powerful position of the 
army within the defence establishment. This example illustrates how politically active 
the military was, and how unwilling it was to tolerate the criticism or involvement of 
the citizenry, namely the PKI, in determining any civil-military relationship and 
therefore making any concordant relationship during this time highly unlikely. 
The matter of West Irian would become a factor of instability. Each partner had their 
own motivations for wanting to prosecute the campaign in Irian.
470
 Sukarno’s reasons 
behind his involvement in the campaign in Irian were to get the Indonesian masses 
behind his drive for a continuation of the revolution.
471
 West Irian could also be seen 
as a piece of unfinished business following the revolution for Sukarno. It remained, 
after all, a possession of the Dutch. As well as being motivated by a powerful sense of 
nationalism it was also suggested that Sukarno was also able to use the West Irian 
issue as a useful distraction from domestic issues at various times throughout his 
leadership.
472
 Similarly for the army it was a sense of humiliation that drove them 
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together to participate in West Irian with Sukarno.
473
 The army also benefitted from 
an increase in its size as well as loans for new weaponry.
474
 The PKI was supportive 
of the West Irian Campaign to support their protector, Sukarno, who in the early 
1960's was protecting them from the army. The PKI was also motivated by a strong 
sense of nationalism and anti-imperialism, and the action in Irian it believed would 
create wider support for the party domestically.
475
 This was successful, and in 1962 
the PKI was estimated to have had around 2 million members, the largest communist 
party in any non-communist nation.
476
 
In 1962 there was a crucial change in the army's leadership as Sukarno moved to gain 
tighter control over the army. He had been concerned by what he viewed as the 
lenient punishment of some of the PRRI's leaders. He undertook to replace Nasution 
with an individual who would be more amenable to his interests. According to Crouch 
part of the reason also resided in the fact that Sukarno perceived Nasution as being the 
most likely candidate capable of moving the army against him. Sukarno however had 
to exercise caution in his handling of Nasution, as he had been heavily involved in the 
army's rise to power and had considerable support within the officer corps.
477
 Sukarno 
managed to achieve this by offering him a simultaneous promotion that ultimately 
became a demotion. Sukarno offered to make Nasution commander of the armed 
forces with authority over all four of the armed services; however, as it transpired he 
did not end up having operational control over those services. His new post was 
changed to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. This meant that his roles were limited to 
organisation and civil defence. Although he remained an important personality, he 
had limited operational control over the military, and in particular the army. It was 
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also crucial that Sukarno was able to find a replacement acceptable to the officer 
corps as well as to the departing army head. The candidate found was Major General 
Yani, who enjoyed the support of both the army's officer corps as well as Nasution. 
The choice of Yani gave Sukarno the security of weakening the powerful Nasution as 
well as undermining the army's position as a partner within the framework of guided 
democracy.
478
 
The army's power was further diminished by the end of martial law. For Sukarno this 
was a further crucial tactic in minimising the political power of the army. Sukarno 
was able to justify this course of action with the quashing of a number of rebellions 
throughout Indonesia as well as the successful completion of the Irian campaign in 
August 1962.
479
 Martial law was finally lifted on May 1 1963. General Nasution, who 
was Sukarno’s largest potential threat within the armed forces had been side lined by 
Sukarno. Sukarno was also developing alliances within other branches of the armed 
forces which would also further his ability to control the influence of the army. The 
relationship between the army, political leadership and the citizenry that existed under 
Guided Democracy was one that was precariously balanced. The political leadership, 
personified by Sukarno, was acutely aware of the need to limit the influence of the 
military and the citizenry, in particular the communists. Sukarno had attempted to 
weaken the position of the army as a partner, and had succeeded to a certain extent 
through his replacement of its leader and his cultivation of alliances within the other 
branches of the armed services outside of the army. Sukarno was nevertheless still 
dependent upon the army.  He could not remove them entirely, and furthermore he 
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needed to be mindful of the influence that the PKI had. If Sukarno permitted them too 
much leeway then the army may move to challenge the status quo. 
Indonesia's confrontation in Malaysia would also have an important impact on the 
nature of the power relationship under Guided Democracy. Once again the army, the 
political leadership and the citizenry undertook courses of action that they believed 
would best serve their interests. The PKI was motivated to stand against the formation 
of Malaysia out of its nationalist and anti-imperialist ideology. More pragmatically, 
however, its support for the campaign in Malaysia was about strengthening "...its 
hand in internal politics at the expense of its rivals and enemies."
480
 
Similar motives have to be taken into account to explain Sukarno's support for action 
against Malaysia. Stemming from this, Legge suggests that Sukarno's actions were 
underpinned by a sense of being slighted by colonial powers which were setting 
Malaysia up for the maintenance of their own interests.
481
 As an aside, Mortimer 
argues that by 1963 Sukarno was becoming increasingly comfortable in relying upon 
the communists, and the relationship between the two parties was becoming closer.
482
 
The political leadership and the citizenry were moving closer together. 
The army's involvement in the Malaysia confrontation was mixed from the outset.  
They were not interested in becoming involved in a large military operation; however 
this was tempered by other considerations.
483
 The army, like Sukarno and the PKI, 
were nationalist in orientation. They aspired to see Indonesia become a regional 
leader. Crouch argues that the formation of Malaya was seen as a continuation of 
British influence.
484
 More pragmatically part of this calculation may have been to see 
an end to British military bases in Malaya. There were also the memories amongst the 
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army of the period during which Malaya had been used as a transit point for material 
being smuggled into Indonesia to support regional uprisings. The new Malaysia 
would have a sizeable Chinese minority and it has been suggested that the army was 
concerned about the spectre of the Chinese Communist Party in the region.
485
 Mainly 
though, this must be seen within the context of the changing place of the army. 
Martial law had reduced the army's power. There was the hope that events would 
transpire in such a way as to once again be of benefit to the army domestically.
486
 
While the confrontation with Malaysia was heating up the PKI increasingly began 
criticizing the army domestically. They labelled them as bureaucratic capitalists. The 
PKI also'...openly declared the Army and the Police to be 'anti-people' and 
recommended themselves to the poorer peasants by advocating land reform."
487
 Once 
again, through the actions of criticizing what could be termed 'military style', the PKI 
was attacking the army and attempting to ingratiate themselves further amongst the 
population. The citizenry that can be termed as the PKI was thus clearly making a 
deliberate attempt to increase its support at the expense of the military, all the while 
criticizing it for its perceived evils. 
The army was careful in its management of the confrontation with Malaysia. It was 
concerned about committing to a large scale confrontation. The issue of Malaysia also 
became one in which rivalry between the various branches of the armed services 
began to be tested. In particular the Air Force commander Omar Dhani, who was a 
supporter of Sukarno, was put in charge of the command (Koga) responsible for the 
military operations against Malaysia. The significance of Dhani's appointment to this 
position was that it gave Sukarno a man with whom he shared mutual interests; 
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beyond this, it was also further evidence of the trend that was developing under 
guided democracy, that being the increasing division of the armed forces. As Elson 
notes, this was undertaken by Sukarno with the intent of "...advancing and 
consolidating his own political purposes."
488
 Following the poor performance of a 
number of military operations, Yani began pushing for more army involvement in the 
operations undertaken by Koga. The effect of this was that Koga was eventually 
reorganised with Dhani receiving a new deputy, Suharto. 
The relationship between Nasution and his replacement Yani was also becoming 
increasingly strained due to a number of issues. Yani had taken over in 1962, and had 
sided with Sukarno in restricting Nasution from having operational control over the 
army in his new position as the armed forces Chief of Staff. Opinion diverged around 
the areas of the best way to deal with the PKI and the attitudes toward Sukarno.
489
 A 
meeting between Nasution and Yani sided officers was held in January 1965 in an 
attempt to resolve issues between them. It failed to reach agreement on how to handle 
Sukarno. Despite these differences within the top echelons of the military there was 
the continuing commitment amongst members of the army to the principle of 
maintaining the army's political role. 
Since 1957 the PKI had set about making a concerted effort to make closer contacts 
with the army. In 1957 they had assigned a number of party members to begin seeking 
out officers who would support their aims within the armed forces as a whole but in 
particular within the army.
490
 Despite these efforts the number of army officers who 
held sympathy for the PKI was limited.
491
 Sympathy for their position was more 
forthcoming in the Air Force. The Air Force was more closely aligned with Sukarno 
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and leftist politics as a result of its initial Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Surjadi 
Surjadarma, who had been close to Sukarno and held leftist views.
492
 The Air Force's 
leaders believed they had been treated as a junior service by the army and resented the 
army for this. Crouch suggests that despite the fact the PKI and the Air Force shared a 
mutual antagonism of the army, as well as the Air Force's leftist sympathies, it could 
still not be classed as being committed to the PKI.
493
 The PKI’s lack of influence 
within the Armed Forces meant they relied on the ongoing protection of Sukarno. The 
PKI's answer to this came in two forms. The PKI suggested that workers and peasants 
be given military training and arms and be turned into a 'fifth force' alongside the 
army, navy, air force and police. This presented a major challenge to the army in the 
form of a potential armed rival over which it would not have control. The PKI also 
sought to push for the Nasakomization of the armed forces. The major fear for the 
army was that Nasakomization would amount to communist penetration of the army. 
The PKI suggested that the elements of Nasakom be represented within the armed 
forces through the use of advisory teams.
494
 This, it was hoped, would provide the 
PKI's leadership with more influence within the army.
495
 The army was keen to block 
Nasakomization. They argued that being loyal soldiers they were dedicated adherents 
of Pancasila and that they "...upheld the spirit of both the Manipol/USDEK and the 
Nasakom concept."
496
 The army also argued that the armed forces could not be 
expected to function effectively if Nasakom was introduced, and beyond this that the 
military was already imbued with the spirit of Nasakom.
497
 By utilising this argument 
the army was able to ultimately resist the PKI's attempt for greater influence within 
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the army, under the guise of Nasakomization. The army remained opposed to the fifth 
force idea, however by September of 1965; this would no longer be of any 
consequence. In theoretical context the citizenry was now beginning to influence the 
concordance by affecting the army's social composition within the officer corps. The 
PKI had always hoped to gain greater influence within the military and in particular 
the officer corps, however when that proved impossible they began to push for the 
concept of the 'fifth force'. This would have changed the nature of any concordance by 
introducing another security service of sorts into the partnership category. The PKI 
was also pushing hard for Nasakomization of the armed forces. This would have 
required that members of armed forces be taught the meaning of the doctrine through 
advisory teams.  This represented hope for the PKI that they may be able to affect the 
social composition of the army's officer’s corps. 
The Army's New Doctrine 
During the 1950's the military slowly began to develop a role for itself outside of its 
security function. This was spelt out by Nasution, in his middle way speech. The 
military subsequently became involved in the nation's economy with the 
nationalisation of Dutch economic interests. Martial law and Guided democracy 
would increase their power and influence politically. However in the late 1950's and 
early 1960's the army went through important doctrinal changes that would have a 
significant impact on the nature of Indonesian Civil-Military relations and upon the 
concordance of which it was now a part. The army, under this new doctrine, would 
expand more into the social life of the nation as well as having a closer relationship 
with the citizenry. 
Officially this change in doctrine took place in March 1960 with the adoption of 
'Territorial Warfare', or Guerrilla warfare. Due to the nature of this overall strategy it 
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was determined that the soldiers of the TNI develop a close relationship with the 
population.
498
 In order to achieve this, the army had to "...win the confidence of the 
people"
499
 It was also argued that "...the Army should take an interest in the material 
welfare of the people..." the army established specialist units whose purpose it was to 
build a structure for war time resistance.
500
 Sundhaussen argued that these groups 
were also to be used for the purpose of possible confrontation with the PKI.
501
 
Within this strategy there was also the call for the TNI's increased penetration into the 
nation's economy. In order to improve the capability of the TNI there would have to 
be increased economic development; the military's economic activities would also 
provide for its aid programmes for the masses as well as establishing a wartime 
logistics system.
502
 In 1959 the military territories, or T&T, were renamed (Military 
Area Command or KODAM) and increased from 7 to 16. Along with the increase in 
area commands, there was an enlargement in the size of the staff organization in each 
one of these KODAMS. This system of organisation was overhauled with District and 
Sub District commands renamed and staffing increased. By 1963 the military had 
representation all the way down to village level.
503
 As part of this coordinated effort 
to establish its doctrine of territorial warfare and to encourage the symbiotic 
relationship between the masses and the army, the military began "...civic action 
programmes, conducted public indoctrination, and organized cultural events." The 
army used "...doctors, engineers and work gangs of soldiers..." in an effort to win the 
hearts and minds of those in the villages.
504
 The army also made an effort to seek a 
closer relationship with a number of different civilian organisations as well as 
                                                 
498
 Ibid. p.140 
499
 Ibid. p.140 
500
 Ibid. p.140 
501
 Ibid. p.140 
502
 Ibid. p.140 
503
 Ibid. p.141-142 
504
 Ibid. p.141-142 
151 
 
political parties at the local and regional level.
505
 All of these efforts were of course 
not only to strengthen the relationship between the army and the masses but, as 
Sundhaussen suggests, they were part of a deliberate policy to contain the "...political 
advances of the PKI."
506
 These efforts must be seen in the context of the army 
attempting to compete with the PKI at the grass roots level, where its organisation had 
particular strength.
507
 The international environment also has to be taken into 
consideration. South East Asia during the 1960's was one of the frontlines for the 
ideological clash between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the U.S 
military provided the TNI with assistance at this time in the form of training, 
equipment and technical assistance.
508
 
It has already been noted that in the wake of declaration of martial law, the TNI 
stepped into the economic realm. The participation of the army in the nation's 
economic affairs would become more significant and would enable the army to 
develop its own business and charitable interests which, in turn, provided the army 
with its own income stream. During the 1960's the economic performance of 
Indonesia declined as the nation was hit by high levels of inflation and economic 
mismanagement. This 'unofficial' funding became more important for the army as its 
budget was reduced by the central government.
509
 As already noted, the military was 
able to install military personnel into those Dutch companies that had been 
nationalised; however other forms of funding also developed. Three examples of these 
forms of funding developed during the Sukarno era were partnerships, cooperatives 
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and foundations.
510
 Military partnerships between commanders and local businessmen 
were one such source of income. The army would force local traders or businessmen 
to pay taxes or duty to the military for economic transactions.
511
 Cooperatives were 
controlled by individual commands to supply goods to soldiers and their families.
512
 
Lieutenant Colonel Rudini was a specific example. He utilised military vehicles to 
transport commercial goods, as well as establishing a chicken farm and cooperative 
store which supplied his soldiers.
513
 The army also created foundations (yayasan) 
which acted as holding companies for a variety of business interests.
514
 The army's 
famous Diponegoro Division, headed by Suharto from1957-1959 established two 
foundations.  One of these supported the development of the local region and the 
other one supported retired military personnel.
515
 The evolution of military business 
provided the opportunity for personal enrichment that would spur General Nasution to 
conduct an investigation into corrupt and fraudulent practices of soldiers. Post and 
Lindblad suggest however that by the time General Nasution had made this realisation 
it was already too late. Many activities and behaviours had become entrenched.
516
 
Ultimately, with greater economic instability the army's business interests became 
even more critical and sizeable. Developing financial concerns were providing the 
military with an increasing degree of independence from the government, as it was 
able to fund part of its own operations. This had repercussions for any emerging 
concordant relationship because, due to the army having obtained more political 
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power and influence it was now able to operate in a more independently financial 
manner. 
Analysis 
The period of guided democracy proved to be a time of considerable political 
upheaval despite the attempts of Sukarno to establish a system which would be better 
suited to Indonesian culture. The three partners within this system made the 
possibility for any enduring and stable concordance impossible. 
The Military 
The Army was anti-communist in orientation. In 1948 it had fought the communists in 
Madiun. The Communist act of rebellion had left a deep impression on those soldiers 
involved in putting it down. It had affected the mindset of those involved and it 
contributed to the army's view of the communists as being a serious threat. The army 
at this time was also receiving training and assistance from the US army and 
government, which was deeply concerned about the spread of communism in South 
East Asia.
517
 It should be mentioned that there was some sympathy within the army 
for the communists but this was very limited in nature. When the army began to 
challenge Sukarno, he began to look for other allies in the armed forces. He replaced 
the head of the army and sought support from the air force. This split the interests of 
the air force and army, and led to competition between the two groups during the 
Malaysian confrontation. The air force and its commander Omar Dhani were used by 
the political leadership at various times as a means of checking the army’s influence. 
There was also the issue of the fifth force and Nasakomization which would have 
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severe repercussions on the army had these proposals been seen through in the 
manner in which they were originally intended. 
The Political Leadership 
When it comes to defining the political leadership under Guided Democracy, as noted 
earlier it is primarily the personality of Sukarno that was most relevant in having 
"...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces."
518
 There 
were cabinets and other consultative bodies that advised Sukarno, but the real power 
within the political leadership as it has been demonstrated was Sukarno himself. He 
was responsible for the establishment of Guided Democracy and its tenets of Gotong 
Royong. Later he called for the return to the revolution under MANIPOL, and for the 
competing strands of Nationalism, Islam and Communism to work together under 
Nasakom. Despite all these things that Sukarno introduced into the political system it 
was ultimately his own personality and his personal interests that would determine the 
nature of relations between the political leadership and the military and the citizenry. 
The Citizenry 
For the purposes of this discussion the PKI has been focused on as the key group 
within society that represents the citizenry, due to its leading role in government, and 
its rivalry with the military. This may seem to neglect a considerable amount in the 
way of data, and much of the rest of society. Nevertheless as stated elsewhere in this 
thesis, Schiff's definition of her third partner is deeply flawed, namely in the fact that 
by her definition it includes almost everybody. The PKI during the period of guided 
democracy were large in numerical size while operating at a number of different 
levels throughout society. They also had by far the most important relationship with 
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the armed forces. The political leadership relied upon them to counter the power and 
influence of the army. They were also aware of the danger that the staunchly anti-
communist army presented to their attempts to gain more power and influence with 
the political leadership. The concepts of Nasakom and Gotong Royong also should be 
considered within the context of this actor. Nasakom was about bringing the divergent 
forces of nationalism, communism and religion together. These different sections of 
the population would be bought together for discussion and consensus. However the 
PKI was caught in with the other Nasakom members, it remained in direct 
competition with them. Similar to this was the Gotong Royong cabinet; it was another 
attempt to bring convergent forces within the citizenry together in the political realm. 
This gave the citizenry a kind of organisational coherence, with the PKI playing a 
leading role, although it remained ideologically disparate. 
The army had come through the guided democracy period suffering from some 
factionalism, with some officers holding leftist sympathies. Nevertheless for the vast 
majority of these officers the rise of the PKI represented a serious threat and united 
much of the army. The army was challenged by the Air Force who had moved closer 
the PKI and Sukarno; it was more powerful and ultimately more influential. The army 
as an actor had grown more cohesive in a manner that had not been previously seen. 
The political leadership of Sukarno had moved closer toward the PKI and become 
increasingly dependent upon the communists support. The citizenry was far from 
cohesive; society was increasingly split between those who supported the communist 
and Sukarno, and those who sided with the military in its opposition to the PKI.  
Having established the three partners we are now able to assess the indicators of 
concordance. 
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Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
Schiff states that the social composition of the officer corps is the "...primary indicator 
of concordance.", and that the representation of the nation’s particular constituencies 
within the officer corps is critical. She makes the point that it is not a requirement that 
there is broad representation of all those in society, but that there is agreement upon 
the social composition of the officer corps by the concordance partners. The exact 
ethno-religious makeup of the Indonesian army's officer corps has at times been 
problematic. It was the political affiliation of the officers that proved problematic for 
the citizenry and the political leadership to accept. As indicated throughout this 
chapter the Indonesian Army had a historical legacy of being anti-communist and 
suspicious of leftist elements. As an institution, it was deeply wary of the rise in 
popularity of the communist party. In the early 1960's it openly challenged the 
communists, by arresting members of its leadership. The citizenry criticized the 
military and began to challenge the army's powerful martial law role. It argued that 
the army as an institution opposed the people. The Army for its part was regularly 
challenged on points relating to the social composition of the officer corps. The 
political leadership directly challenged the army's leadership, appointing new 
commanders who were more amenable to their interests. It also challenged the army's 
commanders particularly during the Malaysian confrontation by supporting the role of 
Air Force commanders within the operations hierarchy.  The result of this action was 
a further souring of relations between the Army and Air force. The citizenry for its 
part pushed the concept of Nasakom on the army, which would have pushed 
communism into the army. However there was little chance that officers within the 
Army were going to allow this. The military and in particular the army disagreed over 
the social composition of the officer corps with the political leadership and the 
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citizenry during the period of guided democracy, due to the interests that the citizenry 
and the political leadership had and were trying to push upon the military. 
The Political Decision Making Process 
There were a number of different institutional organs that together comprised the 
political decision making process. Before discussing these, the nature of Sukarno's 
guided democracy system of government will be briefly described. As noted by 
Schiff, countries "...evolve differently and often encompass values that may challenge 
modern Western democratization.”519 This point is particularly relevant in the case of 
Indonesia during the Guided democracy period because it was one of the justifications 
that Sukarno used to shape his new political system. He spoke of the need to create a 
system based on consensus, and one that utilised traditional concepts of governance. 
As detailed earlier in the chapter there were a number of different institutions that 
comprised the political decision making progress. There were advisory bodies to the 
president, a parliament and a cabinet. The army for its part had considerable 
representation within the parliament and within the cabinet.  It also held positions 
within regional administration. Within the nations "...cabinet the army had about a 
quarter of the places, including the key departments of defence and security and 
internal affairs....”520 The army would also have significant representation within Koti 
(Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian), which, argues Crouch, "...was 
becoming a more important policy-making body than the cabinet.”521 In 1960, one of 
the government’s advisory bodies passed a plan which laid down the concept of 'total 
peoples defence', which would rely on the coordination between the army and the 
population to defend the country. The citizenry for its part tested the army's powerful 
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presence in the nation’s political decision making. Some ministers were PKI 
affiliated, however the army was successful in blocking more PKI members to these 
government positions. For Sukarno, as well as the PKI, the goal of a Nasakom 
government was slowed down by the army. 
Since the days of martial law the army had been developing its own streams of 
income outside of those officially sanctioned by the government. This changed the 
significance of the political decision making process as an indicator, because the army 
was able to obtain things to supplement the needs of its soldiers outside of that which 
the government was providing. This income stream was obviously not significant 
enough to self-fund the army. Nevertheless it did provide commanders with additional 
income that in many cases strengthened their bond with their own soldiers. During the 
confrontation with Malaysia the army was criticised domestically by the PKI. Despite 
this criticism they were able to step back into the political realm with the partial 
reestablishment of martial law in late 1964, thereby giving them the ability to detain 
people, impose curfews and restrict the movements of those deemed dangerous.
522
 
There was little agreement amongst the three partners on the political decision making 
indicator. There was much disagreement between the military and the PKI over the 
amount of influence that each would have within the political decision making 
process. There was also the occasionally destabilising influence of the political 
leadership as Sukarno, at various times, bolstered the power of either the citizenry or 
the army in order to enhance his own position. 
Recruitment Method 
This indicator has not proved relevant. There have not been issues stemming from the 
type of recruitment during the guided democracy period. 
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Military Style 
During the period of guided democracy there was significant disagreement amongst 
the partners about its style, Schiff refers to military style as being "...the external 
manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it 
looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it."
523
 Anti-communism 
became an important defining characteristic within the Indonesian army. They had 
been engaged in defeating a communist uprising in 1948, and this had led to the 
development of a staunch anti-communist attitude within the army. With the 
establishment of Guided Democracy and Sukarno's increasing contact and reliance 
upon the communist party, tensions were bound to develop. There were efforts to 
temper this strong anti-communist attitude. The first of these was the sacking of 
Nasution, and the subsequent replacement with a commander more amenable to 
Sukarno’s interests and political programme. Next was the attempt by the PKI to have 
the communist influence within the army increased. Through Nasakomization in the 
armed forces, and later the suggestion of the creation of a fifth force.  This however 
failed. 
The Army was also developing as an increasingly potent force within both society and 
within politics. It had, since its inception, developed a close relationship to the wider 
population. It had fought as a Guerrilla force against the Dutch. The Army had also 
been used on a number of occasions as a force for internal security operations. It had 
twice been responsible for the administration of martial law in the country. The Army 
had also gained a foothold in the economy, and furthermore, under Nasution’s 'middle 
way' doctrine, the groundwork was laid for a far more politically and socially 
embedded army. The adoption of territorial warfare, due to the government’s military 
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budget constraints, guaranteed that this relationship between the population and the 
military would endure. The PKI and the political leadership tried to challenge the 
army's anti-communist views by promoting the concept of Nasakom within the armed 
forces; however, this largely failed. In the end there was little agreement amongst the 
partners about military style. The army had an established style that the citizenry and 
the political leadership attempted to affect. However there was little change and the 
army retained its anti-communist views. The army as an institution only became more 
deeply embedded within the political and social life of the nation. 
On the 1st October 1965, a radio announcement was made announcing the Thirtieth of 
September movement, led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung had arrested a council of 
generals. These individuals were described as "...power crazy, neglecting the welfare 
of their troops, living in luxury over the sufferings of their troops, degrading women 
and wasting the nation's money."
524
 Untung claimed that this group of Generals were 
planning a CIA backed coup. The leaders of the Thirtieth September movement had 
issued a statement declaring the establishment of a Revolutionary Council which 
would hold authority. Later that day at 2pm, the names of those on the council were 
announced. A number of military officers were included as well as three 
representatives of the PKI, Sukarno's name was absent from this list. Major General 
Suharto made an announcement later that day declaring that there had been a counter-
revolutionary action, and that this movement was responsible for the disappearance of 
six generals including the head of the army, General Yani. By this time Suharto was 
in charge of the powerful Kostrad unit, and it was within this unit that opposition to 
the Thirtieth September unit was based. All six of the Generals had been killed by the 
kidnappers in the process of arrest or killed later and their bodies dumped, at an air 
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field on the outskirts of Jakarta. The situation in Jakarta was such that two battalions 
of soldiers from bases outside of Jakarta and loyal to the Thirtieth September 
movement held control of the presidential palace. Suharto was able to convince one of 
these units to change sides, while the other unit fled. Throughout the rest of the 
country other units that had been loyal to the Thirtieth September movement were 
turning, often due to the soldiers overthrowing their commanders.  By the next day the 
leadership of the movement itself, had evacuated their base of operations at Halim air 
base. The PKI leader, D.N Aidit, and Air Force Commander, Omar Dhani, had fled. 
Untung was caught and later tried and executed for his role in the attempted coup. 
There are a number of different academic interpretations of those events in October 
1965, particularly concerning the role of Suharto. The important and significant point 
for this discussion is that it was the means that bought Suharto and his New Order 
regime to power, and the affect that such an event had upon the concordance.
525
 The 
army emerged as a stronger coherent actor, as it purged those with communist 
sympathies, and relentlessly pursued the PKI. Those members of the citizenry that had 
opposed the PKI joined the army in this orgy of violence, resulting in around 
1,000,000 deaths.
526
 The political leadership was essentially sidelined as Suharto, took 
power with the support of the army sideling Sukarno. The outcome was the 
establishment of a new concordance, an enforced concordance, the New Order. 
Suharto attempted to civilianise his regime in 1967 when he was appointed to the 
position of president, the military still however remained important to the New Order, 
and to Suharto's maintenance of power. The military became directly involved in 
government with the inclusion of active officers inside the parliament. 
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There were times when there was infighting and factionalisation within the army, 
nevertheless Suharto's position was maintained due to the close relationship that 
existed with the army. The army had been engaged at various times in internal 
security operations and it would now become key to the establishment and 
maintenance of a relationship that supported Suharto and his elite while repressing 
any threat from the wider civilian population. 
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Chapter Six 
The end of Suharto's regime in 1998 was precipitated by a number of factors, some of 
which were longstanding and others were more sudden. This chapter analyses the 
change that took place within the partners of Suharto's enforced concordance. It is 
argued that the change within the partners was so fundamental that the New Order 
regime's brand of enforced concordance collapsed. The change that took place within 
each partner is explored, alongside the role that external factors played in the collapse 
of the regime and the concordance. 
The Role of the Army in Suharto's Downfall 
The economic crisis that hit Indonesia in late 1997 and 1998 caused considerable 
damage to Suharto's regime by undermining a key aspect of its legitimacy, namely the 
ability of the government and Suharto to provide economic growth and an increase in 
wealth for its population. Despite the significance of this, over this period of crisis the 
army and the interaction between Suharto and the army would also have a defining 
impact on the outcome of events in 1998. The military had long backed Suharto, and 
the two had formed a partnership in which they were able to dominate the rest of 
society. What existed under the New Order was not a concordance in the manner 
described by Schiff. Indeed despite the civilianization of the New Order in its later 
years the military was still relied upon as the "...primary weapon for social control."
527
 
Things were changing within the military however, and despite the fact that Suharto 
continued to maintain influence over senior appointments within the Army, these 
changes would play a crucial role in his demise. 
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Factionalism within the Indonesian Armed Forces and in particular the Army has been 
a recurring theme during the institution's history. From its inception the organisation 
was split between those who entered the military from the KNIL and those who came 
from the Guerrillas and the Japanese trained defence organisations. During the 1950's 
Indonesia suffered from a prolonged period of regional instability. Some of the causes 
that fuelled this period of rebellion found support within the army’s rank and file. 
Under Guided Democracy the Army was once again confronted by the spectre of 
factionalism within its ranks stemming from the split created by the close relationship 
between army, PKI and Sukarno. Sukarno was reliant upon the army for his position 
of power.  Despite the importance of this relationship it was Sukarno's proximity to 
and support for the PKI that began to create resentment within the army's ranks. This 
would ultimately divide the army once again. In the events that precipitated the 
collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998, a similar phenomenon would develop between 
the so called 'green faction' and the 'red faction’. 
Throughout this study factionalism within the Indonesian officer corps has proved a 
recurrent theme in the nation's civil-military relations. Factionalism does however 
expose a flaw within Schiff's framework. This flaw relates to the cohesion of this 
actor within her model. Schiff defines the military as being; 
"...defined quite simply. It encompasses the armed forces personnel who represent the 
military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to 
the armed forces. In some nations other security services may also compromise the 
armed forces. Generally, the military is the institution publicly recognized by society 
and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation's borders."
528
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Cohesion within the military is critical to the armed forces as it provides "a structured 
pattern of positive social relationships (bonds) between unit members, individually 
and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit or group's purpose."
529
 If the military is 
split at the level of its leadership and the officer corps, the purpose and effectiveness 
of the organisation as the entity tasked with the security of the state will be 
compromised. In regards to Schiff's framework, a factionalised army may no longer 
resemble the cohesive actor contained within her definition, but rather a series of 
competing groups who would no longer be capable of agreeing amongst themselves 
or any of her indicators, let alone amongst the other partners which, she argues, are a 
requisite of her theory. 
Before moving on to describe the situation which unfolded within the Army in the late 
1990's, it is relevant to discuss the work of Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra 
who have conducted in depth studies of the military's personnel appointments and 
career patterns. Their studies provide relevant background material that helps to 
inform the situation that developed in the 1997 and 1998. Kammen and Chandra 
pointed to underlying structural factors and historical legacies within the Indonesian 
army as being key reasons for the collapse of Suharto's regime.
530
 
In 1964 there began to be a significant growth in the number of graduating officer 
cadets. Kammen and Chandra record that there was now more than twice the number 
of officer graduates, with 280 graduating in 1964 compared to 113 in 1963.
531
 In 1968 
the number of officers sharply increased to 465, while up until 1975 the numbers of 
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graduating officers remained between 300 and 400. Not only was there a huge growth 
in the number of officers graduating, but because of the army's personnel practice of 
allowing an officer who had completed his tour of duty posting to select his 
replacement, there was a "...virtual monopoly on staff and command positions." held 
by the first of these large classes.
532
 To manage this problem the army standardized 
the total number of appointments to key command positions from each graduating 
class, thus preventing any one class from dominating these senior positions. The 
tenures of those officers who held the rank of Major and Major General were also 
reduced.  According to Kammen and Chandra this change had the effect of reducing 
"The variation in command tenure..." as well as standardizing the career paths of 
officers and "...stabilizing expectations within the officer corps.”533 Kammen and 
Chandra also found that there were a number of side effects to the growth in size of 
the officer corps. Due to the fact that territorial commanders had their tenure reduced 
Kammen and Chandra argued that these officers would "...have less knowledge of 
both their responsibilities and of local dynamics, and therefore will be less well 
prepared to anticipate and respond to social unrest.”534 The size of graduating classes 
could also impact upon career prospects of army officers. Competition for positions 
was seen "...as a healthy means of encouraging professionalism..." and a means for 
evaluating the performance of the individual officers.
535
 For the officers themselves 
however the smaller the class sizes the better the career prospects. Kammen and 
Chandra found that the worse the career prospects were, the less likely it was that the 
local command officers would have a "...incentive to take strong action against social 
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unrest."
536
 Kammen and Chandra have also traced the impact of these large 
graduating classes upon the military in the reform period, discovering that particular 
graduating years were more prone to reform than others.
537
 They conclude that 
officers who had graduated in 1973 were more likely to support reform than those 
from the classes of 1970 and 1971.
538
 
Appointment of military officers to Kekaryaan duties (non-military functional duties) 
was also an integral part of the army's middle way and Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) 
doctrines. 
"The appointment system involves placement of military officers in 
civilian posts since, according to BABINKAR, these posts are important 
to safeguard national political stability. The distribution system involves 
placement of retired officers or soon-to-retire officers in civilian positions. 
In so doing, the military retirees to secure a future job and income."
539
 
Kekaryaan included positions such as "...ministers, parliamentarians, ambassadors, 
senior executives in government corporations, bankers, senior civil servants, 
university rectors, provincial governors, sub district heads, and even village 
headmen."
540
 Providing Indonesian Army officers with business opportunities and 
employment post-retirement has been a concern for army leadership. In the late 1990's 
this became more significant. Providing retiring and retired officers with Kekaryaan 
positions was a similar problem to that confronted by the army in providing officers 
from large graduating classes with command positions, namely that there were not 
enough opportunities available. By 1997, there were murmurs of discontent amongst 
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those who had retired, and this discontent followed through in the events of May 1998 
with former officers supporting the calls for political reform.
541
 
In a more recently published article Kammen and Chandra once again conducted a 
detailed analysis of the size of the graduating classes of the Army academies.. They 
found that officers who had graduated in 1970, 1971 and 1972 had little reason to 
support reform. These individuals faced the loss of opportunities in the civil service, 
administrative posts and in the government’s legislative branch. Facing the potential 
loss of these opportunities that were long enjoyed by the officer corps "...they 
responded with a transitionary monopolization of the senior posts in the territorial 
structure, the Army, and TNI headquarters."
542
 For those officers who had graduated 
in 1973 and after, there was incentive to support reform. They would benefit from the 
freeing up of positions that would come from any personnel changes in classes who 
were monopolising career opportunities.
543
 Kammen and Chandra argue that the 
divisions in relation to reform relate to fundamental structural issues within the 
Indonesian officer corps itself and that  
"In the case of Indonesia, the division between those who favoured the status 
quo and those who supported reform was premised on the differential career 
prospects of more senior officers reluctant to relinquish their posts and influence 
and those of more junior officers who stood to benefit from leading reform and 
redefining civil-military relations. These differences were in part a function of 
class solidarity and the monopolization of key billets."
544
 
 
Kammen and Chandra's work demonstrates the importance of the underlying 
structural issues present within the officer corps that generated powerful incentives 
for change and against it. 
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The issue of military factionalisation in the 1990's is widely discussed within the 
literature relating to the role of the army in the events of 1998.
545
 During the mid-
1990's two rival factions began to develop, namely the 'red and white faction' and the 
'green faction'. The red and white faction was generally seen as those officers who 
were "...anti-Suharto, secular, nationalist, 'professional'...". 
546
 It was also seen as 
generally not being "...aligned with the rise of political Islam, reflecting a more 
nominal Islamic (abangan) base...”547 By contrast, those officers who were identified 
with the Green faction were described as being more supportive of Suharto, pro-Islam 
as well as being 'political' officers.
548
 Due to this division there was intense 
competition between each faction for the best political positions within the army.  
They both attempted to increase their influence by expanding in size and recruiting 
officer cadets from the academy. "In contrast to the past, the split within the military 
in the last year of Suharto's rule was very serious."
549
 
Individual officers came to hold particularly important positions in each of these 
competing camps. Two officers in particular would play a crucial role in the events of 
1998. The first of these was General Wiranto, Commander of the Armed Forces in 
1998, and member of the red and white faction.  The second officer was Lt. General 
Prabowo Subianto who was Suharto's son-in-law and commander of the important 
and powerful KOSTRAD unit (Komando Strategis Nasional/Strategic Reserves 
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Command). He was also viewed as belonging to the Green faction of officers. 
Prabowo had enjoyed a quick rise within the military hierarchy not only due to his 
proximity to Suharto, but also because of Suharto's increasing emphasis on promoting 
those officers with Islamic credentials.
550
 The quick rise of Prabowo through the ranks 
added to the background tensions that he came to experience with Wiranto.
551
 
Throughout the 1990's Prabowo rose in rank faster than any of his other military 
academy class graduates until, at the age of 44, he reached the rank of Brigadier 
General. Rinakit concludes that his pattern of promotion undermined the military's 
system of meritocracy that governs the promotional system. 
552
 By the end of 1997 it 
was concluded that there was a balance of power between the two camps. Wiranto 
and his followers dominated positions within the Armed Forces Headquarters, while 
Prabowo and his associates controlled the Army Headquarters within Jakarta itself 
alongside other strategic positions in the capital.
553
 
Lee argues that Prabowo began to undermine the military chain of command in two 
ways. Firstly he advocated the dismissal of Wiranto and the promotion of himself to 
the position of Army commander to a "....number of important people...", and 
secondly because of his role in the kidnappings and disappearances of students in 
1998.
554
 It was also suspected that Prabowo had been involved in the shootings that 
took place at Triskati University on May 12 1998, which killed four people. Rioting 
that took place on the 13
th
 and 14
th
 of May was believed to have also been influenced 
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by Prabowo, and it was thought that he had encouraged individuals to riot in order to 
discredit Wiranto and to "...gain ascendency in the armed forces."
555
 
Amidst the increasing tensions in Indonesia in 1998, the situation between Prabowo 
and Wiranto was coming to a head. The issue for these men now became one of 
surviving the political turmoil while ensuring that they were on the winning side. 
Wiranto was remaining loyal to Suharto and he was also more supportive of reform 
than Prabowo and his supporters. Wiranto was moving closer to elements within the 
domestic opposition. For example, Wiranto courted the support of the NU and, 
according to Lee, Wiranto and those officers around him showed some support for 
and understanding of the student’s position.556 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who 
belonged to Wiranto’s camp and held the position of Chief of Staff for Political 
affairs, was aiding Wiranto in his more conciliatory and pro-reform agenda.
557
 
Yudhoyono, for his part, was involved in discussions with civilian intellectuals over 
plans for reform. 
558
 Despite the shootings that had taken place at Triskati University 
and the subsequent riots, Wiranto and other like-minded officers were "...refraining 
from, indeed rejecting, the path of extreme coercion."
559
  Aspinall considered the 
decision by Wiranto to refrain from the use of coercion to protect Suharto as being 
crucial in bringing the presidency of Suharto to an end. 
"Refraining from extreme force to keep Suharto in power effectively 
meant abandoning him, becoming a means to short-circuit the political 
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crisis and prevent further damage to the state as a whole. For Wiranto and 
his group, it was also a way to pre-empt a move for power or other 
precipitate action by Prabowo (and immediately after Suharto resigned, 
Wiranto secured Prabowo's dismissal as Kostrad commander)."
560
 
Students, supported by soldiers who were loyal to Wiranto's faction, entered and 
occupied Parliament. The Commander of the Garrison in Jakarta claimed that he had 
an inadequate number of soldiers to enable him to prevent the students from 
occupying key government sites.  In the wake of this Rinakit asserts that Suharto now 
believed that the military was no longer supportive of him.
561
 In the wake of Suharto's 
resignation Prabowo and his allies demanded new positions both within cabinet and 
the military. Prabowo was pushing for Wiranto to be dropped from his position as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and for his own promotion as Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Things did not go in Prabowo's favour. He and 
several of his followers were relieved of their positions. Prabowo in particular went 
from controlling Kostrad to being moved out of Jakarta to head the Army's staff and 
command school, a position which held no control of combat soldiers. 
Middle Class Opposition 
As a developing economy Indonesia has historically not had a powerful middle class.   
During the 1950's and 1960's that which did exist was limited in size to "...a small 
coterie of intellectuals and professionals, the middle class was confined within the 
sprawling, chaotic and poorly paid state bureaucracy."
562
 The formation of the middle 
class during the 1950's had been linked directly to the growth of the number of civil 
servants in Government, as these positions were required to be filled by educated 
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candidates.
563
 During the politically and economic chaotic years of the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, events within the country began to affect this small middle class. 
Economically, the country was undergoing a period of severe economic pain. By 
1965-1966 the inflation rate within Indonesia itself was six hundred percent. Despite 
Sukarno's socialist ideology, which would have seen the nation’s citizens in an even 
economic grouping, there was no improvement in the standard of living for 
Indonesians.
564
 The nationalisation of foreign enterprises that took place during the 
1950's was an opportunity that could have presented Indonesia's citizens with better 
economic prospects. Instead, due to corruption, the number of people who did benefit 
was limited.
565
 As mentioned earlier, by the end of Sukarno's rule in Indonesia, the 
nation faced a major problem with inflation, brought about by Sukarno's economic 
policies and in particular his policy of providing subsidies on goods and services. 
There was also the increasingly strong influence of the left upon Sukarno and his 
policies. Over a period of time he had become much closer to the communists and this 
presented a threat to the small number of people who comprised the middle class.
566
 
In the wake of the 30 September Affair the increasingly dire economic situation, 
coupled with Sukarno's pro-communist policies, pushed the small middle class to the 
side of the Army. Aspinall argues that the army was able to rely on the support of the 
middle class. Groups took to the streets against the 'old order'. They used their 
connections to the media to support the army and its position.
567
 Aspinall also points 
out that some of these people also took up positions within the new order regime 
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itself, taking places within GOLKAR, the governing party, or as technocratic 
ministers.
568
 
The middle class has been looked at as an agent which can drive economic transition.  
One well known example of this argument is the work of Samuel Huntington.
569
 He 
argues that in the "Third wave movements for democratization were not lead by 
landlords, peasants, or (apart from Poland) industrial workers. In virtually every 
country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle 
class."
570
 Huntington also makes the point that when the middle class is small, it may 
well prove to be an anti-democratic force, as it had been in the wake of the 30th 
September Coup, and in its support for Suharto. 
"In its early phases, the middle class is not necessarily a force for 
democracy. At times in Latin America and elsewhere, middle-class groups 
acquiesced in or actively supported military coups designed to overthrow 
radical governments and to reduce the political influence of labour and 
peasant organizations."
571
 
Suharto having established his New Order regime embarked on a range of policies to 
encourage economic development. The country had endured prolonged economic and 
social decline under Sukarno, and therefore it was key to Suharto's legitimacy to 
provide the nation with sustained development. For Liddle, the application of these 
policies "...produced results in the form of a growing economic and social 
infrastructure and increasing individual prosperity."
572
 The ability of the New Order 
regime to continue to provide growth was the source of the regime's legitimacy, and 
this economic performance continued for some time. Thus many in the middle class 
continued to support Suharto. As Aspinall notes, the middle class "...support for 
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democratization is often conditional and hesitant..."
573
 In the case of Indonesia, 
Aspinall believes that despite a desire for political reform existing amongst the middle 
class, there was often "...erratic and irresolute forms of opposition." to Suharto, due to 
a concern about the potential for unrest and the loss of economic benefits associated 
with his regime.
574
 Thus despite the growing middle class, serious opposition to his 
regime took some time to materialise. 
Throughout the 1980's economic growth in Indonesia during the 1980's was 
responsible for the increasing size of the middle class. Aspinall notes that this group 
became "...larger, more amorphous, and confident social entity than the tiny and 
besieged group which had supported the army in 1965." He further stated that 
"Following the modernization thesis, it could be expected that the stronger middle 
class would support democratization.” However, many of the factors that had tied the 
middle class to the regime in the 1970s continued to operate.
575
 
By the 1980's capital in Indonesia had also begun to condense itself amongst local 
elites, namely those who had access to political and economic decision makers. 
Unsurprisingly, the Suharto family was one of the prime benefactors of this. They 
profited greatly from their control of the nation's political system. Many of Suharto's 
friends and associates also benefitted greatly. When Suharto left power in 1998 the 
total wealth of his six children was estimated at around $5 Billion.
576
 
Economic growth had a profound impact upon those who were living a marginal 
existence in both rural and urban Indonesia through the 1980's and 1990's. In Jakarta 
there was the creation of a "...large industrial working class..." who experienced poor 
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working and living conditions, due to the large numbers of workers flooding in from 
outside of Jakarta.
577
 
The economic growth and policy changes that took place during the 1980's had the 
effect of facilitating urban development. As a result of this, Indonesia's urban 
population increased in size.
578
 The rate of growth between the years of 1980-1995 
was 5.2 percent, with an overall increase in size from 32.8 million dollars to 70 
million dollars.
579
 As mentioned above many of the people who moved to the cities 
became members of the urban poor. As Aspinall notes, due to the urbanisation and 
population growth in Jakarta and other cities, there was a sizeable growth in the 
number of poor living in the cities. He argues that this class of people would become 
a significant political force in the following years.
580
 
The population growth and increase of those within the middle class coincided with a 
period of openness (keterbukaan) in Indonesia. Although there was a growth in the 
middle class, the pressure from them and other groups opposed to the regime was still 
not adequate to force the regime to change.
581
 Nevertheless there were a number of 
important developments within Indonesia during this time. The press became more 
open and more critical of the regime and its policies. From 1989 the press tackled 
increasingly controversial topics. Aspinall argues that this was due not only to the 
journalists and editors involved in testing the limits of the regime’s tolerance, but also 
to a "...hunger of middle-class readers for provocative news, indicated by the rapid 
expansion of courageous journals like DeTik, which burst from nowhere to achieve 
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circulation of almost a hundred thousand by August 1993."
582
 There were also 
demonstrations undertaken by students and farmers in 1988 and 1989. This led to 
more protests in the early 1990's.
583
 There was also a substantial growth in the number 
of NGO's from the end of the 1980's.
584
 These NGO's were active in a number of 
areas such as legal reform and environmental protection. Middle class intellectuals 
often belonged to these groups.
585
 Some of these NGO's became more politically 
active and began pushing for greater democratization.
586
 This period of relative 
openness ended in 1994, with the banning of three news magazines, caused by their 
coverage and criticism of a recent military acquisition. Despite Suharto's return to 
coercive tactics in dealing with this opposition, the middle class become more 
involved in political activities and it was also becoming more assertive and 
powerful.
587
 As a result of this crackdown by the authorities, there was a change 
amongst those who would have previously acquiesced. It was noted by Aspinall that 
there were large demonstrations, by those previous cautious members of the nation’s 
middle class who were united against the new policies of the government.
588
 
The PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri 
At the end of 1993 there was a change in the leadership of the Democratic Party (PDI) 
which resulted in a change of leadership.  The new leader was Megawati 
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Sukarnoputri. Suharto and the military had tried to control the election of the 
leadership, however by the end of the year this had failed. Attempts to control the 
decisions of the PDI had been stymied by serving military officers, influential retired 
army officers, the press and other politicians.
589
 The rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri to 
the position of leader of the PDI was in no small part due to her lineage. Sukarno was 
Megawati's father, and Eklof argues that her popularity was due largely to the fact that 
her name represented "...the ideas and charisma of her late father."
590
 The power of 
Sukarno as a symbol to the PDI and Megawati was significant. Sukarno, despite his 
tumultuous period of rule, represented much of what was seen as the antithesis to 
Suharto's new order.
591
 Eklof believes Megawati was seen by her supporter as having 
inherited those virtues of her father that saw her associated with a simple lifestyle 
with a close relationship to the people. Beyond this she was seen as someone with a 
"...reputation for decency, patience, calm and righteousness..."
592
 
Under Megawati the PDI was conveying a powerful, but simple message about the 
state of Indonesian politics and society. This would grow in popularity amongst a 
variety of different classes within Indonesian society. The PDI and Megawati rejected 
the states interference. In front of the party faithful Megawati asserted that they had 
the right to political participation and that they rebuff the use of intimidation and 
bribery by the regime.
593
 Their wider political program was focused on a 'proper 
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implementation' of Pancasila Democracy, which would provide for "...equal status of 
the parties, free and fair elections, party control of party affairs..."
594
 
From the mid 1980's the PDI itself began to draw an increasing level of support from 
the growing middle class and urban professionals.
595
 Professionals and intellectuals 
were drawn to the PDI in increasing numbers under Megawati as the political 
platform which she espoused enabled them to "...pursue reform "constitutionally" and 
avoid the dangers of being associated with challenging the system from outside."
596
 
Although much of the PDI's support base was drawn from lower social classes, small 
to medium sized business owners also showed their support.
597
 Its mass support was 
drawn from the youth small traders and those "...who constituted the urban informal 
sector..."
598
 Sukarnoist popularity did much for the PDI. It attracted large numbers of 
people from the poorer social classes who looked nostalgically to the past when those 
from such classes held a higher place within the life of the nation.
599
 
Megawati was ultimately removed from her position as PDI leader, courtesy of a PDI 
congress which had been organised as a result of Suharto's government and military 
officials.
600
This came about as a result of suggestions that were made about Megawati 
potentially standing in presidential elections.
601
 The congress resulted in Megawati 
being removed from the leadership of the PDI, but with it came a wave of violence 
and protest. Supporters of Megawati took to the streets of Jakarta, demonstrating 
against the congress and the Government’s support of it. A number of demonstrators, 
as well as soldiers and riot police, were injured during the confrontation. Megawati 
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took legal action against those in the PDI who had supported her removal as well as 
various governments and military officials who had been involved in the arrangement 
of the congress. Support also came from a group of NGO's who banded together in 
response to the Government's involvement with the PDI.
602
 Support for Megawati was 
building. A Free Speech Forum was established in front of the PDI's headquarters in 
Jakarta and this gradually became more critical of the government and attracted 
greater numbers of people. The military responded to this challenge by criticising the 
protestors and those participating in the forum, claiming that they were behaving 
unconstitutionally and that the speeches at the forum did not reflect "...Indonesian 
values..."
603
 Eklof argued that the statements of the military illustrated "...jargon 
typical of the New Order: branding political opponents as subversive and un-
Indonesian and accusing them of having links with the PKI, the government's political 
ghost par excellence."
604
 The crackdown came on the 27 of July, with the covert and 
overt support of the military,
605
 resulting in the deaths of five people, and widespread 
rioting throughout Jakarta. 
Suharto and his military supporters proved once again adept at equating the demands 
of the protestors with the subversive PKI narrative that had been so well cultivated 
during the New Order. The political leadership and the military had survived in the 
face of demands for greater political participation, by using underhand methods to try 
to unseat Megawati, and then by using the myth of the chaotic, dangerous PKI legacy 
to target its opponents.
606
  Despite the fact that the concord and the regime had 
survived, its "...shaky democratic credentials..." were demonstrated alongside its 
general unwillingness to accommodate any type of reform. 
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The Economic Crisis of 1998 
Under the New Order, the Indonesian economy had experienced economic growth 
that would remain largely sustained throughout Suharto's rule. Indonesia went from a 
largely underperforming agrarian based economy in the 1960's to one in which the 
manufacturing sector contributed more to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
607
 
Indonesia's average growth rate between 1965 and 1997 was seven percent and its real 
gross national product (GNP) "...roughly doubled every ten years."
608
 The 
performance of the economy during the New Order led to significant social change as 
well as structural change within the economy itself; 
"These structural changes were reflected in a shift of production from 
agriculture to manufacturing and modern services; a reduction in the 
agricultural labour force and growth urban centres; an enhanced role for 
trade in the economy; and increasing role for the central government in 
the economy; and monetisation of the economy as a result of stable 
economic management."
609
 
As a result of the performance of Indonesia's economy there were considerable social 
improvements. In 1965 the incidence of poverty in Indonesia was reduced 
considerably from approximately sixty percent of the population to approximately ten 
percent.
610
 Health care was improved with a resultant decrease in infant mortality 
rates and there was also improved access to safe drinking water.
611
 Access to basic 
education was improved with higher enrolment ratios. Aspinall argued that as a direct 
result of Indonesia's economic growth there was an associated demand for a 
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workforce that had a variety of skills and accordingly, one which required higher 
levels of education. 
"Tertiary education is no longer the exclusive preserve of the upper 
reaches of the narrow, cosmopolitan elite of the big cities (many of whom, 
in any case, send their children overseas for study) as it arguably was in 
the 1960's and even in the 1970's. Instead, it has become more accessible 
to wider layers, including youths from lower middle class backgrounds 
(whether military, civil service, entrepreneurial, or professional) in the 
provincial centre’s."612 
Indonesia had clearly undergone considerable economic growth as a result of the New 
Order regime, yet by 1997 the situation within South East Asia amongst Indonesia 
and the other high performing Asian economies (HPAE) had begun to decline. 
Huntington argued that during the 1960 and 1970's authoritarian regimes were driven 
to look to performance as a basis for legitimacy.
613
 This argument could also be made 
for Suharto's government, namely that in order to secure his New Order regime's 
legitimacy he sought to improve the economic performance of the country. Pabottingi 
argues that the New Order Government had perused with "...single minded..." 
determination its goal of economic growth.
614
 Alagappa argues that the claim to 
legitimacy through performance can be problematic for authoritarian governments 
such as Suharto's.
615
 On the basis of economic performance, legitimacy can quickly 
erode, particularly if the state and regime is faced with an economic crisis or 
decreasing performance.
616
 Alagappa also notes that even strong economic 
performance can generate pressures that can destabilise a government. He argues that 
over a longer time period there are tensions generated between the government and 
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new groups within society, such as the middle class and an evolving civil society.
617
 
Such groups then begin to demand greater participation and inclusion. These demands 
"...run counter to the interests of the power holders..." leading "....to the contestation 
of authoritarian rule."
618
 In the case of Indonesia both of these points manifested 
themselves. 
By 1998 the economic situation had become very serious. There was a drastic 
devaluation in the value of the Indonesian currency. In November 1998 the rate of 
exchange with the U.S dollar began dropping from around Rp 2,500 to Rp 4,000 and 
eventually dropped as low as Rp 17,000 by the middle of January 1999. Economic 
growth plummeted from eight percent in 1996 to negative fourteen percent in 1998.
619
 
Many of Indonesia's large companies were now facing collapse and unemployment 
rose as a result as did the cost of food and clothing. The Indonesian banking system 
also destabilised as foreign banks began to refuse credit. Indonesia's economy, that 
had once bought growth and raised living standards, was now faltering. This would 
soon have serious repercussions for Suharto’s regime. 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN) 
A defining characteristic of the New Order was widespread corruption.  By the time 
of the economic crisis in 1997-1998, this corruption was seen as a reason for an end to 
the regime.
620
 Issues of KKN had formed a part of life during the New Order regime, 
and in order to maintain control Suharto used the power of patronage.
621
 Vatikiotis 
believes that Suharto's power was not so much maintained through the power of the 
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gun as his, “power of the purse”622 Suharto's control of the country enabled him to 
dispense favours and concessions to those whose loyalty he wished to secure. KKN 
also became a method by which Suharto and his family enriched themselves 
massively, Elson describes how Suharto viewed the enterprises of his children as tools 
of development for Indonesia, and that these could not be viewed as corruption if it 
was in the interest of the nation.
623
 There were a myriad of ways in which this 
corruption was manifested.  The Suharto family in particular benefitted from the 
imposition of monopolies.  Through the use of states funds, Suharto’s son Tommy, 
was able to secure a monopoly position acting as a middleman between producers of 
cloves and cigarette manufacturers in the production of clove cigarettes.
624
 Foreign 
businesses were also drawn into the web of KKN if they hoped to conduct business in 
Indonesia. Robertson-Snape details an example of such an episode when it was 
thought that one of the world’s largest gold deposits had been discovered in 
Indonesia.
625
 She describes a situation in which members of the Suharto family 
became involved in the bidding process for the rights to extract the gold. Two rival 
companies, Bre-X and Barrick Gold Corporation, became involved in the bidding for 
the contract. In an effort to secure the rights for themselves each company secured the 
help of a member of the Suharto family. In Bre-X's attempt to secure a deal they had 
approached Sigit Suharto who asked for a payment of $40 million rupiah upfront and 
a ten percent stake in the mine. Ultimately the discovery of the gold turned out to be a 
scam, however not before  a close friend of Suharto, Bob Hasan had to be bought in to 
negotiate a deal to avoid an impending feud between the family members. Hasan for 
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his part was reported to have negotiated a thirty percent stake in the gold deposit.
626
 
For friends and members of the Suharto family such deals could prove highly 
lucrative, however in the case of the mine the Indonesian people stood to gain 
nothing.
627
 
Bob Hasan was an example of a Suharto associate who profited massively under 
Suharto's rule. He was a timber tycoon and personal friend of Suharto.  In March 1998 
he was appointed to the position of Minister of Trade and Industry. Described as 'one 
of Asia's best connected agents of crony capitalism', he controlled the Indonesian 
Wood Panel Association (Apkindo), which 
"...not only set the price for wood exports, but determined export levels, 
and even decided which shipping and insurance companies would be 
used. Hasan's own timber company-built up on forestry concessions given 
to him by Suharto-as well as his shipping and insurance companies 
benefited greatly from his position in Apkindo."
628
 
Hasan is but one example of KKN that was so widely resented by the student and 
middle class demonstrators that took to the streets in 1998. 
Suharto also had considerable wealth. It has been argued that he was not only rich but 
could be considered to be super rich, belonging to the category of the world's 
wealthiest people.
629
 Suharto denied this claiming that his comparison to people such 
as the Sultan of Brunei or King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was inaccurate. He even 
challenged Indonesian citizens to prove the existence of foreign bank accounts.
630
 It is 
interesting to note that Elson paints Suharto's interest in money as not being motivated 
by rampant greed, but rather being motivated by the ability that it gave him to 
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maintain his own power.
631
 In the end however Suharto's corruption became central to 
demand from protestors that he step down from office, and ultimately the systemic 
corruption, that he had once relied upon to keep him in office, became a key factor in 
his downfall. 
Analysis 
The Military 
One of the most significant factors in Suharto's downfall in 1998 was the emergence 
of serious factionalism within the army, and the relationship that this factionalism 
then played in the resulting lack of a military crackdown upon protestors. It would be 
inaccurate to state that Suharto's New Order army had never experienced 
factionalisation, as it most certainly had. Fundamentally different in 1998 was the 
factionalism that had translated into a split within the military's high command, and 
this lack of cohesion amongst the military’s senior leadership translated directly into 
the military failing to mobilise at crucial points in order to rescue the regime. The 
factions were not only the products of increasing resentment amongst some 
Indonesian officers toward Suharto, but also arose from more historic structural issues 
within the armed forces. These factions were also separated by their ideological 
outlook with the green faction who were seen as more strongly Islamic and more 
supportive of Suharto. The red and white faction was seen as being secular with a 
nationalist and more professional outlook. Both of these groups had powerful officers 
within their ranks. The green faction had Prabowo who held KOSTRAD command. 
Command of this unit could have given the Pro-Suharto faction adequate force to 
crush protests in Jakarta. However, the actions of Wiranto and Yudhoyono sidelined 
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Prabowo from this potentially decisive position. The lack of cohesion amongst the 
military was of the utmost importance to the collapse of Suharto's regime. The change 
from a partially factionalised military to one that was now deeply factionalised 
undermined Suharto's ability to enforce his concordance. The change in this actor 
directly contributed to Suharto's collapse. 
Political Leadership 
The ability of Suharto to control the army was gradually weakening.  He had, in the 
intervening years, used his personal influence for the express purpose of maintaining 
loyalty within the officer corps. This was a key tactic in ensuring that the army would 
support his regime. However, by 1998 this policy had created resentment, and this 
contributed directly to the factionalisation in the officer corps. Suharto's ability to use 
the military to maintain his rule was one of the factors that was crucial to the 
longevity of the New Order. His regime was being undermined by KKN and a failing 
economy. Simultaneously there was the rise of a credible political opposition headed 
by the PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri. These factors combined to weaken his hold 
on the Political Leadership, despite his determination to maintain control. 
The Citizenry 
The citizenry's relationship with the military had changed radically since the time of 
the New Order's establishment. There were many groups within society which 
supported Suharto in his ascension to power. After the chaotic years of Sukarno, the 
middle class were motivated to support Suharto by a desire for political change and 
stability. However by the 1990's things had changed irrevocably. This once small 
middle class which had been concerned about maintaining its wealth, had grown in 
size and was beginning to make demands for greater political freedoms, a free press 
188 
 
and an end to KKN. It was becoming more confident and increasing in size. During 
1989, members of the middle class were able to enjoy greater freedoms during the 
period of openness. Professionals, in particular journalists, made the most of this, and 
some newspapers responded by printing articles critical of the government. There was 
a growth in the number of NGO's. Membership within these groups included lawyers 
and intellectuals. This period of openness ended in 1994, when the more critical 
media outlets were banned. Crucially though, by the 1990's the middle class had 
grown in physical size and it had also tasted greater freedom. As a result of this period 
of openness, the problems in Indonesia were drawn into sharper focus as was the 
population’s lack of freedom. The relationship between the citizenry and Suharto was 
changing. The urban poor and working class were suffering due to the prevalence of 
corruption. By 1998 a wide cross section of opposition had arisen to challenge 
Suharto. In challenging Suharto, the citizenry was challenging the role of the armed 
forces in the country. The military had supported Suharto, and now that the masses 
were mobilising against him the relationship of control that the military had over the 
population was being challenged. The confrontation between students, their middle 
class supporters and the military on the 27th of July showed that the opposition to 
Suharto had grown, and it would no longer accept the close relationship between 
political power and military power in Indonesia. As a partner within the concordance 
framework, the citizenry were cohesive, and united in opposition to Suharto. Prior to 
the 1990's the middle class had been considerably smaller and more conservative in 
nature, it had not actively challenged Suharto so openly or in such numbers. This 
partner who had been previously placated by Suharto and controlled using coercion 
no longer accepted him or the military's relationship with government. The change in 
the nature of this actor bought about the end of Suharto's enforced concordance. 
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The Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
It has already been noted that there was an increasing level of factionalism within the 
Indonesian army in the 1990's. As detailed earlier, there were divisions emerging 
along religious lines, namely those amongst the green officer group and the red and 
white faction. Schiff believes the social composition of the officer corps to be the 
primary indicator of concordance. However, in the context of collapsing enforced 
concordance it is not the indicators but the nature of the actors that has driven the 
change. The protest movement that brought Suharto down was not driven out of 
concern for an officer corps that was more representative. Instead it was the cohesion 
within the citizenry, the lack of cohesion in the military, a weakening political 
leadership, a credible political opposition and finally the impact of the economic 
crisis. 
The Political Decision Making Process 
By 1998, there was widespread opposition to the government of Suharto. In opposing 
Suharto, the protestors and political opposition were also expressing a desire for 
change to Indonesia's civil military relations. Schiff states that the political decision 
making process are the channels that determine the requirements of the military.
632
 
The military under the New Order held 75 seats in the Parliament. It also operated 
according to its doctrine of Dwi Fungsi, which enabled it to maintain a presence in the 
political, social and economic life of the country. Dwi Fungsi enabled the army to 
generate its own streams of income, outside that which was provided by the 
government, by using military owned businesses and foundations. Despite this power 
by the 1990's the military was increasingly losing influence in government due to the 
appointment of powerful civilians, such as the appointment of two of Suharto's 
                                                 
632
 Schiff. p.45 
190 
 
children to the Golkar Central Executive Board. This caused discontent within the 
army.
633
 Resentment was building within the officer corps at the interference that 
Suharto had within the military. In particular this resentment stemmed from his 
interference in the promotion system. According to Nordlinger's liberal model of 
civilian control, it is important that the military’ independence is respected.634 In 
particular Nordlinger notes that the interference of politicians in the military's 
promotions system can generate "...powerful praetorian motivations."
635
 The military 
did not in its entirety seek to bring Suharto down, sections of it however became less 
supportive of him, and these elements, such as those led by Wiranto were key in 
restraining the military from a forcible crackdown on protestors. The PDI and 
Megawati were challenging Suharto's control of the political decision making process 
by calling for greater political participation and an end to the use of intimidation and 
bribery. The PDI argued for the proper implementation of Pancasila democracy, 
which they believed would lead to wider political participation and greater equality 
and fairness amongst political parties. Suharto and those who supported him however 
arranged for an end to Megawati as the head of the PDI. The removal of Megawati 
from the PDI led to demonstrations by the citizenry against the government’s role in 
her removal from office. NGO's also supported the plight of the PDI. The government 
attempted to describe the actions of the protestors as subversive. They alluded to links 
existing with the PKI. These protests ultimately turned violent with police and 
military suppression resulting in five deaths and widespread rioting throughout 
Jakarta. 
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By1998, there was disagreement amongst the partners on the political decision 
making process. The military was generally less supportive of Suharto, with its officer 
corps once again beset by factionalism. The citizenry wanted greater freedoms and 
political participation. In the meantime Suharto remained resolute in maintaining his 
hold on power. Megawati was removed from her position within the PDI when it 
appeared as though she would be a possible threat to his rule. This only served to 
harden the resolve of the opposition and this led to protests calling for an end to the 
regime. 
Recruitment Method 
The recruitment method of the army at this time did not prove to be a significant 
indicator. 
Military Style 
In the final years of Suharto's regime the military's style began to alter, the change in 
this indicator prevented the continuation of Suharto's enforced concordance. It has 
been noted the role that factionalism played in breaking up coherence in the army. 
This directly impacted upon the army's military style by changing the role of the 
military from being a supporter and enforcer of Suharto's regime, to one which failed 
to crush dissent. It was noted that Indonesia's armed forces had been used as Suharto's 
main tool for maintaining control of society.
636
 The factionalism that emerged in the 
1990's split the army into two powerful opposing groups, the red and white faction 
emerged as with some officers who favoured political reform. These officers held 
powerful positions in the army's high command, when tension began to mount in 
Jakarta in 1998 these officer's such as Wiranto restricted the opposing green faction 
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from taking more forceful action against the protestors. This example illustrates a 
change that took place in the army's style, one that saw it transform from enforcer to 
one that restricted the use of military force to crush protestors.  
The change that took place in the military, citizenry and the political leadership 
bought an end to Suharto's regime. Factionalism in the army split the institution, 
resulting in dissension within the partner. This lead to a change in the military's style, 
from enforcer, to one that did not actively attempt to crush the protest movement. The 
growth of the middle class altered the citizenry. Demands for political reform and 
more personal freedom transformed this partner from one that had supported Suharto, 
to one which opposed him. Suharto, who personified the political leadership, was 
increasingly undermined by his inability to deal effectively with the economic crisis, 
and close personal association and that of his family with KKN. There was no 
agreement amongst the partners on the indicators of concordance this resulted in the 
destruction of Suharto's era of enforced concordance. 
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Conclusion 
Indonesia's Armed Forces and in particular, the nations army have played a significant 
role in the economic, social and political history of the nation. The military emerged 
as a powerful actor within the political and social life of the nation, in the wake of the 
revolution. It reached the zenith of its power and influence under Suharto, where its 
influence expanded directly into government and society under its doctrine of Dwi 
Fungsi. The role of the army in the wake of the collapse of Suharto's New Order 
regime has waned, however there have been aspects of the institutions influence 
which have endured and have proved problematic for the country's new democratic 
political system. The Indonesian military's relationship with government and the 
nation's population has been examined using Schiff's concordance framework. It 
emphasises the importance of culture in history within the civil military relationship. 
Her model challenges the importance of civilian control of the military in preventing 
military intervention, instead offering a different type of relationship. This 
relationship is based upon agreement amongst the citizenry, military and political 
leaders. When this agreement is present amongst the partners on four indicators, 
Schiff's theory predicts that concordance will emerge.  However, it has been shown in 
the context of the Indonesian experience, that concordance has been extremely 
difficult to achieve, when it was achieved it was achieved in no small part through the 
use of coercive force. This concordance was maintained through the use of coercive 
force and the suppression of political activity and media freedom. Thus Schiff's very 
concept of concordance, an agreement must be treated with some scepticism. It will 
be suggested that it may be more accurate to assess this relationship along a 
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continuum, from cases such as Indonesia through to a concordance where the use of 
coercion is absent. 
The period of time that culminated in the successful revolution against Dutch rule 
would prove important to the development of the army. During these early years the 
military developed in a way in which many of its early divisions became entangled 
within its structure, this prevented the military from developing as a coherent partner. 
Those recruited into its ranks came from vastly different backgrounds, there were 
those from the KNIL, PETA and Guerrilla groups. These officers had different levels 
of technical knowledge and professionalism. The KNIL members were trained 
according to the Dutch standards of education and professionalism. Those from 
PETA, where trained by the Japanese, they were heavily nationalistic, disciplined, 
their educational levels varied. KNIL soldiers often obtained senior ranks over other 
officer recruits despite their similar ages, as those from the KNIL background often 
had superior technical knowledge in the area of command. Factions between these 
two groups soon emerged, this would endure into the 1950's. The military's style also 
began to develop, the experiences of the soldiers from PETA under the Japanese and 
the conduct of the nationalist political leadership during the revolution resulted in a 
distrust of civilian politicians. The ethnic and religious diversity present in Indonesia 
also drove tension, with an overwhelming number within the officer corps being both 
Javanese and Muslim, this officer corps makeup did not reflect the nation's diversity. 
The army became beset from an early stage by problems in its command structure and 
factionalism. It also developed a view of itself as key to the foundation of the state, 
and had come to view itself as being closely linked with the citizenry. By the end of 
the revolution the army that had emerged was factionalised, lacked an effective 
command structure as well as an antagonistic view of the civilian political leadership.  
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The political leadership lacked control over the army, going right back to its origins 
the army had emerged largely spontaneously. The political leaders struggled in these 
early days to impose control over the army. Sukarno had emerged out of the war as a 
charismatic leader with wide appeal amongst the population, however in the years 
following the revolution he would endure a troubled relationship with the army. The 
pattern for this was established early in Indonesia's history and would result in a 
turbulent relationship between the army and its civilian masters in the future. The 
civilian population initially united in the pursuit of independence became less 
cohesive toward 1949. There was a communist uprising in Madiun in 1948, which the 
army was called into suppress. Division emerged amongst the nations Islamic 
groupings, some of whom had secular affiliations and some like Darul Islam who had 
more radical goals. These two uprisings demonstrated to the army the danger of both 
radical Islam and communism. Even with the conclusion of the successful revolution 
there was no agreement amongst the partners, no concordance was possible. 
Beginning in 1950 the army's chief Nasution begin considering plans for reform and 
reorganisation, reductions in personnel, changes in training and doctrine and a change 
in the educational system. The goal of this reform was a smaller, more professional 
and effective army. This quickly became a source of tension, and contributed to a 
hardening of the factions already present in the army. In particular attitudes hardened 
amongst PETA soldiers who would have the most to lose should reform take place. 
The factionalism present within the army would soon become even more serious for 
Indonesia's civil military relations with the interference of the nation's political 
leaders. Sukarno and other politicians became involved siding with PETA soldiers, 
opposing Nasution and ultimately replacing him following an attempt to force 
Sukarno hand through the use of protestors. The government in 1955 would attempt to 
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appoint Colonel Bambang Utojo to the position of army chief of staff, based upon his 
political allegiances, resistance to the appointment quickly emerged. This was all 
evidence of political interference within the military's domain. In the wake of these 
events negative attitudes towards civilian politicians would harden amongst the 
officer corps. 
Military unity was again undermined in November 1956, by the actions of Colonel 
Lubis, who motivated by a dislike of Nasution and his new 'Tour of Duty' personnel 
system, undertook action to attempt Nasution's removal. Problems within the military 
where not only limited to factionalism and political interference, but also issues of 
command and control and discipline. Some regional commanders outside of Jakarta 
during the mid 1950's had developed an increasingly hostile relationship with the 
central army command. Many of these commanders often enjoyed intense loyalty 
from their soldiers. This presented a challenge to the army's commanders in Jakarta, 
as well as undermining the hierarchy and chain of command. These problems within 
the army would soon align with civilian dissatisfaction amongst the population of 
Indonesia's outer islands, at the perceived lack of attention from the government. This 
resentment was manifested in an episode of instability in Indonesia's regions, which 
culminated with the declaration of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia. In response to the regional instability and increasing disobedience amongst 
its regional commanders, martial law was declared on the 14th of March 1957 ending 
Indonesia's parliamentary democracy. The introduction of martial law presented the 
army with the opportunity for role expansion, it quickly took over control of 
nationalised Dutch companies. Martial law also provided the army with the 
opportunity to expand its political role, partially in response to the political chaos of 
the time the army now pushed for involvement in government. This expansion in both 
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economic and political roles was articulated by General Nasution in his 'Middle Way' 
speech, he claimed that the army's participation in these areas would aid in the 
development of the nation. 
The army in the late 1940's had participated in counter insurgency operations, this 
trend had continued into the 1950's with its involvement in operations suppressing 
regional uprisings. It had been involved in operations against religious groups, 
communists and dissident military officers. These operations changed the army, 
domestic operations in a counter insurgent role affected the military, by altering their 
skills and technical knowledge. It also had the effect of hardening army attitudes 
toward groups that were challenging the authority of the unitary state. The result was 
a more politically active army, more aware and sensitive to those groups it identified 
as being forces of divisiveness in society. 
The 1950's was a period in Indonesian history that was characterised by political and 
social turmoil. The military was beset by issues which prevented the establishment of 
concordance. The army once again suffered internal division, and lacked the cohesion 
required to form a concordance. There were also repeated episodes of political 
interference within the army by the political leadership. The military resented this 
intrusion, and sought to prevent it. The political leadership was also a far from 
coherent partner during this time, Sukarno was able to maintain his prominent 
position within the political system. However, there were frequent changes of cabinet; 
this instability within the political reached its height with the regional crisis and the 
imposition of martial law in 1957, bringing an end to Indonesia's experience with 
constitutional democracy. There were similar levels of disunity within the citizenry. 
firstly elements of the citizenry were used by both the political leadership and the 
military in their confrontation with one another. Secondly, the upheaval in the regions 
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that culminated with the PRRI rebellion demonstrated that there was serious division 
between the population in Java and the outlying regions of Indonesia. None of these 
actors where united enough to consider them coherent, thus preventing the 
development of any concordance. There was similarly no agreement upon any of 
Schiff's indicators. 
With the end of constitutional democracy came Indonesia's new political experiment, 
guided democracy. At the centre of guided democracy sat the competing interests of 
Sukarno, the PKI and an increasingly politically assertive military. The strain of the 
relationship between the PKI and the army would ultimately contribute to the collapse 
of guided democracy. Sukarno relied upon both of these mutually antagonistic groups 
to maintain his own power. Guided democracy attempted to gain consensus through a 
diverse range of political and social groupings. Sukarno introduced the concept of the 
Gotong Royong parliament which contained representatives from these diverse 
groupings, these were meant to provide the institutional machinery for guided 
democracy, however such bodies became increasingly ineffective. The military under 
guided democracy obtained considerable representation within parliament, this would 
become a source of tension with the PKI. The PKI's size and grassroots organisation 
made it a powerful opponent for the army. It began to assert itself during the 
confrontation with Malaysia by challenging the military domestically. Its support for 
the campaign in Malaysia was also had the affect of moving it closer to Sukarno. The 
army by 1963 was beginning to see a decline in its fortunes. Martial law was ended on 
May 1 1963, bringing to an end some of its influence in the countries social and 
political life. The military was also subject once again to political interference when 
Nasution was replaced in 1962, with Ahmad Yani, an officer who was more amenable 
to Sukarno's interests. The PKI also made a concerted effort to gain greater support 
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within the armed forces, through its suggestion of a 'fifth force' and the 
implementation of Nasakom within the army's ranks.  
The army in 1960 had made official changes in its doctrine which bought it into closer 
contact with the population. There was the creation of military command areas, which 
covered different geographic areas within the country. The military under this new 
doctrine of territorial warfare soon had representation down to village level within the 
country. The army engaged in development projects in the villages and made a 
concerted effort to gain relationships with local political parties. This new doctrine 
that the army implemented should be viewed as a response to the challenge that the 
PKI presented with its sizeable membership. The expansion of the army's role within 
the economy has already been discussed, however in the 1960's the importance of the 
army's financial interests grew. Indonesia's economy in the 1960's was performing 
poorly, the importance of the army's business interests grew as a source of providing 
for itself and its soldiers. This had the affect of providing the army with greater 
independence from the government. It also changed the nature of the political 
decision making process by making the army slightly less dependent upon the 
government for its funding. 
Indonesia's period of guided democracy was characterised by competition and conflict 
between the military, the political leadership and the citizenry. The army during this 
period was strongly anti-communist, bringing it into direct competition with the PKI, 
Sukarno's other major supporter during guided democracy. The PKI made various 
attempts to challenge the position of the military; Sukarno also changed removed 
Nasution, a figure who had come to challenge his dominant role under guided 
democracy. In contrast to earlier periods the army had managed to a certain extent to 
unify, particularly around the issue of the threat from the PKI. There was some 
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disagreement within the army's senior levels of command over how best to deal with 
the PKI. Nevertheless the military by 1965 was far more united than it had been at 
previous times. It could be considered by 1965 to be a coherent partner.  The political 
leadership during guided democracy was ultimately controlled by the presence of 
Sukarno. There was considerable support during the period of guided democracy for 
the PKI amongst the citizenry, Sukarno had attempted to unite the divergent forces 
within society through the creation of his Gotong Royong parliament and his policy of 
Nasakom. There was resistance to the PKI from Islamic groups and member of the 
middle class whose interests were threatened by the PKI's policies. The division that 
existed between the PKI and the army prevented the partners from agreeing upon any 
concordance. 
Guided Democracy was ended in 1965 by an attempted coup led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Untung, his attempted coup was defeated by Suharto. It was under Suharto 
that the first concordant relationship emerged. It however was not one based upon 
agreement. The army was purged of those individuals who had sided with Untung and 
held sympathies for the political left. Violent suppression of the PKI was undertaken, 
involving participants from within the citizenry itself, resulted in an end to communist 
support within the population. Sukarno's position as the charismatic leader of 
Indonesia was ended with Suharto's ascent to the position of president in 1967. The 
political leadership under Suharto changed from one that was characterised by 
Weber's Charismatic domination, to one of Legal Domination under Suharto. The 
New Order and Suharto would rule Indonesia until 1998. 
Suharto's regime collapsed in 1998; there were a number of reasons for this occurring. 
Indonesia in 1998 was hit by the East Asian financial crisis. Under the New Order 
there had been a prolonged period of economic growth, this came to an end in 1998. 
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The financial crisis had devastating results for the Indonesian economy and the 
middle and working class of Indonesia. The middle class in particular that had 
benefitted as a result of the New Order's economic growth was hit by the devaluation 
in currency. The onset of this sudden economic crisis had the affect of destabilising 
the enforced concordance that had existed under the New Order.  
There were a number of issues within the army, who under the New Order had been a 
key supporter of Suharto, which would gradually undermine the ability of Suharto to 
control the country. The army was subject to a number of structural issues that 
undermined the coherence of the actor. There were long standing structural issues 
within the officer corps that materialised in the 1990's the pushed some in the army to 
be more supportive of reform and change in the political system. Factionalism in the 
1990's emerged between the red and white, green factions within the officer corps. 
The struggle between the military elite in the late 1990's prevented the military from 
taking unified violent action to stop protestors. The lack of coherence within the 
military prevented the enforced concordance of Suharto continuing. 
There was also a change within the citizenry in the final decade of Suharto's rule that 
led to the collapse of the New Order. The middle class had grown since the time of 
the Guided democracy period, once supporters of the New Order regime, their support 
began to diminish as demands for greater political participation and personal 
freedoms materialised. The demands of the middle class would align itself with the 
emergence of credible political opposition to Suharto. The PDI and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri presented a political a voice for the middle class and the working 
classes. KKN contributed to the undermining of Suharto's legitimacy. By 1998 the 
citizenry emerged by as a partner that was united against Suharto. 
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Key Historic Legacies 
Much of the work in the field of civil military relations theory has emphasised the 
separation of the military and civilian spheres. Theories such as Huntington's 
emphasised the importance of military professionalism, and the division of the 
military and civil spheres in preventing military intervention.
637
 Huntington argued 
that a military whose professionalism is maximised will be rendered politically 
neutral, he termed this objective control.
638
  
Others such as Finer and Stepan have challenged the notion that professionalism 
restricts the army from undertaking political intervention.
639
 Sundhaussen has argued 
that in the context of states whose civilian politician's do not operate with the same 
levels of "...efficiency and performance..." as the military, high levels of military 
professionalism may threaten civilian supremacy.
640
 Indonesia's military 
professionalism suggests Sundhaussen was affected by the performance of the 
economy, as the economy deteriorated he argues the more the army became 
concerned by its performance, ultimately he argues that many of the army's interests 
were tied to the performance of the economy.
641
 Moreover Sundhaussen notes 
 "...the importance of economic factors within the overall framework of 
national politics and security, the defence doctrine of the Indonesian 
Army, both in its external defence and its internal security aspects, relied 
significantly on the application of economic measures to secure the 
support of the population for the government and the military, particularly 
when an army has to fight a guerrilla war against external aggressors and 
conduct anti-guerrilla warfare against internal dissidents."
642
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Indonesian military professionalism and the expansion of the army's political role also 
evolved through its participation in internal operations, against Communist's, 
Islamist's and other regional dissidents. As Stepan has argued, the military's 
participation in domestic operations such as those in a counter-insurgency role can 
have the effect of expanding their knowledge and expertise into the realm of political 
issues.
643
 Indonesia's military professionalism became linked to an expansion of its 
role into the political, economic and social life of the nation. 
Schiff's argues that a nation's unique history and culture are fundamental to 
understanding the civil military relationship.
644
 In the context of Indonesia the 
understanding and study of the nation's history and culture is of the utmost 
significance. It is problematic applying a model that emphasises separation of civil 
and military realms when the nation has no history of this having occurred. Schiff in 
her work stress's this point by stating that the imposition of a model which emphasises 
the separation of civil and military institutions is inappropriate in nations which have 
no history of separation.
645
 The events during the revolution and immediately 
afterward also affected the manner in which the army viewed civilian politicians. The 
surrender of the civilian leadership during the revolution resulted in the army taking a 
negative view of the civilian leadership. This was further compounded by the political 
interference during the 1950's that led to factionalism within the officer corps. The 
military throughout the 1950's and 1960's and much later during Suharto's rule 
suffered from episodes of political interference. Interference from political leaders 
also became a recurring theme in Indonesia's civil military relations. Leaders of the 
country attempted to intervene in personnel appointments or attempted to alter 
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internal army policies. This resulted in internal military issues and sometimes as was 
the case with the 17th October affair, open confrontation with the government. 
Political interference contributed to the army's disdain for civilian politicians.  
The army as a result of its involvement in the revolution came to hold a view of itself 
which justified it holding a special position in society. The army had been involved in 
a guerrilla style struggle that led to a strong bond within the citizenry of the nation. 
The nature of this war demanded that they work closely with the population. The 
military viewed their role in the revolution as being fundamental to gaining of 
Indonesia's independence, the army had after all continued to fight despite the 
surrender of the nationalist leaders. These factors engendered a sense of entitlement 
within the army. During the 1950's the army's perception of itself changed to one 
where it saw itself as a guardian of the national interest.
646
 This was the result of  a 
perception of the inherent weakness of the civilian politicians, political instability and 
unrest within the country. This perception that the army held of itself as a privileged 
institution and one that was a guardian of the national interest, helps explain why it 
became involved in the nation's political life. 
Factionalism within the army has also been  characteristic of Indonesia's civil military 
relations. This has been caused by a variety of factors. The diversity of Indonesia has 
been one contributing factor. Firstly the historic division that exists between Java and 
its outer islands led to division amongst those officers that served in the army's 
command in Java and those based in outer islands. Ethnic and religious background 
were also a major contributing factor to the factionalism that the army suffered, 
division in particular between Javanese officers and those from elsewhere on the 
archipalego. In the early days of the army there were strong divisions between those 
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from PETA and those who had Dutch military training in the KNIL. The levels of 
education, technical ability and disparate institutional cultures within the KNIL and 
PETA separated these two groups. In the context of this study factionalism has 
prevented the establishment of a coherent military partner, this explains why there 
was no concordance until the army became unified around Suharto in 1965. In 1998, 
disunity amongst the officer corps represented by the green faction and those from the 
red and white group of officers contributed to the collapse of the enforced 
concordance that existed at the time. 
Assessment of Schiff's Model 
Schiff's concordance model approaches the problem of interpreting civil military 
relations in a manner unique too much of the existing work. Instead of arguing for a 
separation of the military and the political spheres, Schiff has focused her argument 
upon the notion of concordance. This contends that when agreement is reached on 
four indicators amongst three partners, military intervention will not occur. When 
agreement is not present intervention is more likely to occur. There however some 
problems with her theory that have been exposed in the Indonesian case. The first of 
these focuses upon the partners themselves. 
There is an inherent assumption built into Schiff's theory that the partners in a 
concordant relationship already exist, and that these actors always remain in place. 
However, this study has illustrated that this point cannot be taken for granted. The 
case of the formation of the Indonesian army being an example of this. Schiff states 
that the military can be defined quite simply,  
"It encompasses the armed forces and the personnel who represent the 
military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those most 
dedicated to the armed forces....Generally, the military is the institution 
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publicly recognized by society and the political elites as the institution 
that defends a nation's borders."
647
  
In the case of the Indonesian military it evolved slowly, with personnel coming from 
several different groups. Even when the armed forces had been formed in the shape of 
the TKR it is highly questionable the degree to which the personnel were committed 
to the armed forces. It has been noted many times that the army at this time was 
comprised of two major groups, those from the KNIL and those from the Japanese 
trained PETA. The degree of commitment that many of these men could be seen as 
having to the armed forces is questionable, because at this early stage there was a 
significant level of jealousy and animosity between these two groups. Thus the notion 
of these officers being committed to anything beyond their own group of soldiers and 
officers is questionable. 
 The creation of the Indonesian army took place in the wake of Dutch colonisation, 
Japanese occupation and then involvement in a war for independence. The military 
evolved throughout this period and went through several incarnations before the TKR 
was eventually established. In the case of the Indonesian army there was also 
indecisiveness in the Indonesian government over the creation the army.
648
 The 
Indonesian government took some time in establishing the military structure or even 
creating "...an army owing allegiance or even a sense of obligation to them."
649
 This 
illustrates that the Indonesian army took time to form as a partner, and in slowly 
evolved into what Schiff would define as a partner. 
It is also clear from the Indonesian case that the partners do not always remain in 
place. In the case of the Indonesian citizenry in the wake of Suharto's seizure of 
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power large numbers of the citizenry were either killed or imprisoned for their support 
of the PKI.  
"...the citizenry is by corollary even more heterogeneous than the political 
leadership. Usually it is comprised of individuals who are members of 
unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm 
workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may 
be disenfranchised. It is also best defined by function. How do citizens 
interact with the military? Is there agreement among the citizens 
themselves over the role of the military in society?"
650
 
In the case of the PKI's supporter's they were many and varied, they came from rural 
areas as well as urban, they were involved in unions. Schiff also states the citizens can 
be defined by their relationship to the military and whether there is agreement 
amongst the citizenry over the role of the military. In the case of the mass killings of 
communist supporters there were as many as 1,000,000 members of the citizenry 
killed, this took place with the participation of other members of the  citizenry. It does 
not seem possible that in the wake of these killings that the citizenry could still exist 
as a partner, those who did disagree with the military or its supporters were murdered. 
In doing this the military removed any opposition within the citizenry, through the use 
of extreme violence. 
The coherence or unity of actors has also been demonstrated to be of crucial factor in 
the case of Indonesia's civil military relations. Schiff does not discuss the effect of 
cohesion amongst her partners. Change in the partners is important in understanding 
how a concordant relationship can either emerge or collapse. The issue of coherence 
within the armed forces has been a recurrent theme throughout this study. The issue of 
factionalism has been a recurring theme within Indonesia's civil military relations, the 
army has since the time of its creation suffered from varying levels of factionalism. 
Factionalism has resulted in a lack of coherent military partner. If the military is not 
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coherent, it is unable to agree on any of the indicators. Thus, as long as there is 
division amongst the officer corps there is no possibility that they will be able to agree 
with the other partners on the indicators of concordance. The result of this is that no 
concordant relationship is possible. The problem of coherence within each partner has 
not been limited to the military. It has been shown that in the case of Indonesia, 
division within the other partners has also produced a lack of coherence. Schiff's 
model cannot take account for the variety of opinion within the citizenry and the 
political leadership, the diversity in opinion within these partners result in a lack of 
coherence, preventing concordance. As demonstrated in Indonesia, military 
factionalism and the diversity of opinion amongst the citizenry, and political 
leadership has precluded concordance. 
Accounting for change using Schiff's model is also problematic. The presence of  a 
concordant relationship is based upon the agreement amongst the three partners on the 
four indicators. If agreement is present a concordance will materialise, if agreement is 
not present concordance will not materialize, the model is static. Accordingly this 
cannot take account of more subtle changes that may take place over time. Change 
within the actors themselves can contribute to a change in the concord, thus by 
examining the actors it becomes possible to trace the evolution and account for 
change in a concord, in doing so the model become's dynamic.  
This type of dynamic change occurred amongst the middle class in the 1990's, a 
growing segment of the Indonesian citizenry which had  supported the New Order, 
however as their numbers grew, so did their demands upon the Suharto and the 
political leadership. The middle class had supported the New Order and Suharto for 
its economic policies which had seen their wealth grow and numbers grow. As the 
middle class grew there was corresponding demand for greater political and personal 
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freedom. In the case of Indonesia the political leadership did not respond to these 
demands by undertaking reform or allowing greater freedoms for this influential 
sector of the population. This change within the citizenry contributed to the end of the 
concordance in 1998. Middle class opposition to Suharto and the New Order grew, 
they participated in the protests in Jakarta that led to the toppling of the regime. This 
change in the citizenry demonstrates how dynamic change can occur through the 
change in the actors themselves. In particular the case of Indonesia has demonstrated 
the importance of economic change on the citizenry, and the ramifications that this 
had upon the political system and its political leadership, through an expansion of 
their demands for greater political participation. 
Change in  the Political leadership can also effect the concordance. In this study two 
distinct types of political leadership were identified utilising Webers model of 
legitimate domination.
651
 Sukarno's period of leadership was identified as belonging 
to the charismatic category. Suharto's form of leadership has been characterised as 
Legal domination. In relation to charismatic leadership Weber notes that the leaders 
are followed due to their "...non-routine qualities...", and that people will only follow 
these leaders to the extent to which they ascribe these qualities to them.
652
 In the case 
of Sukarno these non-routine qualities stemmed from his involvement in the 
independence movement. Weber also notes that the rule of charismatic leaders ends 
when the masses lose faith in their leadership potential. This loss of faith developed 
slowly as he moved gradually closer to the PKI, and ultimately he lost credibility 
following the attempted coup for which the PKI was blamed.  
Dynamic change in the actors whether in the military, the citizenry or the political 
leadership can ultimately undermine the existence of a concord, resulting in the 
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destruction of it. In Indonesia in 1998 change within two of the actors, the military 
and the citizenry resulted in the collapse of Suharto's enforced concordance. This 
change was also affected by two external factors, an economic crisis and a change in 
the security environment. 
It was identified at the beginning of this study that the onset of a sudden crisis outside 
of the control of a nation's political leader can have a significant impact upon a 
concord. The 1998 East Asian financial crisis was an example of this. This event led 
to massive devaluation of the Indonesian currency, capital flight and raised living 
costs dramatically for many of those most vulnerable to a rise in prices for staple 
goods. This put pressure upon the Indonesian government to take steps to improve the 
situation in the country. The authorities however where incapable of dealing with the 
crisis, and anger continued to grow. This resulted in protests and demonstrations 
calling not only for an improvement to the economy, but calls for a change in the 
government itself. 
Assessing exactly what constitutes a concordant relationship in the Indonesian case 
has also proved problematic. In the case of Indonesia, concordance was only 
established under the rule of Suharto and the New Order. The concordance that 
developed under Suharto has been termed enforced concordance because of the role 
that coercion and the use of violence played in his seizure of power and then in 
maintaining it. The New Order was established by a coherent military, citizenry and 
political leadership. In the case of the citizenry, mass killings of communist's removed 
opposition to the military within the citizenry. There was agreement on the indicators 
of concordance. It is difficult to accept the notion that a concordance can be created 
through the use of extreme violence, as Wells notes, "How is one to distinguish 
between the absence of intervention and the presence of agreement? The argument 
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seems to presume that agreement/concordance is somehow unrelated to forms of 
coercion/persuasion."
653
 Given this it would seem that the Schiff's framework must be 
modified so that concordance exists on a continuum, with concordance as defined by 
Schiff in the middle and enforced concordance such as Suharto's regime at the other. 
 
Figure 2 - Continuum of Concordance 
 
 
Contributions to theoretical work 
Schiff's theory is a relatively new piece of theory in the field of civil military 
relations, she claims her work is different to the prevailing separation theory because 
"...the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values 
or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society."
654
 This study has 
contributed to the existing theoretical work by testing Schiff's theory in the context of 
Indonesia. The case of the Indonesian army is one in which the notion of separation 
between the civil and the military spheres is not clearly defined. Accordingly 
Indonesia's armed forces make an ideal case study for Schiff's model precisely 
because there has not been a significant history of civil military separation. This study 
has made several specific contributions to Schiff's work. Firstly, the level of unity 
within each actor has been shown to be a significant factor, in establishing 
concordance, accounting for change and in understanding the demise of concordance. 
Secondly, the issue of Schiff's model as a static model has been challenged, it has 
been shown that there can be a number of causes to account for this dynamic change. 
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Finally, the issue of concordance has been reinterpreted and put on a scale. This work 
has emphasised the importance of a nation's unique culture and history in 
understanding civil military relations. It demonstrates the problems in taking 
theoretical models of civil military relations bound within a particular historical or 
cultural experience and applying them to nations such as Indonesia.  
The field of civil military relations would benefit from future research using Schiff's 
work, as well as future research on Indonesia. In particular the role that old soldiers 
now play in the democratic system of Indonesia. Schiff's work has presented 
something that challenges the established order; it would be beneficial to the field of 
civil military relations to see her theory tested elsewhere. In particular those nations 
which do not have civil military relationship are based upon separation but may 
include some level of integration. 
Contemporary Indonesia 
Indonesia today is a vastly different place to what it was in 1998. The military has 
seen its power curbed through a program of reform. It has lost its political and social 
role which was enshrined in Dwi Fungsi, this has resulted in a loss of seats in the 
legislature, business interests being bought under the control of the government. 
There are troubling aspects that still remain however, particularly human rights issues. 
This was highlighted in the case of the murder of four prisoners in Cebongan prison 
who had been accused of killing a Kopassus (Special Forces) member. Those 
responsible were found to be the murdered mans fellow soldiers. The Indonesian 
defence minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro stated that the attack did not amount to an 
abuse of human rights.
655
 The ongoing existence of the territorial command system. 
which was a key part of Suharto's system of control, is a further example of the 
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military's authoritarian past.
656
 The participation of old soldiers such as Prabowo 
Subianto, who is banned from travel to the United States, for his suspected 
involvement in human rights abuses, is also concerning.
657
 Indonesia's civil military 
relations under democracy are still in a state of change. 
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